Re "literal" interpretation
There is what we call a "literal" interpretation etc.
But we should beware taking the idea of a "literal" interpretation too
literally. A "literal" interpretation is itself the product of a very involved
set of processes, much as the ordinary perception of objects is the product of
a very involved set of processes. In both cases, the processes involved are
rendered largely 'invisible' to us and are not part of the conscious
experience. But the existence of these processes means that what we may take as
simple and straightforward is actually the result of something very complex and
involved.
In one view, we obtain a "literal" interpretation because we can "read off"
from the words used. Without much critical reflection, we may tend to think we
can and do "read off" meanings from the words used in some 'direct' way - and
this is what constitutes a "literal" interpretation. And many philosophers talk
about language as if we can and do "read off" directly from the words used in a
more or less straightforward way. But this is very, very far from the case.
Compare: many philosophers have also treated perception - say, 'seeing an
orange' - as if it is something where our perceptual apparatus can "read off"
directly from properties of the object perceived: but this is also very, very
far the case.
We do not know much [afaik] about the very elaborate processes involved in
decoding language for meaning, as we do not know much about the very elaborate
interactions between the physical brain and its unconscious and conscious
mental processes [see Popper's contributions to "The Self and Its Brain", which
indicates the position is further complicated by the vital role of W3 in these
interactions]. This is why there currently is no great "theory of meaning" that
fully explains how and why words have the meanings they have - or which we give
them. Yet we know enough to say that a "literal" interpretation is not the
result of some more or less straightforward pathways between the words used and
their attendant 'meanings' but is itself a construction built from a most
elaborate set of processes.
We have recently discussed something pertinent. Among the points made in the
thread on jurisprudence is that the same wording - "treated less favourably" -
can have two different interpretations or "meanings". And a lawyer can know
(or guess) this must be case before they have even worked out what those two
different interpretations are. The lawyer cannot know this is the case because
the different interpretations can be "read off" from the same wording. They
'know' (or conjecture) it is the case because of their grasp of the relevant W3
problem-situation and their knowledge of relevant W3 content: in particular,
the lawyer knows that pregnancy is always gender-specific, and so "treated less
favourably" must mean something different in the context of pregnancy than it
means when applied between the genders generally - otherwise the special
section concerning pregnancy would be redundant (and the lawyer knows - through
study of W3 legal principles - that a specially enacted section will only be
interpreted in a way that renders it redundant when the case for this is very
compelling).
What a lawyer does in such a case is not unusual but is something we
continually do when learning and using language - but this process of
'adjustment and refinement' in interpretation and understanding, though perhaps
more clearly observable in children, becomes invisible to us as we reach a
level of competence where interpretation becomes less consciously problematic
(having developed many conscious and unconscious problem-solving techniques to
apply to questions of meaning - a process that begins when we first learn
language as a child).
The process by which we become adept at solving problems of interpretation in
the field of language, so that 'interpretation' becomes less consciously
problematic (even to the point where it is not consciously problematic), is one
that obscures from us the truth that 'interpretation' is always the result of a
most elaborate and complex process - much as the process by which we become
adept at solving problems of interpretation in the field of perception, so that
'interpretation' becomes less consciously problematic, is one that obscures
from us the truth that perceptual 'interpretation' is always the result of a
most elaborate and complex process.
So while there is such a thing as what we call a "literal" interpretation, it
is not something we simply "read off" from the words used. It is an illusion to
think otherwise but perhaps a prevalent one.
DnlLdn
On Thursday, 30 April 2015, 12:58, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
I'd suggest that we don't confuse 'implicatures' with metaphorical usage.
Metaphorical usage is not something confined to poetry but is often found in
every-day talk, as we can learn from Lakoff's "Metaphors we live by."
Grice at any rate didn't think that his analysis was applicable to 'fictions.'
O.K.
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 1:20 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
We are considering what I call Quintilian's Paradox:
"literally", adv. fig. figuratively.
In a message dated 4/28/2015 4:28:06 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"Lily was literally run off her feet."
I would play with this:
We have Joyce:
i. Lily was literally run off her feet.
I would simplify to the present continuous.
ii. Lily is running off her feet.
We have then two options: To add 'figuratively' is otiose, and Joyce would
not use it.
iii. Lily is figuratively running off her feet.
The implicature is alleged to be "to run off one's feet", to be very busy.
It would be even more otiose for Joyce to add the implicatum after the
utteratum:
iv. Figuratively, Lily is running off her feet: she is too busy.
As for the 'literally', we have variants. We have Joyce and we have:
v. Literally, Lily is running off her feet.
Dickens apparently had already used 'literally' to mean 'figuratively', so
this would however not be a _first_. I'm not surprised if Quintilian was
the first.
Now, (v) may be interpreted literally. The obvious comparison is with
Grice,
vi. You're the cream in my coffee.
vii. Literally, you're the cream in my coffee.
While it IS possible for an utterer to address one's cream in one's cup of
coffee, or mug of coffee, and utter, "You are literally the cream in my
coffee", the utterance may be viewed as otiose (and flouting one or two of the
conversational rules): on the assumption that the utterer thinks or
expects that his addressee will hear the utterance (and cream does not have
ears), it may be further argued that if cream had ears, and a consciousness to
match, cream would KNOW already that cream is the cream in the utterer's
coffee. Whereas to regard it as addressed to one's sweetheart can be
derogatory if emphasised by 'literally'.
In the case of Joyce:
i. Lily was literally run off her feet.
The issue arose when Rachael Dowling played the role in the film version of
the story.
"How am I supposed to do that?", she asked, on first reading the
screenplay.
It was a good thing her father was a film director, and gave good
instructions. In the filmed version you can actually see Ms. Dowling (what a
brilliant actress, she can do most things on screen) literally run off her feet.
The director later commented, "We thought of taking Joyce literally, for a
change."
I append the cast in ps, because many of the characters are also seen as
doing literally difficult (if not figurative) things, thanks to the genius of
John Houston -- including Bartell D'Arcy (played by Frank Patterson,
another versatile actor).
Cheers,
Speranza
Anjelica Huston ... Gretta Conroy
Donal McCann ... Gabriel Conroy
Dan O'Herlihy ... Mr. Browne
Donal Donnelly ... Theodore Alfred "Freddy" Malins
Helena Carroll ... Aunt Kate Morkan
Cathleen Delany ... Aunt Julia Morkan
Ingrid Craigie ... Mary Jane
Rachael Dowling ... Lily
Marie Kean ... Mrs. Malins
Frank Patterson ... Bartell D'Arcy
Maria McDermottroe ... Molly Ivors
Sean McClory ... Mr. Grace
Katherine O'Toole ... Miss Furlong
Maria Hayden ... Miss O'Callaghan
Bairbre Dowling ... Miss Higgins
Lyda Anderson ... Miss Daly
Colm Meaney ... Mr. Bergin
Cormac O'Herlihy ... Mr. Kerrigan
Dan O'Herlihy ... Mr. Browne
Paul Grant ... Mr. Duffy
Paul Carroll ... Young Gentleman
Patrick Gallagher ... Mr. Egan
Dara Clarke ... Miss Power
Brendan Dillon ... Cabman
Redmond M. Gleeson ... Nightporter
Amanda Baird ... Young Lady
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