[quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity + Peacocke

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2010 19:05:02 -0000

--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@...> wrote:
> As a pole around which to argue about types of circular reasoning, Fodor 
> introduces another rule (R) in his polemic against Peacocke:
> (R) the inference to 'p and q' is valid iff p and q are both true
> Now, this appears to be circular, because the elucidation of what 'p and q' 
> should mean relies on an instance of "and". Fodor goes on to say that there's 
> basically (almost) nothing wrong with this, because the second instance of 
> 'and' is a metalanguage element. In fact, Fodor says that as long as this is 
> a theory of the content of AND, it's all right to rely on an instance of AND 
> in the metalanguage. But, to be precise, Fodor argues, it's not OK for a 
> theory about how AND is learned to presuppose a language with the concept of 
> conjuction already present. >This would be a circular argument.

I still don't see why the replication of a truth table commits this fallacy.  
But, in any case, wouldn't Fodor's "language of thought" itself be a language 
that allows for 'and' to be learned precisely because it contains a concept of 
conjunction itself?


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