[lit-ideas] Darwiniana
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2012 12:31:51 -0500 (EST)
In a message dated 2/23/2012 11:09:58 A.M. UTC-02,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
">http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n02/jerry-fodor/the-trouble-with-psyc
hological-darwinism
This "pushback" has given rise to the counter-pushback:
_http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Darwin_Got_Wrong_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Darwin_Got_Wrong) ."
"For example, among the negative opinions there canvassed:
"Evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne describes this book as "a profoundly
misguided critique of natural selection"[21] and "as biologically uninformed
as it is strident.",[22] while
In a review in Science Douglas J. Futuyma concluded:
Because they are prominent in their own fields, some readers may suppose
that they are authorities on evolution who have written a profound and
important book. They aren't, and it isn't.[23]
Adam Rutherford, editor of Nature writing in The Guardian also reviewed it
negatively.[24]" There is likely much more to this than a simple pushing
back against overly reductionist uses of Darwinism [or neo-Darwinism]. There
is an underlying question of what kind of explanation 'Darwinism' is -
what we might also describe as the question of its logical character,
including the extent to which Darwinism is 'scientific' (or testable)."
To do that, we would need to symbolise the theory, and focus not on what
the theory _states_ (the topic of the theory), but to abstract considerations
like:
-- observational terms/predicates vs. theoretical terms/predicates
the nature of explanation, nomological models, falsificationist models
axiomatic component
empirical support, paradigm, research-programme, the nature of the
evidence, theory-laden observation.
and so on.
i.e. the stuff that standard philosophers of science (Popper, Lakatos,
Kuhn, or Hanson) have been interested all along.
McEvoy:
"The pushing back against overly reductionist uses of Darwin is something
Popper's writings have long endorsed btw. Indeed his 'emergentist' theory of
there being irreducible Worlds 1,2&3 (and even of there being irreducible
levels within those 'Worlds') takes anti-reductionism further than many.
But this pushing back is, in Popper's case, not intended as a pushing back
against Darwinism so much as against a misunderstanding of the logical
character and empirical status of Darwinism as a form of explanation."
Well, Popper's claim to fame is indeed his falsificationism. But we should
go one step earlier and reconsider how Popper's target of attack,
inductionism, had explained (or not) the logical character of the 'Darwinian'
explanation.
We may, if we are historically concerned or interested, considered where
Darwin got his ideas of scientific explanation from, in the very
philosophical Spencer or the more mathematical or axiomatic Malthus. And we
should of
course consider, while we are at, the relevance of 'synthetic a priori'. How
analytic is the thesis of the 'survival of the fittest', say?
Once we have assessed how "Inductionism" or positivism explains or fails
to justify the valid logical character of the Darwinian explanation can we
consider whether Popper's thesis -- that Darwinism is not falsifiable, never
mind verifiable. And only THEN can we go further to consider 'sociological'
aspects: the nature of the evidence, as per the work of Hanson, the
'paradigm' that Darwinism supports, alla Kuhn, and the 'research paradigm,
alla
Lakatos (degenerating or not, with a belt that protects against
counterexamples), and so on.
McEvoy:
"On Popper's view, it is to misunderstand its logical character and
empirical status to argue that Darwinism indicates the truth of some form of
reductionism."
Reductionism is a philosophical idea. The thesis, say, that the organic
reduces to the inorganic, or that life is not a principle (anti-vitalism), or
that the soul does not evolve, etc., is a philosophical valid one.
Philosophers like to consider these theses per se, and are free to introduce
their
own axioms or principles that guide their systems. It is different when a
_scientist_ uses these ideas. (I'm not arguing with Popper that the
simplistic demarcation is between 'science' and a misconceived 'metaphysics',
though).
E.g. Grice spends HOURS considering the topic of 'reductionism'
(psychophysical, only) in his "Method in philosophical psychology": the devil
of
scientism lies at the heart of it, he notes. There are ontological problems
involved, too, such as the individuation of entities over which
theoretical/observational predicates range (the Ramsey thesis, Ramsified
naming,
Ramsified description), and so on.
McEvoy:
"As a thought on which to leave this for now: if we have a jelly that has
come from a mould, we can explain the exact shape and size of the jelly by
the 'selection pressure' exerted on the liquid put into the mould. We might
say, in explanatory terms, we can 'reduce' the shape and size of the jelly
to the shape and size of the mould. But 'natural selection' is not an
explanation of the characteristics of organisms in quite this way - the
'moulding' effect of 'natural selection' over time is not akin to an imprint
of
positive characteristics (as per the shape and size of the jelly) but the
elimination of negative [or maladapted] characteristics. This is a profoundly
different kind explanation to a reductionist one - and this is even before
we bring 'emergentist' arguments, or even the point that the motor of
relative adaptability is the random mutation which itself is not explained in
any
'moulded' sense."
Indeed. Perhaps it's FUNCTIONALISM that can be brought in too. NOT in the
sense we were discussing earlier, about Turing being a 'functionalist'. But
the idea of what people have called
teleo-functionalism.
The idea that the lung is to breathe (J. R. Searle has written on this in
his 'teleo-functional' explanation of the 'mind'), say.
But Darwinism requires TELEOLOGICAL explanations that are (or should be)
incompatible with causal explanations of the physical type and the
reductionist (alla Patricia Churchland is right in shedding doubts on this).
At what
level does it make sense to speak of this feature in the wold having this
_function_?
While Grice does not use 'evolutionary' a lot, he came, as a metaphysician,
to favour 'final' arguments, or 'final causes', alla medieval theology,
even. There's a lot of Finalism in Darwinism, but as McEvoy notes, the issues
are very complex when we bring in emergentism for good measure. The
keyword should be:
PHILOSOPHICAL DARWINISM.
For:
Reductionism cannot be easily reduced.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
---
From: Phil Enns _phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxx (mailto:phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx)
>Robert Paul linked to a book review by Jerry Fodor:
_http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n02/jerry-fodor/the-trouble-with-psychological-darwinism_
(http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20/n02/jerry-fodor/the-trouble-with-psychological-darwinism)
Thank you for the link. A very interesting pushback against the
reductionism of so much of sociobiology.>
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