Re: [quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 17:11:18 -0700 (PDT)
Hi Larry:
Thanks & your point about compositionality is a good one.
Still, I'm wondering about how we know how LOT builds up the compositions. For
example, it seems natural to think that OR, AND, and NOT are LOT elements. But,
all of the logical operators can be build up out of NOR by itself or just NAND
by itself. So, does my embedded mentalese have a NOR or a NAND or something
else?
The carburetor example is pretty funny. It seems like Fodor just will not
retreat under any circumstances.
Thanks!
--Ron
--- On Fri, 10/1/10, Larry Tapper <larry_tapper@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: Larry Tapper <larry_tapper@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Friday, October 1, 2010, 1:17 PM
Ron Allen writes:
RA> But, what I'm wondering with the Language Of Thought is that it seems like
you could argue that for easy logical concepts, like AND and OR and NOT, but
what about odd ones like the material conditional? This is something a lot of
people have trouble with, and the only way to teach is by the truth table.
There is no LOT item for p -> q for a lot of people.
Hello Ron,
But if there's a LOT item for CARBURETOR, as Fodor famously argued, it wouldn't
seem too much of a stretch to say there's one for the material conditional.
Well, maybe he didn't put the CARBURETOR example quite so baldly --- IIRC the
idea was that the concept could be built up compositionally, but the
acquisition of it couldn't be explained without appealing to something like
innate LOT elements.
The material conditional case seems analogous to that, because once you've got
NOT and OR, you can build it from those, i.e. p->q is equivalent to NOT-p OR q.
I also rather dimly recall Fodor writing about "triggering events" which call
forth combinations of LOT elements from the depths. In the material conditional
case, I suppose the triggering event would be a dull one --- your logic teacher
trying to drum the truth table into your head. But, the argument might go, the
concept acquisition succeeds because you've already got NOT and OR.
Regards, Larry
--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@...> wrote:
>
> I agree. I don't see the truth table as containing an 'and' within it. But,
> Fodor is aware that Peacocke is trying to carefully avoid circularity, and
> tries to pin him with the charge of circularity at a deeper level (this is on
> p. 44 where Fodor begins the John & Mary swim argument). I'm thinking that
> Fodor's argument there is incorrect, and I hope to get to that a little later
> today.
> Â
> Yes, as I understand the LOT, it would justify these types of definitions.
> You already have a CONJUNCTION concept built into your brain at birth.
> Â
> But, what I'm wondering with the Language Of Thought is that it seems like
> you could argue that for easy logical concepts, like AND and OR and NOT, but
> what about odd ones like the material conditional? This is something a lot of
> people have trouble with, and the only way to teach is by the truth table.
> There is no LOT item for p -> q for a lot of people.
> Â
> --Ron
>
> --- On Fri, 10/1/10, walto <calhorn@...> wrote:
>
>
> From: walto <calhorn@...>
> Subject: [quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
> To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Friday, October 1, 2010, 12:05 PM
>
>
> Â
>
>
>
>
>
> --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@> wrote:
> >
> > As a pole around which to argue about types of circular reasoning, Fodor
> > introduces another rule (R) in his polemic against Peacocke:
> > ÂÂ
> > (R) the inference to 'p and q' is valid iff p and q are both true
> > ÂÂ
> > Now, this appears to be circular, because the elucidation of what 'p and q'
> > should mean relies on an instance of "and". Fodor goes on to say that
> > there's basically (almost) nothing wrong with this, because the second
> > instance of 'and' is a metalanguage element. In fact, Fodor says that as
> > long as this is a theory of the content of AND, it's all right to rely on
> > an instance of AND in the metalanguage. But, to be precise, Fodor argues,
> > it's not OK for a theory about how AND is learned to presuppose a language
> > with the concept of conjuction already present. >This would be a circular
> > argument.
>
> I still don't see why the replication of a truth table commits this fallacy.
> But, in any case, wouldn't Fodor's "language of thought" itself be a language
> that allows for 'and' to be learned precisely because it contains a concept
> of conjunction itself?
>
> W
>
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