Here is the problem illustrated: Gordon Swobe's Red Chicken: Let us say I have the Chinese encyclopedia situation as Gordon describes. Further assume that Searle's axiom 3 = true; syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. Now let us say that whenever this Chinese encyclopedia task occurs a Red Chicken appears and a Red Chicken never appears unless an attempt is made to decipher Chinese from the syntax using the encyclopedia. I think what SWM is saying is this: A red chicken is not the same as the deciphering of Chinese. A red chicken is caused by the deciphering of Chinese It is an empirical fact whether a Red Chicken always, and only, appears when the deciphering Chinese situation occurs not a conclusion that can be drawn apriori independent of fact. On this fact the assertion of causality is based. Seale is not producing any factual basis (Ok I understand Kant enough to know that neccessity implies the apriori but I am using shorthand - you know what I mean when I say "always and only" re the meaning of a theory of "always and only" whose "always and only-ness" has been checked and never found to fail but is perpetually disprovable as in Popper.) Now here is the interesting part of what I think at least SWM is saying.... The red chicken is not a separate entity from the deciphering even though the fact of it is not the fact of the deciphering because the red chicken is always and only caused by the deciphering. Now substitute "blue chicken" for red... same answer... substitute "a planet like mars" .... same answer... so substitute... "the semantics of chinese".... same answer - QED for SWM. You cannot determine that something is caused or not caused by something simply by determining that the fact of it is not the fact of the something that is causing it. Therefore the chinese room fails because causality can only be determined by a factual determination so no conclusion can be obtained without an empirical source. (I note only that for consciousness - as opposed to the red chicken! - we will never have such any empirical source but the room may! ;) This is true as long as we don't do what is being posited with respect to melding minds with memories remaining intact etc. But its second order) The confusion is in the meaning of causality and its relation to being. There is a deliberate fallacy in the analogy I am making because consciousness is not an object and a red chicken is but it illustrates the logic of the problem still. The real problem: I assert that it is possible for anything to cause anything as SWM states, provided no mechanism for the causality to occur is required to assert causality. I note that for example electron-positron pair production lacks a mechanism also as does most of physics so the absence of a mechanism for the cause does not imply any sense of lacking relative to the effects documented by the physical sciences. I therefore assert that mechanism-less causality is inherent in material causality for all but naive materialism. Some believe that a mechanism for the causality of consciousness does in fact exist and is now being determined by neurology and cybernetics. Which mechanism causes consciousness we may find, but that is not the same as finding a mechanism for the cause. If I scratch my head and a rabbit always and only appears then I have found that scratching my head is the cause of the rabbit but it does not mean I have found a mechanism for that cause. A mechanism for a cause is a kind of principle that explains how the movement of the mechanism results in the caused effect not a statement that the movement of the mechanism does in fact reliably cause the effect. That does not exclude causality. In fact, physics in the usual case is no longer mechanistic except in an approximate sense in the case of macroscopic material objects. That a material arrangement when made causes consciousness is a very old fact known by parents. That there exists a mechanism for this like some complex watch cannot be true - and it is wrong to assert that it is being found. No matter. Most of the effects that physics documents also lack mechanism. We just assert that they reliably occur and hence gain the predictive power of the science. And the determination of exactly what physical effects produce exactly what consciousness will be more than enough accomplishment for neurology and cybernetics. On Apr 15, 7:07 am, Gordon Swobe <gts_2...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > --- On Thu, 4/15/10, SWM <wittrs...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Your encyclopedia example is just more of the same mistake > > you keep making. It's just another version of the CR with > > the same fundamental error > > Unbelievable! > > <rolling eyes> :) > > -gts > > ========================================== > > Need Something? Check here:http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/ ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/