[lit-ideas] Re: Professor Popper's Paradox
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2004 10:41:33 +0100 (BST)
--- Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx wrote:
>
>
> We are considering Popper's demarcation between 'science' and
> 'non-science'.
> This was brought up by Donal McEvoy in response to Geary's suggestion that
>
> "Philosophy is no Daddy Feelgood", or words to that effect (that went over
>
> Chase's head -- an esoteric reference to The Negro Problem).
>
> The issues are different. One is if a metaphilosophical query is itself
> philosophical. Another issue is Popper's.
They are linked surely, because the question is whether the use of meta- in
metaphilosophical is somewhat bogus since the metaphilosophical question
might just as well be termed philosophical. Is this a yet another example of
the tendency of some academics to introduce needless complication when there
is nor real point to it?
> Popper was then concerned with the demarcation of 'science' (which he
> adored) and everything else (which we may call 'non-science').
AND much of which 'non-science' he adored.
>Now, the > demarcation
> needs a _criterion_.
Yes, but anyone who understands Popper's views will see that the word
'criterion' should not be taken too seriously eg. we should not think for
instance that there is anything like an 'algorithm' for producing scientific
theories, or that the demarcation will be hard-and-fast as we might expect a
rigorous 'criterion' to be. (But then Popper was opposed to 'criterion'
philosophies like the positivist dogma that the meaning of a statement is the
method of its verification).
>Popper argued that this _criterion_ is 'metaphysical'
>
> or 'philosophical'.
Yes: because it is not a criterion that is testable by observation - it is
rather a proposal based on evaluation as to what proposed 'science' is most
valuable: ie. is science valuable for producing tautolgies ['All swans are
white'] or isolated but striking observation statements ['Look there's a swan
with JLS on it, and look there's a bus with Mike Geary on it'? Or is it
rather more to be valued for producing theories of great generality and
explanatory power ['E=mc2'] that may nevertheless be tested, often
ingeniously, by some observation?
> I submit that this is paradoxical, and springs from two problems Popper
> had:
>
> (1) with 'normativity'. As McEvoy notes:
>
> >The actual situation is not as plain as that, so he would not say it. I
> refer
> >you back to my previous post where I mentioned some of things he would
> say
> >about there being a normative element in stipulations as to what counts
> as
> >philosophy or what counts as science etc ie. he denies such stipulations
> are
> >straightforward descriptions of given 'facts'.
>
>
>
> (2) with 'conceptual analysis', since, as McEvoy also notes, Popper would
> rather be seen dead than seen as providing a 'conceptual' analysis of what
>
> 'science' is.
Unfortunately JL is not specific enough as to what exactly the problems are
and how they give rise to a paradox.
>
>
> In this, Popper was very different from, say, Grice.
>
> For Grice, you start with a conceptual problem. Grice's problems were with
>
> ordinary English (Anglo-Saxon) words, hardly "science". He wrote:
>
> "The [concepts] with which (as a philosopher) I am _normally_ concerned are
>
> pretty commonly used ones." (WOW, p. 175). He adds that there is an element
> of
> subjectivity in conceptual analysis I'm not sure Popper would be happy
> with:
>
> "Even if my assumption that was goes for me goes for others is mistaken, it
>
> does not matter; my philosophical puzzles have arisen in connection with
> _my_
> use of [some expression, e.g. 'science', arguendo], and my conceptual
> analysis will be of value to me (and to any others who may find that their
> use of
> [the expression -- e.g. 'science'] coincides with mine." (WOW, p. 175).
>
> Popper felt the situation was paradoxical.
>
> Science was defined in terms of 'testability' and then the _criterion_ by
> which one would _demarcate_ between 'science' and 'non-science' turned out
> _not_
> to be 'testable' or 'falsifiable'.
But he did not think this paradoxical anymore than it is 'paradoxical' that I
can refer to the colour 'green' in words that are not themselves coloured
green. I can refer to what makes a statement scientific by way of a theory
that is not itself scientific. I can refer to what makes an animal an
'offspring' of other animals by way of a theory that is not itself the
offspring of any two animals. Where is the paradox in any of this? It may all
be 'paradoxical' in the loose sense of striking, but how is it paradoxical as
in _problematic_?
>It was, for Popper, a sad acceptance
> that
> Philosophy and Metaphysics _did_ play a role in the Grand Discipline he
> professed, "Scientific Method".
There was no sad acceptance. Popper, unlike some logical positivists, never
thought science should be a self-contained or self-perpetuating system
isolated from metaphysics - and he stressed the importance of metaphysics for
science.
> It is true that Popper himself was, as McEvoy notes, a "philosopher".
> Indeed, a "living philosopher" in the words of Schlipp. And then he died.
Is this another of JL's profound paradoxes? If so, I remain at a loss.
Donal
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