[lit-ideas] New from the Bright Side
- From: Eric <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2007 16:22:11 -0500
*anti-gloom in a critique of the NYT*
Al Qaeda is Back?
Let's go to the videotape.
By James S. Robbins
Periodically I give a seminar as part of a government course for
counterterrorism analysts. The general topic for that segment is
assessing the War on Terrorism, and I am billed as “The Optimist.” The
organizers tell me they like to bring me in because I am provocative.
That has always surprised me, because I never thought telling people
they are doing a good job keeping the enemy at bay was particularly
controversial. But you’d be surprised, as I am time and again, at the
level of skepticism I run into. It is the same point of view reflected
in the piece in Monday’s New York Times, based on intelligence-community
sources, that says Al Qaeda is reconstituting. Their command and control
is robust. They are running training camps. They are on the way back.
Seems like five years into the war and we have nothing to show for it.
One frequently hears similar views in the debate over the war. So long
as Osama bin Laden is alive, he is winning. The sanctuaries in North
Waziristan are an Afghanistan redux. The Taliban are resurgent and on
the verge of victory. The U.S. is bogged down, its resources stretched
thin. They suckered us into the region, and now everything is going
according to al Qaeda’s plan.
Part of the problem is that we attribute preternatural qualities to the
terrorists while establishing standards for our own success that are
unattainable. For example, the notion that anything at all is going
according to al Qaeda’s plan is nonsense. Bin Laden laid out the
strategic goals of the organization in his 1996 Declaration of War. What
would winning look like in their framework? Osama bin Laden the most
popular leader in the Muslim world, revered by all, leading an
increasingly united nation of true believers. Attacks on U.S. and
Coalition military installations and warships throughout the region,
sometimes resulting in major losses, leading to a comprehensive retreat
from the Middle East. Regimes in the region suffering internal revolts,
riots, a breakdown of the internal security apparatus, mutinies among
their troops, assassinations of key leaders, and eventually armies of
mujahedeen seizing control of the capitals and pledging allegiance to
bin Laden’s growing empire. A united Palestinian movement, religious in
orientation and loyal to the al Qaeda program, waging a war to the death
on an increasingly beleaguered and strategically isolated Israel.
Incessant, occasionally dramatic attacks in the West and especially in
the United States, showing the puissance of the movement and its ability
to inflict damage on the U.S. at times and places of their choosing.
Is this the war we are fighting? Not even close. The U.S. is more
involved in the region than ever before. No regimes in the region have
been overthrown by al Qaeda or its minions, or are even close to being
taken over. Israel is not about to be destroyed. And al Qaeda is finding
that exporting the revolution is not as easy as they expected. They have
lost their primary state sponsor, lost the initiative, lost their
ability to make attacks of strategic significance, and their leaders are
hunkered down in safe houses afraid to be seen in public and wondering
day by day who around them might betray them. So by their own standards,
what have they achieved?
Take the simplest metric, the ability of the enemy to attack the United
States. We are told that al Qaeda presents an “existential threat” to
America, and certainly the enemy talks a great deal about destroying us,
but at some point they have to demonstrate their capacity to inflict
harm. 9/11 was impressive, but what has the enemy done lately? Doesn’t
that fact that they have not been able to wreak havoc or even
inconvenience since then prove the effectiveness of our measures against
them? Ah, the critique goes, they are biding their time. They are
long-term strategic thinkers. They are dedicated to a generations-long
struggle that will not be resolved in their lifetimes. And so forth. But
anyone who doesn’t think that when bin Laden talks about the caliphate
he isn’t imagining himself as the revered caliph doesn’t understand the
psychology of the charismatic mass movement leader. The terrorists
aren’t biding their time before attacking the U.S., they want to attack
us right now. They are doing the very best they can do; it just isn’t
very effective.
As for attacks abroad, the enemy can commit them, from time to time. But
do they add up to anything? Most have the same strategic impact as 9/11
— creating implacable enemies. These terror attacks do not destabilize
societies, do not create cowed populations in fear of the next act of
violence, do not send crowds into the streets chanting pro-al Qaeda
slogans. Rather they demonstrate to the people in the target countries
that they are not safe from the enemies of civilization, and they had
better take strong action to defend themselves. This is true even in
Spain, which is cited as an example of a terrorist success because of
the proximity of the 2004 Madrid bombings to the defeat of the pro-U.S.
government in elections days later. The Spanish government has been
resolute in tracking down al Qaeda members inside the country, and has
cooperated in international efforts against terror networks. So apart
from killing people, how have enemy actions abroad benefited them?
Since 9/11 the Coalition has done a great deal of damage to the global
terrorist network, its funding operations, personnel structure,
leadership, command and control, and ability to commit violence. Al
Qaeda and other organizations still exist, but at much diminished
capacity. Some say mere existence is enough — so long as they are
surviving they are winning. They are complex and adaptive, and we cannot
cope. But again, this sets the bar much too high, and is not an
effects-based measure. Bin Laden and his cronies did not get into the
terrorist game to remain terrorists forever. Terrorism is the tool of
the weak who seek to use violence to express their grievances against
the status quo. But in order to actually achieve the power they seek
they must eventually escalate to guerilla conflict and conventional war.
So said Mao. A revolutionary organization whose leaders cannot show
their faces in public and in fact have not been seen for the last five
years cannot be said to be successfully prosecuting the struggle.
The conclusion that the enemy has reconstituted part of its command and
control network and recruitment and training infrastructure seems to be
derived from information gathered in the wake of the most recent
terrorist takedowns in Britain. (The fact that these attacks were broken
up before they could be executed strikes me as another indicant of
success on our part.) It may well be that some small scale camps have
been established — nothing like those in Taliban Afghanistan surely —
but this is as much opportunity as threat. If al Qaeda is coalescing, it
is easier to target. If there are camps, they can be surveiled. If there
are training programs, they can be infiltrated. Al Qaeda’s leaders
should understand that these are not the 1990s. Unlike then, everything
they do will be watched. Unlike then, we are not afraid to take strong
action instantly when opportunities arise. If we can lull them into a
false sense of security, allow them to reconstitute to the point where
they feel comfortable enough to operate in the open, so much the better.
If they get confident, they will make mistakes. And they have a lot to
be confident about. I’m certain the enemy is convinced we are a weak,
failing power with neither the will or capacity to continue to prosecute
the war effectively. At least that’s what they read in the papers.
— James S. Robbins is senior fellow in national-security affairs at
the American Foreign Policy Council, a trustee for the Leaders for
Liberty Foundation, and author of Last in Their Class: Custer, Picket
and the Goats of West Point.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MTY2MTMyOGYzOTRiNWYyMDA2OWNhMmU2OWQ1NjU2ZGQ=
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