[Wittrs] Re: formal arguments/thought experiments/1st and 2nd order props
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 20:58:31 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> Budd:
> > > And I diagnose:
> > >
> > > Yes, once you talk of functional properties as first-order properties,
> > > you entertain Searle's biological naturalism!
>
>
> Stuart:
> > So on your view computational processes running on computers are what
> > Searle means by "biological naturalism"?
>
> Budd:
> No. It is what you mean without knowing it. You don't distinguish the two.
> Both are on a par.
>
Uhhuh, yep, right! Now can you demonstrate any of this with some reasons to
back up what is otherwise just bald assertion?
You say here that I mean something other than I said and yet offer nothing to
support that.
Then you say I don't make a distinction between the two. What distinction do
you mean? The one I already said I don't make and see no reason to make? What
is the point of noting that I don't do what I have already said I don't do in
order to demonstrate I am wrong for not doing it?
Finally you say "both are on a par". Isn't this just a reassertion of what you
initially said when you asserted that speaking of the role computers have vis a
vis software in the AI project is equivalent to
Searle's thesis that biological naturalism is the best way to describe how
brains, a patently biological occurrence in the natural world, do what they do?
Why oh why would anyone think there is any reason to equate Searle's thesis of
biological naturalism (about brains) with the computationalist thesis that
certain kinds of computers (having sufficient capacity) can run certain kinds
of programs to achieve the same results brains achieve? Especially, given the
fact that Searle expends all his not inconsiderable energies on attacking the
idea of "strong AI" the thesis that consciousness can be replicated (not just
simulated) on computers?
>
> Stuart:
> > Well we must have missed something because there isn't anything
> > "biological" or "natural" (as in naturally occurring) in computers!
>
> Budd:
> So says Searle given his distinction between 1st and 2nd order properties.
>
> Respond to my argument from the other day. Just what will you say?
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
WHAT argument from the other day? If you make a case, backed up with reasons I
am always willing to respond. But when you just shoot from the lip with a
blunderbuss of assertions about things like who Dennett "spanks" or how Fodor
goes him one better or that Searle thinks that computers are an instance of
biological naturalism, well then I frankly don't know what to say in response.
Such claims are all over the map and lack sufficient rational integrity to
figure out what's meant in order to even offer a response.
SWM
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