[lit-ideas] Re: Mop Rumpchuck
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 17:20:21 -0330
The idea that the concept of a moral right is coherent, but an ontological right
is not, is interesting. Is it that there are no moral rights we possess simply
in virtue of being that mode of being-in-the-world we call "human?" In such a
case, the idea of our humanity as a ground of moral rightness and wrongness
would seem to be vitiated. And if that itself is a sound inference, does it not
follow that "only a god could save us now"?
Walter O
MUN
P.S.:
P1: I am a human being
C: You ought not to disrespect my humanity.
But is that not a case of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> Walter writes
>
> > I can't remember such exchanges. Perhaps if somebody is [able] to jog our
> memory
> > we'll also find out if "interesting" was ever defined within the exchanges
> and,
> > if so, how. One's position on that issue may go some way in determining
> one's
> > views on the other question.
>
> I remember a fairly lengthy dispute (mostly) between Phil Enns and me,
> in which Phil argued that there was no such thing as a right
> (ontologically, not morally, speaking). This was of course different
> from my skirmish with Mike over whether there was any such thing as a thing.
>
> Robert Paul
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