[lit-ideas] Re: Darwiniana
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2012 13:06:17 -0500 (EST)
In a message dated 2/24/2012 12:42:35 P.M. UTC-02,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>>There is an underlying question of what kind of explanation 'Darwinism'
is -
>>what we might also describe as the question of its logical character,
>>including the extent to which Darwinism is 'scientific' (or testable)."
>It can, I think, be put more simply: it's a question of what
>testable/falsifiable consequences a certain formulation of
>'Darwinism' ['D'] may have.
>A formulation of D as "survival of the fittest" may
>lack falsifiable consequences, especially if
>the only criterion of fitness is survival. But other
>D-type formulations may have falsifiable consequences: for example,
>that even a species where the gender ratio is 9:1 [whichever way] will
>over time evolve into one with a roughly 1:1 sex ratio
>[this is because mutations or deviations away from the 9:1 ratio
>will always be more successful in reproductive terms and so
>spread until an equilbrium of roughly 1:1 is reached: this can be
>be shown 'mathematically' but is also testable empirically].
Interesting.
Will check out other versions of "D", as McEvoy calls it, with "testable"
content.
For indeed, "Darwinism" is too broad a concept -- and as McEvoy notes
below, it can encompass something as broad as what he calls a truly
'metaphysical' research programme. We should be sticking to what Darwin wrote,
though
-- as per "Darwiniana" (rather than deal with 'the evolution of Darwin', as
it were?) -- e.g. Darwin's delightful turns of phrase"
>Popper argues, it is Lamarckism that has
>an inductive 'logical character'. Whereas D has
>a
---- falsificationist/non-inductive/eliminativist 'logical character'
>[as per the 'jelly-point'].
>This superior, correct 'logical character' is one of the
>strong NON-EMPIRICAL grounds for preferring D
>over Lamarckism. [This argument is developed at several places in
Popper's work].
Thanks for that.
>Popper retracted his argument that D is not falsifiable (I believe I
>have posted on this before). His amended position is that
>while CERTAIN FORMULATIONS of D are barely (if at all) testable (as
>per his earlier arguments), certain D-type formulations ARE testable.
>We should, therefore, distinguish specific D-type explanations that are
testable by observation from D
>as a FRAMEWORK which suggests what type of explanation we should seek.
As a framework positing what would be an acceptable 'explanation in
principle', D may be
>NOT itself open to falsification and is not falsified simply because some
specific D-type explanation is falsified. In other words, we need to
distinguish D _qua_ metaphysical research programme from D _qua_ specific types
of testable explanation.
Excellent. I loved the expression,
"metaphysical research programme".
I'm not sure I would like to use the adjective
'metaphysical'
there, but I understand McEvoy's point.
It is Russellianism.
Russell argued that subject-predicate logic embodied what Russell, in an
attempt to be funny, called
"stone-age metaphysics".
Grice famously replied, "Surely stone-age PHYSICS".
Grice:
"The use made of the Russellian phrase
'stone-age metaphysics'
may have more rhetorical appeal than argumentative force.
Certainly
'stone-age' PHYSICS,
if by that we mean a primitive
set of hypotheses about how the world goes
which might (conceivably) be emdedded somehow or
other in ordinary language, would not be a proper object
for first-order devotion. But this fact would not prevent
something derivable or extractable from stone-age PHYSICS,
perhaps some very general characterisation of the nature
of reality, from being a proper target for serious
research."
(Grice, "Reply to Richards", p. 52).
In more or less contemporary work (Grice, 1986, "Actions and Events") Grice
goes on to distinguish the metaphysician from the scientist. One works by
_hypostasis_ (the metaphysician), one by hypothesis (the scientist). But it
would be neat to trace the main features of the so-called (by McEvoy) D as
a "metaphysical" research programme. McEvoy goes on:
"There is more to be said, particularly on reductionism. But we seem to be
agreed on the 'jelly-point': D is NOT a REDUCTIVE explanation of evolved
characteristics, and in several senses, but particularly in that it does not
explain those characteristics being as they are in a way that is entirely
reducible to [or predictable, or deducible, from] 'selection pressures'
[whereas the shape and size of the jelly may be entirely reducible
to/predictable from the shape and size of the mould, as the entirely
determinant
'selection pressure' on its shape and size]. Rather D gives a partial
explanation
of the endurance of certain characteristics (as against others) because
they are more successful at avoiding elimination by the various selection
pressures. This is much LESS A DETERMINANT explanation and allows for much
greater contingency in explaining the course of evolution [e.g. how an
asteroid disaster might wipe out a dominant species like the dinosaurs and set
evolution on a different course]. It also allows that 'selection pressures'
are often NOT SO SEVERE that only a very limited variety of life-forms could
endure them. As Popper aptly puts it, even unfit and maladapted traits may
succeed in the course of evolution - "at least until they fail"".
Good. As we browse some bibliography, we should distinguish:
D as the focus.
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE as a focus.
e.g. Newtonian physics has been the EXAMPLE given by philosophers of
science to illustrate this or that way that 'that little thing called science'
works. Also the Copernican Revolution, say. So we should doublecheck with
philosophers of science and their citations of this or that type of Darwinism
as they illustrate this or that.
The point about 'metaphysical' is not meant as pedantic. Because it could
be argued that by using 'metaphysical' we are already suggesting that
whatever that research programme encompasses will go beyond, say, Popper's
criterion of demarcation between 'science' and 'metaphysics' (broadly
construed).
But if we consider Carnap (the assistance of R. B. Jones here has been
valuable) on what Carnap calls 'external' vs. 'internal' questions may do. A
'research programme' may have (so-called) metaphysical features if these are
the features that set what counts as 'what there is', even, or what is
categorially possible, or worth an explanation, about the matter of course.
The 'metaphysical' may turn out to be the 'axiomatic' -- or as Grice would
prefer, 'the eschatological'. Grice thought that there was a discipline
missing in ontology: eschatology. Eschatology, for Grice, deals with the
nature
of categories, and category-barriers. What kind of 'category' is 'fit', or
'survive', say. And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
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