I replied to this one, Neil, but it never went through. Yahoo seems to do that at times. Anyway, fortunately I saved part of my reply, reproduced below: --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote: > <snip> > Budd: > > . . . It targets your point that parallel processing offers > > us something more COMPUTATIONALLY than serial computing. > Neil: > Can you point out where Stuart said that parallel processing provides > something special, other than raw compute power. I seem to have missed > that. > SWM: In fairness to Budd, Neil, I do argue that something is added with parallel processing, but not that something is added "computationally" as he puts it. I think that capacity is required to achieve the requisite level of complexity in the system and that capacity involves running more processes doing more things at the same time in an interactive way. Thus I am saying that the capacity requirement is met by a parallel processing capability. Budd seems to take me as talking about the quality of the processes in question whereas what I am actually doing is talking about the quality of the system in question, a system that is constituted by such processes. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Budd: > > That is decidedly false and Searle's CR is equivalent to a UTM and > > ALL possible parallel processing DEFINED IN COMPUTATIONAL TERMS is > > also equivalent to what can be done serially with a UTM. > Neil: > If computational AI is possible (and I don't assume it is), then > Searle's CR is equivalent to a computer so highly powered that it could > maybe have one thought every 1000 years. It is grossly underpowered > for the job. And I'm pretty sure that is what Stuart was pointing out. > That the CR is so underpowered, makes it implausible as a source of > intelligence. And since Searle's argument is at beast only an attempt > to show AI is implausible, his underpowered equipment makes the > argument very misleading. > SWM: Yes, here I think we are clearly in agreement, Neil (as we probably are on the matter of parallel processing, too, once we parse the difference between Budd's way of stating the matter and mine). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Budd: > > No one is ever going to find that some process or other is > > intrinsically computational. > Neil: > This actually has no consequences, as far as I can tell. It's a side > issue. > SWM: Yes, I agree. This just looks like verbiage to me without any implications for the argument we are conducting on this matter. Heck, I don't even know what it means to speak of something as being "intrinsically computational". Intrinsicness is plainly a relative matter and depends on the context. What, after all, is intrinsic in any absolute sense? So one could say that computer programs running on computers are intrinsically that in one sense, being what they are, but really just so many physical events, in another sense, because to be "computational" would mean to be a particular kind of alogrithm and the algorithm is an abstraction, a kind of content carried by the physical events of the processes going on in the machine, etc. But so what? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Budd: > > The upshot of so saying is that it makes it difficult to distinguish > > the truly mental from nonmental. > > > > And this is the upshot of the systems reply as a reply to Searle's > > CRA. > Neil: > I am wondering whether you have ever read the Systems reply. It has no > such consequences, and it is actually the correct response to Searle's > bogus argument. > SWM: I also don't see the point. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > I'll add that I actually think Searle might be right about AI. However, > his CRA was a complete failure at showing that. > > Regards, > Neil > > ========================================= Yes, Searle could be right for empirical reasons but not for the reasons laid out in the CRA. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/