[lit-ideas] Professor Popper's Paradox
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2004 13:18:28 EDT
We are considering Popper's demarcation between 'science' and 'non-science'.
This was brought up by Donal McEvoy in response to Geary's suggestion that
"Philosophy is no Daddy Feelgood", or words to that effect (that went over
Chase's head -- an esoteric reference to The Negro Problem).
The issues are different. One is if a metaphilosophical query is itself
philosophical. Another issue is Popper's.
Popper was then concerned with the demarcation of 'science' (which he
adored) and everything else (which we may call 'non-science'). Now, the
demarcation
needs a _criterion_. Popper argued that this _criterion_ is 'metaphysical'
or 'philosophical'.
I submit that this is paradoxical, and springs from two problems Popper had:
(1) with 'normativity'. As McEvoy notes:
>The actual situation is not as plain as that, so he would not say it. I
refer
>you back to my previous post where I mentioned some of things he would say
>about there being a normative element in stipulations as to what counts as
>philosophy or what counts as science etc ie. he denies such stipulations are
>straightforward descriptions of given 'facts'.
(2) with 'conceptual analysis', since, as McEvoy also notes, Popper would
rather be seen dead than seen as providing a 'conceptual' analysis of what
'science' is.
----
In this, Popper was very different from, say, Grice.
For Grice, you start with a conceptual problem. Grice's problems were with
ordinary English (Anglo-Saxon) words, hardly "science". He wrote:
"The [concepts] with which (as a philosopher) I am _normally_ concerned are
pretty commonly used ones." (WOW, p. 175). He adds that there is an element of
subjectivity in conceptual analysis I'm not sure Popper would be happy with:
"Even if my assumption that was goes for me goes for others is mistaken, it
does not matter; my philosophical puzzles have arisen in connection with _my_
use of [some expression, e.g. 'science', arguendo], and my conceptual
analysis will be of value to me (and to any others who may find that their use
of
[the expression -- e.g. 'science'] coincides with mine." (WOW, p. 175).
Popper felt the situation was paradoxical.
Science was defined in terms of 'testability' and then the _criterion_ by
which one would _demarcate_ between 'science' and 'non-science' turned out
_not_
to be 'testable' or 'falsifiable'. It was, for Popper, a sad acceptance that
Philosophy and Metaphysics _did_ play a role in the Grand Discipline he
professed, "Scientific Method".
It is true that Popper himself was, as McEvoy notes, a "philosopher".
Indeed, a "living philosopher" in the words of Schlipp. And then he died.
Cheers,
JL
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