[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Implicature
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 17:06:02 +0100 (BST)
Two points:-
One is that here have yet another example where JLS mistakes what I have
written. (Perhaps this tendency is a kind of "implicature" run riot?)
>I agree with McEvoy that Witters is stuck with a narrow view on 'naming'>
Far from suggesting W is stuck with such a narrow view, I simply contended that
name/naming as used in PI-410 is used in a narrower sense than the sense in
which we might treat most items of language as different kinds of names (e.g.
'running' as the 'name' of an action); I did not, partly because W does not,
seek to say what this narrower view amounts to: indeed part of my point is that
W is not saying what constitutes a 'name' or naming, or 'I' or 'person', and
that this reflects the 'key tenet' which holds it would be futile to try to say
any such thing.
And I suggested W, in discussing the Augustinian picture and what is 'wrong'
with it, shows he is open-minded about whether name/naming is to be understood
in a narrower or wider way - for W does not suggest that what is 'wrong' or
misleading with that picture is that it treats verbs as names. His point
against such a picture is not that we cannot treat an utterance such as 'Slab'
as a kind of name - perhaps of an object, perhaps also of an action such as
fetching a particular object [the Tractarian W might have made such an
objection, but not the W of Investigations]. W's point cuts deeper and is that,
whatever sense is given such an utterance, its sense is never 'contained
in/said by' the utterance but depends on much more - a much more that can only
be shown and not said. This point does not mean Augustine's picture is false
but that it is misleading if we take such a picture as capturing - as in saying
- how language has a given sense. And though W
begins PI by showing this in relation to the Augustinian picture of language
[as a naming relation; perhaps the simplest and most straightforward kind of
linguistic relation], what W seeks to show would apply to any such picture that
suggests we can capture - as in saying - how language has a given sense:
subsequently in PI, we see W show that, for example, a 'picture' of language
having sense by the following of "rules" is misleading if we take such a
picture as capturing - as in saying - how language has a given sense: for the
sense of any such "rule" is never 'contained in/said by' the "rule" but depends
on much more - a much more that can only be shown and not said.
Second, it seems v doubtful to me that W is concerned with the following kind
of "play" or with making the kind of objection his 'character' in the "play"
makes:-
>Witters wants to play with
conversations alla:
(a) The Case of "I"
A: So -- what person did it? (Broke the china?).
Witters: No person. *I* did it.>
I suggest that such a (foolish) objection would not reflect any grammatical
point that W would care to make.
Donal
________________________________
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wednesday, 27 June 2012, 14:36
Subject: [lit-ideas] Grice's Implicature
Ignored by Witters.
In a message dated 6/27/2012 7:31:40 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
W being open to the possibility that we could construct a language-game
where 'I' did name a person: but W would then seek to show that, if we did
so, this would not get us anywhere in terms of some philosophical argument
that an 'I' is [or is not] a 'person'. So when W claims something like '"I"
is not the name of a person, nor "here" of a place, and "this" is not a
name.',
As I say, in "Reply to Richards", Grice traces his interest in developing a
theory of implicature, and he notes that it trades on a distinction,
which, as I recall, Grice characterises as being mostly minimised by Austin
and
"ignored" by Witters. In "Logic and Conversation", in a jocular way
'echoing Kant', Grice introduces the Category of Quantity. He had considered
something like it in an earlier, "Causal Theory of Perception".
(a) "It seems as though the pillar box before me is red".
seems as something weaker (Grice's word) to say than
(b) "The pillar box is red".
In the language of "Logic and Conversation" this relates to
Informativeness. There are various issues regarding this: as to how to analyse
it. When
discussing the truth-functors, Grice notes that 'informativeness' or
'strength' can be understood in terms of entaillment. "p is more
informative/stron
ger than q if p entails q, but q does not entail p." And so on.
Now, in Witters's games with
(a) "I"
(b) "here"
(c) "this"
we may play different similar implicatures. Witters wants to play with
conversations alla:
(a) The Case of "I"
A: So -- what person did it? (Broke the china?).
Witters: No person. *I* did it.
(b) The Case of "Here" (Note that Witters does NOT mention "Now", which
would be the deictic triad, along with "I"" and "Here" -- as temporal deixis).
A: Were are you going this holiday, Wittgenstein?
Wittenstein: Here.
-- cfr. Grice:
A: Where does B live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France (+> but where exactly is not relevant
to the topic at hand).
It would seem that "I" triggers the implicature: "Just not ANY person". A
similar implicature may be triggered by "Here".
(c) The third case is
"The case of "This".
A: Which is your favourite painting then?
B: This.
----- In this case, it seems as if Wittgenstein is expecting that the
utterance of 'this' should be accompanied by some gesture. But this is not
always the case.
After viewing different houses for rental (in the Cambridge area):
Real-Estate Agent: So which one is your favourite so far?
Wittgenstein: This.
The point that Witters makes that 'I', 'here' and 'this' are not used in
physics is neither here nor there. But he must be thinking in terms of 'pain'
-- "my pain". Imagine if a treatise on pain-killers were to be flooded
with references to the author's "I", his "here" and his "this".
As I say, Grice extended on "I" in personal identity. He is concerned with
the important issue of the mind-body distinction: "I was hit by a cricket
ball". While Witters merely, and sceptically, suggests that there are
various criteria for 'personal identity' he unphilosophically fails to provide
his favourite.
"I", "this" and "here" are deictic, token-reflexive, or indexical, and
Witters possibly knew this. Surely their use in conversation triggers
implicatures that pertain to this 'essential' indexicality.
I agree with McEvoy that Witters is stuck with a narrow view on 'naming' --
on top of that, this narrow view disallows him to expand on the TWO basic
functions of a primitive utterance such as
"The cat is on the mat"
or, to use Witters's triad:
(a) "I am the champion"
or
(b) "Here we grow daffodils"
or
(c) "This is the loveliest day in my life".
These two functions are:
REFER
and
PREDICATE.
Strawson saw this and allowed Searle to write his DPhil (Oxon) on that:
"Sense and Reference". So "I", "this" and "here" may be indexicals that
require some special exegesis in the account of the implicatures they generate
(notably: the implicatures that would be triggered if these indexicals were
NOT to be used), but in no other serious way do they provide evidence that
Witters is onto something deep.
In his essay on "Reference" for the Aristotelian Society, J. O. Urmson
focuses on examples like:
A: Who delivered the letter?
B: Kathleen's husband.
As it happens, A and B know that the town's postman IS Kathleen's husband;
yet the use of the 'dossier', "Kathleen's husband", when "the postman"
would do, seems to trigger the wrong implicature.
TRIGGERING THE WRONG IMPLICATURE by avoiding the words physics avoids:
(a) the case of "I"
Same scenario:
Doctor in hospital ward: Who is in pain here?
Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein.
It would seem that the doctor wants to hear "I", rather.
(b) the case of "this"
Suppose the real estate agent had Witters see a house in Abercrombie Road,
another one in Butterworth Street, and a third one on Callow Drive. They
are in the house in Callow Road, and the same question as per above takes
place:
Real Estate Agent: So, what is your favourite house so far?
Wittgenstein: The one in Callow Drive.
---- Real Estate Agent (puzzled): You mean "this"?
(c) the case of "here"
The wrong implicature for the use of an alternative to 'here' -- the third
indexical Witters use -- is also easy to account for:
A and B want to take a bus, as they walk in Cambridge. A is getting tired,
and asks B where the bus stop. As it happens they are walking along High
Road, in the intersection of Russell Drive, where the bus does stop.
A: Where does the bus stop?
B: High Road, in the intersection with Russell Drive.
--- A (puzzled): You mean 'here'?
Still, "I", "here" and "this" provoke the right philosopher into the right
issues. "This" especially has been worshiped by empiricists like Russell
and even neo-Hegelians like Bradley. It is more basic than "I" or "here".
(Note that "I" amounts to "THIS person" (contra Witters), and "Here" to "THIS
here place"). "I" triggers all sorts of puzzles of the type Hume and Reid
were very familiar with. Witters's casual remarks -- in the context of a
non-too serious seminar in philosophy perhaps cryptically transcribed by
Anscombe -- do not shed much light in ways that any good Griceian account of
the
matter at hand would. Etc.
Cheers,
Speranza
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