--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > I understand equivocating and I'm not equivocating. > > You can't come to understand the meanings of symbols from knowing only their > forms. More precisely, syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor > sufficient for semantics. > > That's all the 3rd axiom means. Nothing more, nothing less. > > Not a complicated concept! > > -gts > Non-identity does not imply non-causality and that isn't complicated either and, moreover, it's the relevant issue here. NO ONE DOUBTS OR DENIES THE FIRST CLAIM WHICH IS WHAT YOUR READING OF THE THIRD PREMISE AMOUNTS TO. It's the second claim, that the third premise means that what is called "syntax" (computational processes running on computers) can't cause what is called "semantics" (meaning as content in minds) that is in dispute. And the fact that the non-identity reading is true says nothing about whether the non-causal reading is. It's a logical equivocation to suppose it does or to miss the fact that it doesn't and, if you subscribe to the conclusion of the CRA on the basis of the truth of its premises, including the third premise, then you are being taken in by the equivocation. Since you did not formulate this argument, Searle did, I would not say you are guilty of the equivocation, just that you are a victim of it. Moreover, denying that you are, or that Searle equivocated in that arguent, isn't evidence you aren't or that he didn't. It's just to follow your usual pattern of asserting your case instead of arguing for it. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/