[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's paradigm shiftiness--Reply to Stuart
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2010 19:38:08 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
>
> <SWM>
>
>
> > New = Budd
> >
> > Hope it's not too confusing!
> >
> <snip>
>
> > All parallel processing can be implemented on a serial computer. There
> > simply is nothing more by way of computation that can be done in parallel
> > that can't be done serially.
> >
>
>
> This misses the point again.
No it doesn't. It targets your point that parallel processing offers us
something more COMPUTATIONALLY than serial computing. That is decidedly false
and Searle's CR is equivalent to a UTM and ALL possible parallel processing
DEFINED IN COMPUTATIONAL TERMS is also equivalent to what can be done serially
with a UTM.
Also, I am not missing your point when you make a different one. You
assimilate parallel processing in your lexicon to physical processes. The
claim is vacuous actually but you don't know it. To the extent it is about
computation it is vacuous. To the extent it is about physical processes,
Searle doesn't disagree with your change of topic.
No one is ever going to find that some process or other is intrinsically
computational.
And on the other hand, everything under the sun can be given a computational
description.
So one can say that the stomach does information processing.
The upshot of so saying is that it makes it difficult to distinguish the truly
mental from nonmental.
And this is the upshot of the systems reply as a reply to Searle's CRA.
If, on another hand (I'm going to be Jack Handy today!), one wanted to say of A
(AS IN a TYPE OF) systems reply that it amounted to merely the claim that
nonconscious physical processes cause consciousness, then one wouldn't be
saying anything contradicting Searle's biological naturalism.
Immediately below one can see what a mess Stuart creates by dipping back and
forth between comments on computation and comments on physical processes
simpliciter. Just look:
Stuart writes:
"The issue is that, if consciousness is a certain kind of process-based system,
then you need to have all the parts in place, even if they all consist of
different computational processes doing different things and it takes a
parallel platform to do this."
Notice the "even if" above. As already explained, everything can be given a
computational description. Therefore, while the "even if" looks like it's
doing some work above, we know independently that it is an idle phrase given
the vacuity of claiming that some physical process is intrinsically
computational.
The same waffling happens immediately after the above quote:
Stuart writes:
"That one can do each of the processes in a serial way, too, isn't the issue
because one can't do it all in the way that's required, i.e., by running a
sufficiently complex system with lots of things interacting simultaneously, in
parallel, using a serial platform. (PJ has argued that a really, really,
really, really, etc., fast system could do what a parallel system could do even
if we have no such system or the possibility of building one and I am agnostic
on that."
Stuart is agnostic because he really doesn't understand the following:
1. The CR is a UTM.
2. All parallel processing can be done on a UTM.
3. All parallel processing is different from serial processing only in name
(computationally) or not. If not, the only extra here is in noncomputational
terms.
So Stuart really has no beef with Searle's biological naturalism because in
Stuart's lexicon, parallel processing simply means the same thing as what the
brain does if the brain is described as a parallel processor.
Searle's point is that this claim is vacuous. Anything under the sun can be
given a computational description, and it doesn't matter (COMPUTATIONALLY
SPEAKING) that one thing is a serial processor and another a parallel processor.
Stuart is right, however, to see that parallel processing sounds like a better
candidate for mirroring what the brain does because such processing
____sounds____ a bit more realistic as a physical system than serial processing
happening with software running on hardware, what I abbreviate by S/H (SH for
short).
The same confusion simply happens over and over with Stuart, as one can see
with what he immediately says after the above quote:
Stuart writes:
"It may, indeed, be possible to achieve synthetic consciousness on a serial
processor running at super-duper speed. But so what? The issue is what does it
take to do it in the real world and, for that, parallel processors are a way
more realistic option.)"
Now, I'm coming to believe that Stuart simply is playing a game where he
doesn't care that he speaks as sloppily as he does. The options are that he
really is sloppy or that he doesn't care because the point is to see who can
correct him best. Notice that the way he phrases things, he allows for it to
be possible to create consciousness via serial computation. He distinguishes
the type of consciousness by saying "synthetic consciousness" by which he means
AI, which, don't ya know, Searle allows is a possibility without thinking that
SH is a coherent candidate.
Often, Stuart goes straight from Searle's denial that SH is a coherent
candidate for causing semantics or consciousness to the claim that Searle must
have some nonprocess-based conception of consciousness.
Now, notice that Stuart thinks parallel processing more realistic as a way of
thinking how the brain works.
That can only be because he likens parallel processing more to physics compared
to serial processing.
He shifts back and forth from serial processing to parallel processing because
he already knows that both are equal in computational terms while only one
looks more like what the brain may be doing.
But Searle's point is that one doesn't discover information processing in the
physics.
Similarly, Dennett uses the intentional stance to describe levels of
intentionality below the level at which we have it until the bottom level is
all about physical processes without intentionality at all.
He calls it recursaive decomposition.
Searle's naturalism is simply more brutal. It is a humunculus fallacy to
suppose levels of intentionality other than the conscious level--unless one is
so eliminative that they aren't even going to try for a theory of semantics,
effectively denyiong the second premise that minds have semantic contents. Let
Dennett deny this and get away with it. It is still bad philosphy no matter
how inspired by Wittgenstein.
Brains cause consciousness by way of physical processes which are not
computational processes. Let Hacker call this proposition nonsense. Who cares
what he thinks?
Notice how Stuart will continually invoke the notion of computation as a causal
notion when describing Dennett's position--as if Searle's position isn't about
nonconscious processes brutally causing consciousness. So Stuart is constantly
trying to see Searle's position as inconsistent with a "process-based" view of
consciousness and he does this simply by conflating computational processes
with physical ones. So, if one denies the first, one eo ipso denies the
second. This doesn't follow. Then Stuart invokes our ignorance. I'll cut to
the chase:
The options are two (main) species of functionalism:
1. Functionalism with an eliminative thrust (I.e., eliminative materialism) is
espoused by Dennett/Kim wherein we "dissolve" a la Wittgenstein/Hacker the
question of how the brain causes semantics/consciousness (this is a denial of
the second premise wherein it is stated that minds have semantic contents--but
many aren't that quick to notice.. And Dennett will waffle at will, sometimes
trying to say true things. The above is a form of conceptual dualism whereby
one is an eliminativist because one finds that the alternative is a nonphysical
theory of mind, even though they espouse the doctine only if they do in fact
have semantics and really mean it.. Jaegwon Kim points out that one needs some
form of eliminativism if we are not to have causal overdetermination infecting
our theory. Eliminativism is bewitched by conceptual dualism to the point
where it seems impossible to ask how the brain causes first person subjectivity.
2. Functionalism with an epiphenomenal thrust is espoused by Chalmers, who
claims that there really are minds but they have no causal properties. This is
in keeping with Kim's conceptual dualism even though he may not share Chalmers'
epiphenomenalism.. We have our minds in the real world, but they are
nonphysical and do no work for Chalmers, including helping him write a book on
consciousness. All theologians are thus served notice that they have been on
vacation and are entirely screwed up if they hadn't noticed the heaven that
they're already in (looooong story).
Searle merely claims that both are misguided.
Stuart continually argues that Searle's critique amounts to a form of dualism
while I claim that both species of functionalism noted above are mired by
conceptual dualism to begin with.
Immediately after the above quote, Stuart writes:
"> If the issue were that consciousness cannot be sufficiently accounted for by
describing syntactical processes at work, then introducing complexity of this
type wouldn't matter, of course. But as Dennett shows, we can account for the
features of mind by this kind of complexity, at least in a descriptive way (if
one is prepared to give up a preconceived notion of ontological basicness re:
consciousness)."
So the kind of complexity is computational. Searle just says that the thesis
is vacuous. And to the extent it is not vacuous but is about physics doing the
grunt work, it is in keeping with Searle. But Stuart wants to paint Searle a
different color. That is because he doesn't care that he is wrong to do so or
doesn't understand exactly what Searle's beef is. And he can't have it both
ways.
Stuart writes:
"Whether Dennett's model is adequate for accomplishing the synthesis of a
conscious entity in the real world remains an empirical question."
Excuse me while I primally scream. Okay. Much better! The empirical question
is how brains do it. Computationalism is vacuous as such. It is not vacuous
when one insists that by "computational complexity" they mean physical
complexity. Physical complexity, of one form or another, is the right picture
for both Searle and Dennett. Hacker's insistence on the meaninglessness of the
statement "The brain causes consciousness" is just a residue of the
epistemological criterion approach to everything wherein we follow granny's
advice to first define our terms before we dub ourselves competent enough to
perform meaningful speech acts. Fodor thought that we were beyond that now,
joking that it is probably a leg-pull that sometimes senses are created at
Oxford after the visitors leave.
Stuart continues:
"But the point is that there is nothing in principle preventing it, as long as
we can fully describe consciousness this way."
There is nothing in principle which prevents fully describing anything,
including ghosts. Some descriptions simply will invoke physical processes,
including those which cause consciousness. It's not that Searle is denying an
empirical possibility. It is a truism that some physical processes cause
consciousness, Hacker decidedly notwithstanding along with those who use
Wittgenstein as armor for being infected by the nonsense of science.. It is
simply vacuous to describe the physical processes as intrinsically
computational processes.
The upshot is that what you mean by computational complexity is simply physical
complexity. And what Searle means by computation is covered by both serial a
nd parallel processing.
If you insist on conflating computation with physics, then you can join Eray in
critiquing a philosopher he can only misinterpret.
I'll comment some more below.
Stuart writes:
"So everything hinges on whether Dennett's account of consciousness as a
certain agglomeration of features is credible.
Marsha, Marsha, Marsha! (I mean, Dennett, Dennett, ah, Parrot) The way you
spell things, there's no diff. between Dennett and Searle. The way you spell
things, there is. The reason for your contradiction is your conflation of
physics and computation on the one hand, along with your insistence that,
physically speaking, parallel processing seems more realistic as a theory of
how the brain causes consciousness than serial processing. Computationally
speaking, anything that can be computed in parallel can be computed in serial.
Earlier you said that this misses the point. So the alternative is for you to
think that there is a physical difference between the two. Well, nothing is
intrinsically a computation and that is why it doesn't matter for you also to
think that serial processing may also be viable.
You're just a mess. And maybe on purpose. I would like to think you know
better. But assume you are really all wet in your understanding of just what
functionalism may be and just what Searle's real drive is about, it's no big
deal because you are just a centimeter away from saying "Oh, I've been
posilutely goofy when it came to understanding Searle."
Stuart writes:
> To dispute Dennett you have to say his account doesn't fully describe all the
> features that must be present. Searle attempts this with his CRA but his
> attempt hinges on a conception of consciousness which requires it be
> irreducible (i.e., already assumes Dennett's model is mistaken at the outset)
> -- and yet even Searle doesn't stand by this with regard to brains, thereby
> putting him in self-contradiction.
I must assume you're all wet then, but just by that centimeter remember.
Notice that the CRA derives from the CR which derives from the target article.
In the target article in BBS he is showing that a serial computer (or any UTM
which can serially compute anything computable in parallel!!!!) will give false
positives and thus a computational theory of mind can't give necessary and
sufficient conditions.
Well, that's a long way from being in contradiction with a physicalist thesis!
But Stuart may just be pretending to be all wet. Or he's a centimeter away
from learning something. Again, it's no biggie.
Cheers,
Budd
Ps. I snipped but will reply that our discussion six years ago was not at the
Wisdom forum. It was at philosophy_and_science_of_language.
..
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