[lit-ideas] Re: "the space of reasons" from Morc Huck Pump
- From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2008 19:08:08 -0700
John McCreery wrote that I wrote
What I want to suggest is that all of these mental shenanigans occur
after the deed is done, and that most practical reasoning, while
perfectly agreeable when spelled out on the chalk board, is unfelt,
unseen, and untasted before one acts. The addition of 'Therefore, I (or
we) will do such-and-such,' is seldom present prior to action, and if it
is it goes by so fast one seldom notices it.
This pragmatist finds himself in sympathy with Walter's objection that
"a reason on its own can never provide an argument." His example and his
words suggest to me that an argument requires the articulate use of
language to identify and bring into shared awareness at least one
connection between a reason and the action it purports to justify or the
effect it purports to explain.
Let me say that logicians hold no copyright on the word 'reason' or the
word 'argument.' Not everything that's an argument is set down in echt
form with numbered premises. When I read certain novels, I not only
learn from them but can understand them as arguments for or against
certain ways of living, of acting, and of regarding others. Only the
most tedious critic would ask that whatever it is in (or about) the
novel that moved me be set down in the form favored by Irving Copi, let
alone W. V. Quine. Sometimes a picture can be a powerful argument; this
is by no means a figurative use of language.
John mentions Walter's example, yet the only example in our exchange so
far was mine, so perhaps this should read something like '…his objection
to RP's example, and his words…' but I don't have permission yet to
speak for Walter—something about Canadian customs.
I don't believe that Walter rejects saying that there are reasons for
actions. It was this that I was trying to talk about: reasons for
action, and an allegedly special sort of reasoning called practical
reasoning, which even Kant seems to recognize. Practical reasoning is
the shadowy underpinning of folk psychology—the psychology of beliefs
and desires. Its usual form is 'A wants x, y is a means to x, so A
should do y.' Thus, it is usually seen as preceding action. My claim is
that this is often a fiction. It is clearly a fiction when one must act
rationally but quickly, as I've tried to suggest, although, not only are
many rapidly-done actions reasonable, they can easily be seen as
rational after the fact (in more than the Freudian sense of providing a
rationalization).
Thus, when John says
...while I agree with Robert Paul that
most practical reasoning does, indeed, take place after the fact, the
act itself being unconsidered before it happens, it is precisely that
lack of consideration that indicates the lack of argument.
I must disagree. Acts that are rationally explicable insofar as they are
done for reasons (which are the agent's reasons) are not unconsidered,
as I understand that word. An unconsidered act might be a thoughtless
act, an unthinking act, even a careless act; these though have a
pejorative ring, and I shouldn't think that just because practical
reasoning often comes after the fact (I don't have in mind Wellington's
drawing up his plans before Waterloo) it is on all fours with
involuntary jerks and twitches or with carelessness.
One might go further and observe that philosophical argument (as
opposed, for example, to bar room brawls) requires a modicum of
agreement on what the language used means and what its use implies. In
the absence of such agreement, one says A, the other says B, and,
however elaborate the construction of either A or B, no true argument
occurs. As Terry Eagleton wryly remarks about political debate, if we
are discussing Patriarchy, by which you mean a system of social
domination in which men are superior to women and I mean a small town in
upstate New York, no debate [a.k.a. argument] is occurring.
Well, I think so far we've been pretty much agreed in the language we're
using. That people do mistake the meanings of ambiguous words in the
course of a conversation is true but not at issue here—? More than that,
though, Walter and Phil and Eric Dean and I don't seem to be talking
about discussions or 'arguments' which have the form of dialogues. This
makes a difference, I believe, in how one thinks of reasons for action
vs. reasons which support or entail other statements only.
I'll try to think about this some more.
Robert Paul
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