[lit-ideas] Re: Why Philosophy. (Was: On Nip Thievery)
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:08:17 -0230
A very fine posting, Robert. I like returning to it every once in awhile. I'll
reply eventually. Cheers, Walter
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> Walter asks
>
> > What is the role of philosophy in these postmodern, internetized,
> globalized,
> > multicultural, post 9/11 days? Why do we continue to teach this discipline?
> Is
> > it for its relevance to contemporary problems and issues, or is there a
> > timeless, intrinsic worth to philosophy independent of any promotion of
> > interests and consequences for states-of-affairs in the world? (Note how
> your
> > answer to this question influences how you go about teaching philosophy.)
>
> If Walter's question is understood in a certain way, philosophy has
> (would have) no role at all, for postmodernism, the view that everything
> is something else, is antithetical to serious philosophy, and to ask how
> philosophy should proceed post-9/11, or under the hegemony of the
> internet is to ask?it seems to me, although it might not to Walter?that
> philosophy should somehow accommodate itself to certain historical
> periods and states of affairs, for if it failed to do so it would risk
> being dismissed in that familiar '70s way as 'irrelevant.' (Those who
> derided people, practices, ways of thinking, areas of study as
> irrelevant seldom stopped to what the objects of their scorn or pity
> were irrelevant to: they were just irrelevant.
>
> So, I've tipped my hand when it comes to whether and how philosophy
> might be 'relevant' to contemporary problems and issues (and perhaps to
> their disentanglement and solution). If it is, it is only fortuitously
> so. Philosophers are alleged to be good at analyzing problems and
> thinking clearly about them; but philosophers can no more think clearly
> about Dunham-Bush Big-4 (Direct Drive) Compressors, or about the effects
> of El Nino on the rain in Coos Bay, than can any ordinary person. (Most
> philosophers, of course, are quite ordinary persons.)
>
> Enough beating around the bush. Walter asks if 'there's a timeless,
> intrinsic worth to philosophy independent of any promotion of interests
> and consequences for states-of-affairs in the world...' Yes, there is,
> there surely is. But mustn't this be argued for? Doesn't philosophy have
> to prove itself? Doesn't it somehow owe the doubters who wouldn't for a
> moment think about trying it out themselves, a justification for its own
> existence? Someone to whom the very idea of something's having intrinsic
> worth is absolutely mysterious will not be helped by being told that
> this is something philosophy has. So be it. 'I won't even consider it
> until you can demonstrate its benefit to me.' Then philosophy is not for
> you; I'm not here to proselytize.
>
> > All of us who work in the discipline have made significant sacrifices in
> order
> > to contribute to the philosophical literature and/or to help others
> develop
> > philosophical skills and dispositions - sacrifices similar to, if not
> identical
> > with, sharing living quarters with lizards. We all, surely, have our
> "lizard"
> > stories. But what is it that motivates you to pursue and promote this
> > discipline? ("Discipline" here not simply as a distinct scholarly form of
> > inquiry and analysis but also in the Greek sense of a way of life, an
> acquired
> > and educated attunement to the world, others, and oneself.)
>
> What is it that motivates you to pursue and promote this discipline?
> Walter asks. My own answers are modest: I enjoy the 'distinct form of
> inquiry and analysis,' and I believe deeply that someone who takes
> philosophy seriously, even without committing his or her life to it,
> will be drawn to think, however briefly, however confusedly, about a way
> of life, in that old Greek sense; about how one should live. Fine words.
>
> Philosophy does not flourish on lit-ideas, as it once did on Phil-Lit.
> Try having a philosophical discussion (a discussion about some
> philosophical problem), and before long, someone will intercede with the
> discussion breaker that Aristotle was full of beans and has nothing to
> say to the 'modern' mind; or that Aristotle thought (as did Frege,
> later, with a vengeance) that it was possible for certain concepts to
> have sharp boundaries, and that recent sociology (or Wittgenstein, or
> Eleanor Rosch) have all shown how silly this is.
>
> Any attempt (this has been my experience) to examine an issue carefully
> and in detail is soon met with hoots and jeers, barrages of overripe
> tomatoes, and charges of super-hyper-masturbatory-latte-drinking
> intellectualism. So, I scarcely bother any longer?for my own peace of
> mind I scarcely bother. Once, for example, it was possible to discuss
> specific passages from the Tractatus, with law professors at
> Northwestern, Eric Dean, and others; Hume (and sometimes Popper) with
> Donal; Kant with Walter and Phil; contemporary British philosophy with
> JL (and so on, I want to say, in order to disguise my failing memory).
> As far as I can see we have lost the ability and the collegial
> politeness to tolerate such discussions.
>
> Thus we have the curious situation in which philosophy is asked to prove
> that it's gainfully employed, and the ongoing ridicule of it, which
> ridicule, if warranted, would make the original question unnecessary.
>
> Robert Paul
> The Reed Institute
>
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