The Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies
section offers this possible reaction to Iran's
nuke craving. Certainly something to be considered
before bringing the hammer down on them.
Dismissing as ridiculous those who argue that a
nuclear-armed Iran can be contained, and
dismissing as very costly the scenario of
large-scale intelligence-driven bombing, the
authors offer a third choice.
[extract of "We Should Strike Iran, but Not With
Bombs"]
Given these bad options, what should the United
States and Europe do instead? The answer is that
they should do what they said they would do—make
Iran pay a real price if it refuses to suspend its
uranium enrichment activities again. This means
first making a concerted effort to win Russian and
Chinese support for tough action at the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N.
Security Council next month. Ideally, the Security
Council should not only denounce Iran's actions
but agree on an oil embargo and a ban on
investment in Iran.
The credibility of sanctions would be enhanced if
it were clear that negotiations could resume—and
punitive actions be suspended—as soon as Tehran
terminates the enrichment activities it recently
resumed. The offer to support a civilian nuclear
energy program, increase trade and investment—and
even engage in regional security talks and restore
diplomatic relations with the United States—would
also remain on the table.
But if Tehran refuses to back down, it must pay a
price. And while Russia and China may not go
along, Europe, Japan and the United States should
not hide behind their refusal. The argument that
sanctions won't work without China, Russia and
India on board is overstated. Only Western
companies at present possess the sort of expertise
and technology that Iran's energy sector needs,
and in an integrated world oil market, whatever
oil China and India purchase from Iran liberates
supplies elsewhere. Iran could, of course,
retaliate by pulling its oil off the world market,
which would cause a price spike. But if Americans
and Europeans are unwilling to run the risk of a
temporary rise in oil prices as part of what it
takes to prevent an Iranian bomb, then they had
better be prepared to live with the consequences
as well.
The Iranian government believes, as Ahmadinejad
put it recently, that "you [the West] need us more
than we need you." Do we really want to encourage
him in this belief?
There is no guarantee that making the threat of
sanctions more credible or actually imposing them
will have an immediate and positive effect, but
given the alternatives it certainly makes sense to
find out. And even if sanctions don't work in the
short term, they would still be useful to give
future Iranian leaders an incentive to cooperate
and to send a message to other potential
proliferators. At the very least, serious
sanctions would slow the nuclear program by
squeezing the Iranian economy and cutting off key
technologies, would further strain the already
disgruntled middle classes who might one day push
the current regime aside, and would serve as
leverage in the future if Iran ever does decide to
engage the West.
Iran must be presented with a clear choice: It can
become an impoverished, isolated pariah state with
nuclear weapons—like North Korea—or it can begin
to reintegrate with the international community,
meet the needs of its people and preserve its
security in exchange for forgoing this capability.
The choice will be for the Iranians to make. But
we must force them to make it.
http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/iran_20060122.htm
------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
