[lit-ideas] Re: "the space of reasons" from Morc Huck Pump
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2008 16:56:10 -0230
- We typically speak of "reasons for actions" and I think we understand what we
mean well enough, for most purposes. But there is something odd about the idea
that there are reasons for events. "Reasons for performing certain actions (or
acts)" seems less objectionable to me. Similarly, "reasons for deciding not to
go ahead with our plan" sems to be in good order. But in neither case is an
unmediated relationship between a reason and an event implied. The mediating
factor is always a "decision to". Or as Kant renders it, a "maxim" on which we
are willing to act.
- Novels do have arguments in them, but they don't *present* arguments. Certain
events depicted in a story, certain characters described, may express features
to which we assign epistemic warrant, and we then draw conclusions on the
grounds of such assignment. But novelists are tricky; in the absence of an
explicit presentation of an argument, we cannot but remain uncertain where the
author actually stands on the issues, events, descriptions being offered.
Often, we say "Dickens MUST have believed x,y, and z." And perhaps we have good
grounds for the claim. (And almost always these grounds are mixed up with our
own views of what we today, or within our own tribe, think an author *should
have believed* or *should believe*.) But in the absence of a presentation of an
argument in formal terms, our claim is really
only an attribution. We need to present arguments for and against the soundness
of our attributions in justifying that such and such an "argument" is presented
by the author. I think writers often prefer it that way. But I stray into
matters literary .....
A call from the wife: "Dinner's ready!" Hmmmm ....
Walter
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> John McCreery wrote that I wrote
>
>
> > What I want to suggest is that all of these mental shenanigans occur
> > after the deed is done, and that most practical reasoning, while
> > perfectly agreeable when spelled out on the chalk board, is unfelt,
> > unseen, and untasted before one acts. The addition of 'Therefore, I
> (or
> > we) will do such-and-such,' is seldom present prior to action, and if
> it
> > is it goes by so fast one seldom notices it.
>
> > This pragmatist finds himself in sympathy with Walter's objection that
> > "a reason on its own can never provide an argument." His example and his
> > words suggest to me that an argument requires the articulate use of
> > language to identify and bring into shared awareness at least one
> > connection between a reason and the action it purports to justify or the
> > effect it purports to explain.
>
> Let me say that logicians hold no copyright on the word 'reason' or the
> word 'argument.' Not everything that's an argument is set down in echt
> form with numbered premises. When I read certain novels, I not only
> learn from them but can understand them as arguments for or against
> certain ways of living, of acting, and of regarding others. Only the
> most tedious critic would ask that whatever it is in (or about) the
> novel that moved me be set down in the form favored by Irving Copi, let
> alone W. V. Quine. Sometimes a picture can be a powerful argument; this
> is by no means a figurative use of language.
>
> John mentions Walter's example, yet the only example in our exchange so
> far was mine, so perhaps this should read something like '?his objection
> to RP's example, and his words?' but I don't have permission yet to
> speak for Walter?something about Canadian customs.
>
> I don't believe that Walter rejects saying that there are reasons for
> actions. It was this that I was trying to talk about: reasons for
> action, and an allegedly special sort of reasoning called practical
> reasoning, which even Kant seems to recognize. Practical reasoning is
> the shadowy underpinning of folk psychology?the psychology of beliefs
> and desires. Its usual form is 'A wants x, y is a means to x, so A
> should do y.' Thus, it is usually seen as preceding action. My claim is
> that this is often a fiction. It is clearly a fiction when one must act
> rationally but quickly, as I've tried to suggest, although, not only are
> many rapidly-done actions reasonable, they can easily be seen as
> rational after the fact (in more than the Freudian sense of providing a
> rationalization).
>
> Thus, when John says
>
> >...while I agree with Robert Paul that
> > most practical reasoning does, indeed, take place after the fact, the
> > act itself being unconsidered before it happens, it is precisely that
> > lack of consideration that indicates the lack of argument.
>
> I must disagree. Acts that are rationally explicable insofar as they are
> done for reasons (which are the agent's reasons) are not unconsidered,
> as I understand that word. An unconsidered act might be a thoughtless
> act, an unthinking act, even a careless act; these though have a
> pejorative ring, and I shouldn't think that just because practical
> reasoning often comes after the fact (I don't have in mind Wellington's
> drawing up his plans before Waterloo) it is on all fours with
> involuntary jerks and twitches or with carelessness.
>
> > One might go further and observe that philosophical argument (as
> > opposed, for example, to bar room brawls) requires a modicum of
> > agreement on what the language used means and what its use implies. In
> > the absence of such agreement, one says A, the other says B, and,
> > however elaborate the construction of either A or B, no true argument
> > occurs. As Terry Eagleton wryly remarks about political debate, if we
> > are discussing Patriarchy, by which you mean a system of social
> > domination in which men are superior to women and I mean a small town in
> > upstate New York, no debate [a.k.a. argument] is occurring.
>
> Well, I think so far we've been pretty much agreed in the language we're
> using. That people do mistake the meanings of ambiguous words in the
> course of a conversation is true but not at issue here?? More than that,
> though, Walter and Phil and Eric Dean and I don't seem to be talking
> about discussions or 'arguments' which have the form of dialogues. This
> makes a difference, I believe, in how one thinks of reasons for action
> vs. reasons which support or entail other statements only.
>
> I'll try to think about this some more.
>
> Robert Paul
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