[Wittrs] The Self-Refuting Argument
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 01 Nov 2009 11:05:37 -0500
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>the postulate (that there are other consciousnesses outside the data
>>of immediate experience) is itself experienced; and, the postulate
>>(that there are no other consciousnesses outside the data of immediate
>>experience) is itself experienced.
>>the point is that virtually everyone on the planet makes one of these
>>postulates.
>>I accept the first postulate as true even though it is a
>>metaphenomenal claim; namely, that there are other consciousness
>>besides me in the world.
>>the question is whether you make one of these two postulates; and, if
>>so, which one.
>Holding the picture that other people are accompanied by other
>consciousnesses is not a choice I make, but a default condition (PI
>425).
PI 420 is to the same effect, I think. this tacit assumption is
effectively innate; at least, for those with a normal nervous system.
but, assuming that reality conforms to this default belief is still
making a metaphenomenal assumption --- a statement as to what is or is
not beyond experience.
in any case, the question is what to make of the empirical fact that
virtually all of these other consciousnesses self-reference by using the
first person singular pronoun for that purpose.
what basis would any philosopher have to claim that self-referencing is
inherently nonsensical?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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