Re: [quickphilosophy] Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 11:22:16 -0700 (PDT)
As a pole around which to argue about types of circular reasoning, Fodor
introduces another rule (R) in his polemic against Peacocke:
(R) the inference to 'p and q' is valid iff p and q are both true
Now, this appears to be circular, because the elucidation of what 'p and q'
should mean relies on an instance of "and". Fodor goes on to say that there's
basically (almost) nothing wrong with this, because the second instance of
'and' is a metalanguage element. In fact, Fodor says that as long as this is a
theory of the content of AND, it's all right to rely on an instance of AND in
the metalanguage. But, to be precise, Fodor argues, it's not OK for a theory
about how AND is learned to presuppose a language with the concept of
conjuction already present. This would be a circular argument.
I'm at the middle of p. 43 right now. Gotta go get some Thai food for lunch.
Back in a bit.
--Ron
--- On Fri, 10/1/10, Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [quickphilosophy] Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Friday, October 1, 2010, 9:49 AM
Hi quick group:
I'm still digging my way through Section 3.3 of Fodor's article 'Having
Concepts'. In the last paragraph beginning on p. 41, Fodor claims that Peacocke
(A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) commits an equivocation
in formulating the concept possession condition for the implicit definition
theory.
Peacocke says that someone has to follow the CONJUNCTION scheme (below, in
point 2. of my earlier post; it's on p. 41 of Fodor's article, where it's
labeled (I)) by virtue of its form alone. So Fodor says, well, does that mean
that the form is causally sufficient for the subject of Peacocke's experiment
to find them compelling? or, if not, then is that the reason that the subject
has for being compelled?
It seems to me, though, that this is a false dichotomy. If the form isn't
causally sufficient, then something else is required for the cause; it doesn't
mean that the form of the schema is the reason for the subject's compulsion.
All Peacocke wants out of this is to say that, whatever the motivation or
impetus for the subject to assent to the schema, it's the forms themselves, and
not some external factor, like whether the subject agrees with or approves of
the propositions p and q in the claim pCq, that result in the subject's
demonstrating facility with the schema. The subject doesn't have to have a
reason; she only has to follow the pattern of the implicit definition. And, the
cause for the subject's performance would probably include something besides
the form of the schema, such as knowledge of the word 'C' in her language,
willingness to play the game and assent or dissent, and so forth. But, again,
Peacocke doesn't need to define causal
sufficiency for the subject's performance; he only wants to show that this
performance, if it can be demonstrated, whatever its cause, is sufficient to
indicate possession of the concept CONJUNCTION.
So, this little paragraph does not, by my lights, do much damage to Peacocke's
exposition.
Thanks for your patience!
--Ron
--- On Thu, 9/30/10, Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [quickphilosophy] Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Thursday, September 30, 2010, 10:36 AM
Hi qp group:
Ah, it seems that my first post on this topic did make it to the list, but my
spam filter directed my email copy to the Spam folder. It protected me from
spamming myself. I feel so much safer now.
Anyway, Fodor's target now is two camps that are fellow-travelers of the BCP
crowd: the conceptual role group (Boghossian) and the implicit definition group
(Peacocke). It seems to me that BCP is more limited in its claims that these
other thinkers. In other words, you can sort and make inferences without
necessarily having a set of rules for conceptual roles or an implicit
definition. So Fodor seems to be attacking those that go a step beyond plain
vanilla BCP.
Also, it would seem to me that Boghossian would have to support BCP's
conditions for concept possession. If you were sophisticated enough to follow a
set of rules for expressions, then you'd be able to distinguish items in the
extension (sorting), and you'd be able to make inferences (which is just to
follow the rules in various situations). Similarly, holding an implicit
definition would imply being able to sort and being able to infer.
The upshot is that Fodor could damage conceptual role semantics and could
flummox implicit definiton and yet leave vanilla BCP unscathed.
Where does Fodor's attack begin? First he observes that conceptual role
semantics cannot be simply asserting that it's possible to provide rules.
That's easy enough to do in the case of referring expressions, like 'bachelor'.
What could be dicey for conceptual role advocates to claim is that grasping a
concept is to be identified with grasping the rules for the introduction and
elimination of the concept, as in the case of CONJUNCTION given in the last
post.
(The introduction of CONJUNCTION just means that you are given p and q and you
deduce pCq, introducing the C-symbol. Elimination means that you are given pCq,
and from that you infer p (eliminating the C-symbol) or q (no C again).)
Fodor states that in the case of the logical constants, that's what conceptual
role semantics has to do. In other words, Fodor is saying that in the case of
their treatment of the logical constants, that conceptual role semantics merges
with implicit definition concept possession. I think that's what he's saying
in the 3rd paragraph beginning on p. 41 of his article.
Fodor is going to argue that the stronger claim to which the conceptual role
and implicit definition camps must commit--namely that introduction and
elimination rules must be identified with concept possession, not just possible
from concept possession--cannot be sustained.
I hope this isn't too plodding. I find this part of Fodor's article difficult.
Thanks!
--Ron
--- On Wed, 9/29/10, Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [quickphilosophy] Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Wednesday, September 29, 2010, 6:45 AM
Hi quickphilosophy group:
I tried to post this last night, but it didn't stick for some reason. Probably
my ISP at fault.
Fodor has another argument in Section 3.3 of his paper 'Having Concepts' that
argues against 'conceptual role' semantics and the idea of an implicit
definition as the basis for concept possession.
1. Conceptual role semantics assigns rules to expressions that govern their
use. There might be rules for referring expressions, such as 'flywheel', but
the best examples are of logical constants, such as AND and OR, because these
don't seem to have referents, and the only way to explain how they are used is
to specify use rules. An example of a conceptual role semanticist is Paul
Boghossian, whose forthcoming paper Fodor cites. (Fodor writes in 2004, and
Prof. Boghossian's paper appeared in Nous in Aug 1996; here's a link to a draft
on his NYU
homepage: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/boghossian/papers/AnalyticityReconsidered.html).
He says that "Implicit definition: It is by arbitrarily stipulating that
certain sentences of logic are to be true, or that certain inferences are to be
valid, that we attach a meaning to the logical constants. More specifically, a
particular constant means that logical object, if any, which makes valid a
specified set of sentences and/or inferences involving it."
2. The implicit definition camp is also represented by Christopher Peacocke, (A
Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Peacocke says that
"Conjunction is that concept C to posess which a thinker must find transitions
that are instances of the following forms primitively compelling, and must do
so because they are of these forms:
p
q pCq pCq
--- ----- ------
pCq p q "
(I hope that format aligns well in the group's page.) This is on p. 6 of
Peacocke's book. Fodor inserts "[inferential]" before "transitions" in the
quote above. So, basically, you possess the concept of CONJUNCTION if and only
if you're compelled by these transitions, which define the notion of logical
AND.
Let me see if this reply sticks.
Thanks!
--Ron
--- On Mon, 9/13/10, Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: Ron Allen <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [quickphilosophy] Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Monday, September 13, 2010, 10:47 PM
Hi kwikphil group:
Just to recapitulate: Fodor finds in section 3.3 of his paper 'Having
Concepts,' that there is a vicious circle in the BCP analysis of concept
possession. The sorting criterion (one of two, the other being inferential
skill) that is partly sufficient for concept possession depends on the notion
of the concept possessor possessing the same or an equivalent concept in order
to perform the sorting. So, attempting to explain concept possession in terms
of sorting and inference relies on (by way of the first condition, sorting) a
notion of concept possession already, and the concept in question is the same
or conceptually the same ans the one that BCP hopes to analyze. Circular, and
viciously so at that.
But Fodor goes on to remark (p. 40) that this has irked many philosophers, and
Wittgenstein is one of them. Here is how Fodor reviews W's difficulties in
being a sophisticated BCP advocate, beset by the burden of the circularity that
Fodor is gesturing at:
1. For W, having a concept involves knowing a criterion for applying a concept.
[rla, insert] Note that a "criterion" for Wittgenstein is a problematic and
plastic term. I think that Baker and Hacker comment upon this, and that along
with Fodor, we need to be cautious in throwing the concept around.
2. Thus, minimally, one can apply the concept in good instances in favorable
conditions.
3. Second for W, the application criteria for a concept are constitutive of its
content.
[rla] PI.208 seems to say this.
4. Fodor picks an example again: PAIN. The criteria for its 2nd person
application are behavioral.
5. To have the PAIN concept is to sort pains from non-pains [and (rla) to make
inferences; BCP isn't asserting that sorting alone suffices] by behavioral
manifestations.
6. But, the PAIN concept isn't the same as the BEHAVIOR-MANIFESTATION-OF-PAIN
concept.
7. A good instance of the behavioral manifestation an instance of pain, or not?
8. Fodor does not think so, and he thinks that W should be confounded by this
as well: No wonder that W said things like "pain isn't a something" but "it
isn't a nothing either".
[rla: this is Philosophical Investigations 304].
9. In summary, Fodor claims that "...either there is no sorting condition on
concept possession or, if you prefer, the sorting condition that there is is
circular." He has also convicted Wittgenstein, a bona fide sophisticated BCPer,
along with the hapless and crude BCP advocates (Skinner and Quine), of the
charge of circular reasoning.
Next on the menu, Fodor is going to find vicious circularity within the
inference condition that BCP asserts for concept possession. I'll cover this in
the next few posts. Mostly, it's an attack on the theory of concepts that
Peacocke advances in A Study of Concepts, MIT Press, 1992.
Thanks!
--Ron
--- On Mon, 9/13/10, wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx <wavelets@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [quickphilosophy] Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Monday, September 13, 2010, 11:46 AM
Hi quickphilosophers:
Fodor claims that neither of the conditions that Bare-Bones Concept Pragmatism
(BCP) finds to be jointly sufficient for concept possession, sorting and
inference, can be formulated without a vicious circularity.
Beginning with the sorting criterion in Section 3.3 of his article 'Having
Concepts,' Fodor worries about the extension of a sort. He proceeds by example.
1. Consider someone that can sort DOGs according to the concept of a BARKER.
This sort works as long as the only things that bark are DOGs and all DOGs
bark.
2. So, for the sort to be a criterion for concept possession, it seems that
sort must be successful in counterfactual conditions: the sort must work for
cases of barking non-dogs, canine non-barkers, and so on.
3. Yet, it seems that even under counterfactual conditions, the extension that
results from a sort does not determine the concept that motivates the sort.
4. To show this, Fodor offers more examples: (a) TRIANGLE and
CLOSED-TRILATERAL, (b) TWO and EVEN-PRIME, and (c) WATER and H2O.
5. You can have the first of these concepts, without having the second.
6. Thus, the necessary coextension of two sorts does not imply that the sorts
reveal the same concept.
7. One must sort according to some concept that one has.
8. BCP must therefore claim that only sorts according to a conceptually
equivalent concept can produce the same sort.
9. So BCP must claim that the sorting condition for a concept possession C
presupposed some possessed concept C' that is either identical to C or
conceptually equivalent to C.
10. This is a vicious circle.
Fodor goes on to comment on how Wittgenstein attempted to deal with this
circularity. I'll cover that in my next post.
Thanks!
--Ron
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