I actually have to get some work done today, so after this I'll have to step away for awhile. But... > Well, no. It is my impression that maxims _are_ hypothetical imperatives Well, no? Are you sure? I really thought there were 1) Maxims 2) Hypothetical imperatives 3) Categorical imperatives Maxims, I thought, were practical precepts that assume purposes or particular ends. Imperatives, I thought were practical laws and that practical laws do _not_ assume purposes or particular ends, that they are followed out of adherence to the law in and of itself. I thought that this is how maxims and imperatives differ. Kant says it himself in the Remark on Definition I (at 5:20 in my books) - "Thus maxims are indeed principles but _not imperatives_". The difference I thought then between maxims and hypothetical imperatives was this: A maxim is merely a subjective desire dependent on sensibility - it can be either physical or intellectual (I want pizza or I want truth). A hypothetical imperative is _not_ a maxim insofar as it is not just a particular desire. Yes, it is a desire, and it is subjective, but, unlike in a maxim, there is a subjectively conditioned _necessity_ (you, as a general rule, should work in your youth so as not to want in old age), albeit a necessity that cannot be "presupposed in the same degree in all subjects" (5:21). Erin Toronto ----- Original Message ----- From: <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Tuesday, September 28, 2004 10:35 AM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The Immanuel > > > And maxim-following. > > -- We are discussing Kant's idea that there is a set of maxims one may or > may not follow. Erin's mother, and Grice, referred to this as a 'manual' -- the > "Immanuel". > > In a message dated 9/28/2004 10:29:25 AM Eastern Standard Time, > erin.holder@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: > I was under the impression that one isn't supposed to follow one's maxims. > One is supposed to follow practical laws, that is, only those maxims that > are universalizable. I thought maxims, strictly speaking, were mere > practical principles and that practical principles are subjective, "when the > condition is regarded by the subject as holding only for his will" (Book I, > I. Definition) > > "Within a pathologically affected will** of a rational being there can be > found a conflict of maxims with the practical laws cognized by himself. For > example, someone can make it his maxim to let no insult pass unavenged and > yet at the same time see that this is no practical law but only his maxim - > that, on the contrary, as being in one and the same maxim a rule for the > will of every rational being it could not harmonize with itself" (Chapter I, > remark) > > ** pathologically - dependent upon sensibility. > > There are categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives, but maxims > aren't even imperatives, I thought? > > > ----- > > Well, no. It is my impression that maxims _are_ hypothetical imperatives, > with a constant protasis -- having to do with 'prudence'. That's why he also > refers to them as 'counsels of prudence', as opposed to 'technical imperatives' > proper, which don't have this restriction. > > In the end, it is a maxim which gets universalizable, and morally the right > thing to follow -- so I don't think there is such a contrast, in Kant, between > the maxim-following behaviour and the ethically approved behaviour. > > Note that if these things were of such _minimal_ importance to Kant, he > wouldn't call the _MAXims_. > > Cheers, > > JL > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html