This post is way too long for me to relate to, so only one point:
"[F]or example, why the calling out of "Dog" may be a noun when asked what
kind of pet we have or a proper name if we have called our dog "Dog" etc."
Well, the telementationalist may apply Grice's section on "Names and
Descriptions" in his essay in the Quine festschrift. "Dog" used as a proper
name
would defy translation, and thus a word in Finnish including a reference to
"Dog" would still use 'Dog', whereas a sentence referring to the kind of
pet would need to translate 'dog' to Finnish.
*This would depend on the relevant conventions of translation in Finnish.
However, I'd point out that Amerindian names are sometimes translated into
English - e.g. the Sitting Bull, the Crazy Horse. In some languages /
cultures names are supposed to be descriptive of their bearers.
O.K.
On Sat, May 2, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Palma Gershom a partagé la photo de NThambo Tree Camp.
2 h ·
occasionally, true love
Photo de NThambo Tree Camp.
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
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To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Literally
McEvoy refers to what an 'explanation' or philosophical explanation may
amount to. I address that, and throw in 'spirit vs. letter', and 'legere'
into the bargain.
In a message dated 5/1/2015 7:55:34 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"[E]ven if "telementationalism" is right or correct up to a point, it
falls well short of a "theory of meaning" that explains how and why words
have the meanings they have."
Well, it is true that authors such as Grice do distinguish between a
theory of meaning and an analysis of meaning. He thinks that 'meaning' is
an intuitive concept, and a conceptual analysis will just do. To think that
we need a THEORY of meaning would mean we must postulate 'meaning' as a
'theoretical term' beyond our intuitive reach, and this is
counter-intuitive. (He develops this point when reviewing "Mrs. Jack on
the rights and wrongs of Grice on meaning".
McEvoy goes on:
"[F]or example, why the calling out of "Dog" may be a noun when asked what
kind of pet we have or a proper name if we have called our dog "Dog" etc."
Well, the telementationalist may apply Grice's section on "Names and
Descriptions" in his essay in the Quine festschrift. "Dog" used as a proper
name would defy translation, and thus a word in Finnish including a
reference to "Dog" would still use 'Dog', whereas a sentence referring to
the kind of pet would need to translate 'dog' to Finnish.
There ARE criteria.
McEvoy goes on:
"The "telemantationist", a la JLS' Grice, merely indicates we model on
each other's psychological schemes - but, even if true, this does not
explain how we are able to develop psychological schemes where the same
words may have different senses and different words the same senses (to
mention just two problems any "theory of meaning" would have to solve. One
of the great defects of modern academic philosophers is their frequent
delusion that they have properly explained something when what they say
amounts to nothing like a proper explanation - it is as if they are
ill-educated in what a proper explanation looks like."
I think Omar K. was raising the same point when he was defending the view
that a philosopher POINTS to a problem for the SCIENTIST to solve or
explain. I think this is wrong in that there is a keyword: "PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATION".
I can attend a lecture by a philosopher. He presents a problem, he
provides, say, a conceptual analysis, and he offers other tidbits, and I
leave the lecture hall, whispering, "I am convinced by his explanation,
are you?".
Philosophical explanation is not scientific explanation.
McEvoy gives another example:
"A typical error is to offer some definitional argument as if it
constitutes an explanation, which it never does e.g. that defining
"knowledge" as JTB somehow explains the character of knowledge, whereas it
merely amounts to a stipulation. On top of that, they are often themselves
confused as to whether they are offering something substantive or merely
definitional - and often because they harbour the delusion that a mere
definition can also express a substantive truth [akin to a delusion that
the analytic can be simultaneously synthetic. McGinn, we might remember,
is someone who in the same book - his "The Philosophy of Mind" - manages
at two different points to assert both that the self cannot be a
"substance" and that we are driven to the conclusion that the self is a
"substance" (while the same word can have two different senses without
contradiction, these two propositions can only be reconciled by saying we
are driven to a mistaken conclusion, which does not appear to be what
McGinn wishes to say). But then McGinn belongs to that club overly prone
to reasoning that is tortuous to very little effect.
JLS is also a member."
Well, 'self' is a notoriously difficult item in the philosopher's lexicon,
and I'm not surprised McGinn (who knew Grice well -- he exaggerates in his
"Memoirs", though, when he says Grice "had only one tooth") was not
careful enough with Grice's early essay on "Personal Identity" and failed
to stick with Grice's modified Occam's razor, "Do not multiply senses of
'self'
beyond necessity".
An analysis of 'self' (or personal identity) is PRETTY complicated one.
One in terms of memory is provided by Grice in the aforementioned paper,
and he concludes: "Some may argue that my analysis of the simple concept
of "I"
(as in "I fell from the stairs") is a case of 'obscurus per obscurius',
but this criticism is so weak that I won't even address it". Perry,
decades later, felt that Grice's essay was still very valuable and
provided a lovely intro to it in a book on "Personal identity" published
by Grice's university then: University of California Press at Berkeley.
Now for the letter and the law and the legere.
"Law" in the Graeco-Roman terminology is cognate with 'legere', which
means 'read'. I read from Short/Lewis, "Latin Dictionary':
"legere": to read or peruse a writing.
INTERLUDE with Lewis/Short's apparatus ---
ut eos libros per te ipse legeres, Cic. Top. 1: defensionem causae, id.
Verr. 2, 5, 43, § 112: legi apud Clitomachum, A. Albium jocantem dixisse,
etc., id. Ac. 2, 45, 137: aliquid studiose intenteque, Plin. Ep. 9, 13, 1:
significas legisse te in quadam epistula mea, jussisse Verginium, etc.,
id. ib.
9, 19, 1: philosophorum consultorumque opiniones, Quint. 12, 11, 17:
liber tuus et lectus est et legitur a me diligenter, Cic. Fam. 6, 5, 1:
orationem, Quint. 1, 1, 6: aiunt multum legendum esse non multa, Plin.
Ep. 7, 9, 15.
—With a pers. obj.: antiquos et novos, Quint. 2, 5, 23: antiquos
studiosius, id. 3, 6, 62: poëtas, id. 1, 4, 4. —In pass.: Horatius fere
solus legi dignus, Quint. 10, 1, 96: si cum judicio legatur Cassius
Severus, id. 10, 1,
116: dumque legar, mecum pariter tua fama legetur, Ov. Tr. 5, 14, 5:
sepulcra legens, when reading epitaphs, Cic. de Sen. 7, 21: legentium
plerisque, Liv. 1 praef. § 4: opus nescio an minimae legentibus futurum
voluptati, to my readers, Quint. 3, 1, 2; cf. id. 9, 4, 2; 2, 5, 3: nec
Cynicos nec Stoica dogmata, Juv. 13, 121.—Absol.: legendi usus, Lact. 3,
25, 9: memoriam continuus legendi usus instruit, Macr. S. 1, 5, 1.—
-- end of interlude.
And so, we have some notion of 'reading' when speaking of the Law, on
which Cicero was obsessed. What about the perhaps more philosophically
interesting distinction between the 'spirit' and the 'letter', or is it
the letter and the spirit. If 'spirit' is ghost, we have a sort of a
Rylean ghost in a machine, as it were.
To distinguish between the 'letter' of, say, the law versus the 'spirit'
of it said to be an idiomatic antithesis in need of some conceptual
analysis.
Thus, when one obeys the letter of law L1 but not the spirit of L1, one is
obeying the "literal" interpretation of the words (the "letter") of the
law, but not the Griceian M-intent of those who wrote the law.
By "M-intending", Grice means the intention as conceptually analysed in
"Way of Words": i.e. all the three types of intention that are required to
MEAN something: the intention to display your psychological attitude (a
belief or a desire), the intention that one's addressee will recognise
that intention, and finally the intention that nothing which is not
aboveboard (figuratively speaking) counts as having been meant.
Conversely, when one obeys the 'spirit' of, say, the law but not the
'letter', one is doing what the authors of the law M-intended, though not
necessarily adhering to the literal wording.
It is not clear what is best.
"Law" originally referred to legislative statute, but in the idiom may
refer to any kind of rule, since, as Hart demonstrates, the law is a system
of primary and secondary rules.
Intentionally following the letter of the law but not the spirit may be
accomplished through exploiting technicalities, loopholes, and ambiguous
language.
William Shakespeare wrote numerous plays dealing with the 'letter'
versus the 'spirit' antithesis, and he may have taken it from Boccaccio (I
find that most interesting things Shakespeare wrote he borrowed from
Boccaccio but never returned).
Shakespeare almost always comes down on the side of "spirit", often
forcing villains (who always sided with the letter) to make concessions
and remedy.
In one of the best known examples, "The Merchant of Venice", he introduces
the quibble as a plot device to save BOTH the spirit and the letter of the
law.
The moneylender Shylock has made an agreement with Antonio that if he
cannot repay a loan he will have a pound of flesh from him.
When the debt is not repaid in time Porzia at first pleads for mercy in a
famous speech:
"The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath.
It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes."
(IV,i,185).
When Shylock refuses, she finally saves Antonio by pointing out that
Shylock's agreement with him mentioned no blood, and therefore Shylock can
have his pound of flesh only if he sheds no blood.
When Porzia says that there was no mention of 'blood', she means
"EXPLICATURE". "Blood" may have been IMPLICATED, but implicatures are
cancellable.
To refer to another realm, interpretations of the U.S. Constitution have
historically divided on the "Letter versus Spirit" debate.
For example, at the founding, the Federalist Party argued for a looser
(rather than 'literal') interpretation of the Constitution, granting
Congress broad powers in keeping with the spirit of the broader purpose of
some founders (notably including the Federalist founders' purposes).
The Federalists would have represented the "spirit" aspect.
I..e they would be Griceian at heart.
In contrast, the Democratic-Republicans, who favoured a limited federal
government, argued for the strict, 'literal', interpretation of the
Constitution, arguing that the federal government was granted only those
powers enumerated in the Constitution, and nothing not explicitly stated.
No implicatures allowed, as it were. On the other hand, the Federalist
would counter-argue: Implicature happens.
The Democratic-Republicans represented the "letter" interpretation, and
would be Russellian in spirit. Recall that Grice concedes that both Russell
and Strawson make the same 'common mistake': they fail to recognise
Implicature. But still the Federalists are more Griceian than the
Democratic-Republicans.
Modern Constitutional interpretation also divides on these lines.
Currently, Living Constitution scholars advocate a "spirit"-esque
interpretative strategy, although one grounded in a spirit that reflects
broad powers. This may be given a Griceian explanation and justification.
Originalist or Textualist scholars advocate a more "letter"-based
approach, arguing that the Amendment process of the Constitution
necessarily forecloses broader interpretations that can be accomplished
simply by passing an amendment. This can also be given a Griceian
explanation and justification by stating as per an axiom, "No
implicatures, please."
A third realm is the Christian Bible references the letter and the spirit
of the law in Romans 2:29 NASB.
Though it is not quoted directly, the principle is applied using the words
"spirit" and "letter" in context with the legalistic view of the Hebrew
Bible.
This is the first recorded use of the phrase, as it should, so perhaps
it's not Graeco-Roman in nature, but since it occurs in "Romans" it is
perhaps at least "Roman", who were also pretty legalistic in spirit.
In the New Testament, Pharisees are seen as people who place 'the letter'
of the law above 'the spirit' or Griceian M-Intention (Mark 2:3–28, 3:1–
6).
Thus, "Pharisee" has entered the language as a pejorative for one who does
so.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'pharisee' with one of the meanings
as a person of the spirit or character commonly attributed to the Pharisees
in the New Testament; a legalist or formalist.
Of course this is figurative, as when the Queen met the Greek ambassador
at her own garden party.
THE QUEEN: You are from Athens, I suppose.
THE GREEK AMBASSADOR: No, ma'am, if I may, ma'am. I'm a Lesbian.
---
Pharisees are also depicted as being lawless or corrupt (Matthew 23:38).
The Greek word used in the verse means lawlessness, and the corresponding
Hebrew word means fraud or injustice, which are what Grice calls
'value-oriented words' (in The Conception of Value).
However, the Hebrew word "Perushim" from which "Pharisee" is derived,
actually means "separatists", referencing their focus on spiritual needs
versus worldly pleasures. So this complicates things.
"Traditionally, the word 'pharisee' comes from the Hebrew פרושים prushim
from פרוש parush, meaning "separated," that is, one who is separated for a
life of purity."
In the Gospels, Jesus is often shown as being critical of Pharisees. But
then he is being critical of many other stuff, too.
Luther protested.
Jesus is more like the Essenes than the other Jewish groups of the time
(Sadducees, Pharisees, Zealots).
However, the pharisees, like Jesus, believe in the resurrection of the
dead, and in divine judgment.
The pharisees advocate prayer, almsgiving and fasting as spiritual
practices.
The pharisees are those who were trying to be faithful to the law given
to them by God.
Not all pharisees, nor all Jews of that time, were legalistic.
The same could be said of the Romans. Regulus was VERY legalistic, but
Cato the younger wasn't, and so on.
Remus was possibly more legalistic than Romolo, for that matter.
But back to the pharisees, though modern usage has the lexeme "pharisee"
as a pejorative to describe someone who is legalistic and rigid, it is
not an accurate description of all pharisees.
It is like Grice's discussion of 'athlete'. When in "Meaning" he
criticises Stevenson's analysis of meaning he plays with Stevenson's
example, "All athletes are tall". This Grice notes should not make us
think that 'tall' is part of what is meant by 'athlete'.
The argument over the "Spirit of the Law" vs. the "Letter of the Law" was
part of early Jewish dialogue as well.
The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) is one of the New
Testament texts to address this theme.
The passage concerns a dialogue between Jesus and an "expert in the law"
or "lawyer".
As described in verse 25:
"a certain lawyer stood up and tested Him saying, Teacher what must I do
to inherit eternal life?," NKJV
-- the intent of the dialogue was to trap Jesus into making statements
contrary to the law, and Grice would add, to trap him into even triggering
IMPLICATURES contrary to the law.
Jesus responds by posing the question back to the lawyer, as already
having knowledge of the law:
"What is written in the law?" verse 26.
The lawyer quotes Deuteronomy 6:5
"You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart, with all your soul,
with all your strength, and with all your mind and your neighbour as
yourself.", NKJV
and Leviticus 19:18.
The question
"Who is my neighbour?", that follows in verse 29, is described as being
asked with the goal of self-justification.
It is THEN that Jesus responds with the story of a man beaten by robbers
who is ignored by a priest and a Levite, but then rescued and
compassionately cared for by a Samaritan.
Priests and Levites were Jews whose qualifications and duties were very
meticulously set forth in Mosaic law (Leviticus 10, and Numbers 5-8) while
Samaritans were descended from Jews who had intermarried with their
Babylonian captives and had been forced to establish a sect with an
alternative (if not literal) interpretation of the Law.
In the story, both the Priest and Levite follow their prescribed
regulations dutifully, yet do not help the injured traveller, even crossing
to the other side of the road to avoid possible rule violations.
(This is difficult to formalise in deontic logic: cfr. supererogatory and
suberogatory).
The Samaritan, whose very existence is based on a REFUTATION of Jewish
law (specifically Deuteronomy 12 which speaks to the proper place of
worship which Samaritans had replaced the Temple in Jerusalem with Mount
Mariah -- and treating law as something that can be refuted alla Popper
than merely rejected, positivistically) goes above and beyond simply
tending to the injured man.
He takes him to an inn and gives money for the man's care, promises and
then actually does return to inquire about the man, and pay any overage
incurred.
Jesus concludes by asking him which of the men was a "neighbour" to the
beaten traveller, to which his reply was "the one who showed compassion".
Like Socrates, and later Hart, it would seem as if Jesus was an adherent
of 'conceptual analysis' as the proper type of philosophical explanation,
or a good necessary prolegomenon to a good philosophical explanation.
According to Jeremiah, "the qualities of the new covenant expounded upon
the old are :
a) It will not be broken;
b) Its law will be written in the heart, not merely on tablets of stone;
c) The knowledge of God will deem it no longer necessary to put it into
written words of instruction."
(b) is 'figurative' in that it does not have to be literally written 'on'
the heart. Either 'heart' or 'written' has to be understood as a 'trope'
-- cfr. "I learned it by heart".
According to Luke (Lk 22, 20), and Paul, in the first epistle to the
Corinthians (1 Cor 11, 25), this prophecy was fulfilled only through the
work of Jesus Christ, who said
"This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which will be shed for you."
Christ did not come to abolish the law but to fulfill it -- were 'abolish'
is a better term than 'refute'.
Jesus's alleged purpose was to encourage people to look beyond the
"letter of the law" to the "spirit of the law" and this may be the
implicature behind "Jesus Grice Almighty", in looking to he principles
behind the commandments and the law's Griceian M-intention.
Jesus quotes from the book of Deuteronomy and Leviticus:
"All the Law can be summed up in this: to love God with all your heart,
all your mind and all your soul, and to love your neighbour as yourself"
(paraphrased).
Hart ignores this since he thinks Jesus is being figurative (and Hart was
not raised as a Christian, anyway).
Another realm where the letter/spirit applies is in gaming the system,
also called "rules lawyering".
This is the following of the letter (sometimes referred to as RaW or
"Rules as Written") over, or contrary to, the spirit (sometimes referred to
as RaI or "Rules as Intended") of the law -- where the "I" of "Intended" is
best expanded as "Griceian M-Intended", since there are intentions and
Griceian intentions, and interpretation of a sophisticated type requires
Griceian M-intentions.
Gaming the system is used negatively to describe the act of manipulating
the rules to achieve a personal advantage.
It may also mean acting in an antisocial, irritating manner while
technically staying within the bounds of the rules.
There are other keywords to explore here: Expounding of the Law, Legal
opportunism, Legal technicality, Loophole, Malicious compliance &
Work-to-rule, Hart's Positive law & Natural law, Sense and reference The
Spirit of the Laws, the 1748 political theory treatise by Montesquieu,
Abuse of the legal system, and Mosaic law in Christian theology.
Cheers,
Speranza
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