[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Implicature

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 12:39:57 -0400 (EDT)


In a message dated 6/27/2012 12:06:26 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
it seems v doubtful to me that W is  concerned with the following kind of 
"play" or with making the kind of objection  his 'character' in the "play" 
makes:-... I suggest that such a (foolish)  objection would not reflect any g
rammatical point that W would care to  make.
 
For the record, here below the longer excerpts kindly provided by R. Paul.  
It may do as an exercise to provide "better" conversational exchanges than 
the  one Witters cares to give.
 
It seems obvious Witters (like Grice) is concerned with the 'conversational 
 game' and its possible 'moves'. But, whereas Grice knew the answer (an  
'implicature' never affects the 'sense' of an expression), Witters was so  
confused that he thought that conversational multiplicities shed light on the  
wrong dictum that meaning _was_ use. Or something.
 
I intend to refer to McEvoy's reference to 'naming' in another post.

Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
----


403. If I were to reserve the word "pain" solely for what I  had
hitherto called "my pain", and others "L.W.'s pain", I should do
other  people no injustice, so long as a notation were provided in which
the loss of  the word "pain" in other connexions were somehow
supplied. Other people would  still be pitied, treated by doctors and
so on. It would, of course, be no  objection to this mode of expression
to say: "But look here, other people  have just the same as you!"
But what should I gain from this new kind of  account? Nothing.
But after all neither does the solipsist want any practical  advantage
when he advances his view!

404. "When I say 'I am in pain',  I do not point to a person who is
in pain, since in a certain sense I have no  idea who is." And this can 
be given a justification. For the main point is:  I did not say that 
such-and such a person was in pain, but "I am . . . . . "  Now in saying 
this I don't name any person. Just as I don't name anyone when  I groan 
with pain. Though someone else sees who is in pain from  the
groaning. What does it mean to know who is in pain? It means, for  
example, to know which man in this room is in pain: for instance, that  
it is the one who is sitting over there, or the one who is standing in  
that corner, the tall one over there with the fair hair, and so on.—What  
am I getting at? At the fact that there is a great variety of criteria  
for personal 'identity'''.Now which of them determines my saying that  
'/' am in pain? None.

405. "But at any rate when you say 'I am in  pain', you want to
draw the attention of others to a particular person."—The  answer
might be: No, I want to draw their attention to myself.—

406.  "But surely what you want to do with the words 'I am. . . .'
is to  distinguish between yourself and other people."—Can this be said
in every  case? Even when I merely groan? And even if I do 'want
to distinguish'  between myself and other people—do I want to distinguish 
between the person  L.W. and the person N.N.?

407. It would be possible to imagine someone  groaning out:
"Someone is in pain—I don't know who!"—and our then  hurrying
to help him, the one who groaned. "Someone is in pain—I don't know  
who!"—and our then hurrying to help him, the one who groaned.

408.  "But you aren't in doubt whether it is you or someone else
who has the  pain!"—The proposition "I don't know whether I
or someone else is in pain"  would be a logical product, and one of its
factors would be: "I don't know  whether I am in pain or not"—
and that is not a significant  proposition.

409. Imagine several people standing in a ring, and me among  them.
One of us, sometimes this one, sometimes that, is connected to  the
poles of an electrical machine without our being able to see this.  I
observe the faces of the others and try to see which of us has just  been
electrified.—Then I say: "Now I know who it is; for it's myself."
In  this sense I could also say: "Now I know who is getting the shocks;
it is  myself." This would be a rather queer way of speaking.—But if I
make the  supposition that I can feel the shock even when someone
else is electrified,  then the expression "Now I know who . . . ."
becomes quite unsuitable. It  does not belong to this game.

410. "I" is not the name of a person, nor  "here" of a place, and
"this" is not a name. But they are connected with  names. Names are
explained by means of them. It is also true that it is  characteristic of
physics not to use these words. 
 
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