Do we really want a North Korea in the Middle East? No one decent wants a North Korea anywhere. ----- Original Message ----- From: Lawrence Helm To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Friday, February 03, 2006 8:31 AM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: What to do about Iran: the Brookings Strategy I'm skeptical of the Brookings strategy. I note that North Korea is advanced as an example of the effectiveness of the isolation Iran could expect if they didn't submit. Do we really want a North Korea in the Middle East? Also, I think the bombing of WMD sites accompanied by Special Forces on the ground if necessary, will be a cost-effective solution. They haven't offered evidence that it is more expensive than their approach. We would still need troops and planes to make sure Iran didn't use its porous borders to break the containment/isolation/sanctions. Also they scoff at "containment," but their approach is just a "more effective" containment than we had in Iraq, that is they hope it will be. Also, how can we expect our friendly enemies France, China, and Russia (necessary to the Brookings strategy) to support us in Iran when they didn't in Iraq? They can't say nukes are the difference because everyone believed Saddam had Nukes or was very close to having them, but that didn't stop the necessary three from opposing the U.S. But if we can't get China, and Russia to go along, Brookings says not to worry, we can really hurt them by going it alone - with a containment/isolation/sanctions of the willing. They think Europe (including France) would be united behind us in this. Who are these guys? Also, do we really want to give the Islamists another propaganda victory by causing Iranian children to die as Iraqi children died during an extended isolation? And the isolation of Iraq wasn't as effective as the isolation Brookings proposes for Iran - hence more dead children. Lawrence -----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Eric Yost Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 11:02 PM To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] What to do about Iran: the Brookings Strategy The Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies section offers this possible reaction to Iran's nuke craving. Certainly something to be considered before bringing the hammer down on them. Dismissing as ridiculous those who argue that a nuclear-armed Iran can be contained, and dismissing as very costly the scenario of large-scale intelligence-driven bombing, the authors offer a third choice. [extract of "We Should Strike Iran, but Not With Bombs"] Given these bad options, what should the United States and Europe do instead? The answer is that they should do what they said they would do-make Iran pay a real price if it refuses to suspend its uranium enrichment activities again. This means first making a concerted effort to win Russian and Chinese support for tough action at the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Security Council next month. Ideally, the Security Council should not only denounce Iran's actions but agree on an oil embargo and a ban on investment in Iran. The credibility of sanctions would be enhanced if it were clear that negotiations could resume-and punitive actions be suspended-as soon as Tehran terminates the enrichment activities it recently resumed. The offer to support a civilian nuclear energy program, increase trade and investment-and even engage in regional security talks and restore diplomatic relations with the United States-would also remain on the table. But if Tehran refuses to back down, it must pay a price. And while Russia and China may not go along, Europe, Japan and the United States should not hide behind their refusal. The argument that sanctions won't work without China, Russia and India on board is overstated. Only Western companies at present possess the sort of expertise and technology that Iran's energy sector needs, and in an integrated world oil market, whatever oil China and India purchase from Iran liberates supplies elsewhere. Iran could, of course, retaliate by pulling its oil off the world market, which would cause a price spike. But if Americans and Europeans are unwilling to run the risk of a temporary rise in oil prices as part of what it takes to prevent an Iranian bomb, then they had better be prepared to live with the consequences as well. The Iranian government believes, as Ahmadinejad put it recently, that "you [the West] need us more than we need you." Do we really want to encourage him in this belief? There is no guarantee that making the threat of sanctions more credible or actually imposing them will have an immediate and positive effect, but given the alternatives it certainly makes sense to find out. And even if sanctions don't work in the short term, they would still be useful to give future Iranian leaders an incentive to cooperate and to send a message to other potential proliferators. At the very least, serious sanctions would slow the nuclear program by squeezing the Iranian economy and cutting off key technologies, would further strain the already disgruntled middle classes who might one day push the current regime aside, and would serve as leverage in the future if Iran ever does decide to engage the West. Iran must be presented with a clear choice: It can become an impoverished, isolated pariah state with nuclear weapons-like North Korea-or it can begin to reintegrate with the international community, meet the needs of its people and preserve its security in exchange for forgoing this capability. The choice will be for the Iranians to make. But we must force them to make it. http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/iran_20060122.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 267.15.0/248 - Release Date: 01/02/2006