In a message dated 1/31/2011 5:03:57 P.M., donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: This independence from 'precision' is why it is not precisely correct to suggest I had Tarski in mind. I was referring to McEvoy, when he wrote: "the concept of 'ok' is arguably not a very precise one ... usually conveying a meaning that achieves only ok levels of precision" This appeal to the meta-language in the object-language _IS_ Tarskian to the backbone. Davidson's disquotational view (of truth, or "OK") is a chip from the old block: "OK" is ok "Snow is white" is OK iff snow is white. ---- "OK" is a concept in the object-language. If we say ""OK" is OK" we are using, in the predicate, "OK" metalinguistically. To say that "OK" "conveys a meaning that achieves only OK levels of precision" involves a liar-type paradox: (OK) OK is OK cfr. (S) S is true Etc. Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html