--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > --- On Thu, 4/15/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > > Look, the CRA is about whether so-called "Strong AI" is > > possible. "Strong AI" is Searle's name for the thesis that > > one can produce consciousness via programs on computers. So > > the issue IS entirely about what a computer can or cannot > > do, i.e., can it CAUSE consciousness as brains do. > > > > If it's not about THAT, the whole exercise is pointless. > > Right, but the CR thought experiment/3rd axiom is not "about that". Wrong. There is nothing to show if it's not about that because no one thinks that syntax IS semantics. > It's about syntax and semantics and nothing else -- just one leg of the three > legged stool that leads to the conclusion that programs don't cause minds. > And it's the stool that's the issue. > For whatever reason, you can't see clear to separate the three legs of the > stool. You confabulate and imagine arguments that don't exist. > The reason is simple. NO ONE THINKS SYNTAX IS SEMANTICS. The issue is what does it take to produce "semantics"? If non-identity doesn't imply non-causality then the fact that syntax isn't semantics is irrelevant to the conclusion. > The actual CRA is very simple. Given A, B and C, D is true. And A means A and > nothing else, B means B and nothing else, and C means C and nothing else. > The CRA purports to lead to certain conclusions. That's why it's called the Chinese Room ARGUMENT -- CRA. > > I am challenging the validity of that conclusion for the > > reason that the third premise is misleading BECAUSE it > > equivocates its meaning, shifting from a denial of identity > > (undoubtedly true) to a denial of causality (not undoubedtly > > true based on the CR and very likely false > > The "denial of causality" argument does not exist in the 3rd axiom, which > tells us only that no agent of any kind can obtain semantic understanding > from syntax. Then it doesn't support the conclusion of the CRA and the argument is shown to be mistaken. > You imagine a "denial of causality" claim in the 3rd axiom because it exists > in the conclusion (where syntactic programs don't *cause* minds) and you > don't like the conclusion. > > gts > The conclusion is shown to be unsustained by the premises because a denial of identity does not imply a denial of causality. This has nothing to do with my preferences, especially since I initially thought the CRA was right and agreed with its conclusions. Only on more careful consideration and analysis did I realize something was wrong with it and then just what that something was. It was two things: 1) The misleading equivocation in the third premise; and 2) The underlying presumption of dualism in the CR which leads to the conflation of the two readings in the equivocal third premise. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/