[Wittrs] The Alleged 4th Premise
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 06:49:53 -0400
Gordon Swobe wrote:
>Here we see the logical structure of Searle's formal argument as given
>in his article in Scientific American that I referenced earlier.
>(A1) Programs are formal (syntactic).
>(A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).
>(A3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for
>semantics. (This is what the Chinese room experiment shows.)
>(C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.
>(This conclusion should follow without controversy from the first three
>axioms.)
C1 *does* follow from the first three axioms alone.
the controversy that Stuart is promoting does not concern the validity
of the argument. it concerns the grounds for thinking that A3 is true.
Stuart writes [2010-03-27 - 09:49 PM]:
>My point is that there's a fourth, suppressed premise, that Searle
>doesn't notice, i.e., that the only way the third premise (the one
>about not being constitutive of nor sufficient for) can be true,
>WITHOUT ADDING ANY EMPIRICAL INFORMATION (as in research to confirm
>Hawkins thinking or Edelman's), is if we think consciousness has a
>certain characteristic, namely that it must be a process property and
>therefore irreducible to constituents that are qualitatively different
>than itself.
this statement alleges that the third premise would be true if and only
consciousness is a process property; and, therefore, irreducible to
constituents qualitatively different from itself
this so called '4th premise' is logically equivalent to an argument
consisting of two premises and a conclusion.
[S1]: consciousness is a process property (of the brain)
[S2]: a process property is irreducible to constituents that are
qualitatively different from itself
[S3]: (therefore) consciousness is irreducible to constituents that are
qualitatively different from itself
controversy follows in a number of ways, including (but not limited to):
* from the suggestion that the so-called 4th premise is required to make
the CRA logically valid
* from Stuart's claim that something about the allegedly necessary 4th
premise means that Searle is a Cartesian style interactive Substance
Dualist, ISD.
* from Stuart's claim that something about the allegedly necessary 4th
premise means that Searle contradicts himself or is otherwise confused
(or both).
* from the claim that there is one and only one way that Searle's third
premise can be true.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Stuart,
I challenge the last point, the claim that there is one and only one way
that Searle's third premise can be true.
I pointed out a few days ago that "there are grounds unrelated to the
CRA Presumption for believing that syntax does not constitute and is not
sufficient for semantics".
you replied, "I have NEVER, EVER denied that there are other grounds for
claiming the CRA's conclusion is true".
the bulk of your argument (eg that Searle is a closet Cartesian, that
Searle contradicts himself) hinges on the claim that there is only one
way that the third premise could be true.
if there are alternate grounds for believing that Searle's third premise
is true; then, you have contradicted yourself.
you're argument self-destructs.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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