BruceD wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>just to be clear, Searle's actual claim is that consciousness is not >>ontologically reducible (even though causally reducible) to the brain >>processes that cause it; and, we are both treating that position as a >>sufficient basis for claiming that, for Searle, consciousness is an >>ontological basicality. >Help me grasp the difference between ontological and causal reduction, >please. Take a tooth ache. In what sense can the ache be reduced to >brain processes but still not reduced ontologically. the form of your question begs an obvious question: how do we know that the toothache is 'reduced' at all. let's say that you have a damaged tooth; that you experience pain; and, that you conclude that the damaged tooth (T) causes the pain (P). schematically, you are saying: P is caused by T now, as you know (because you helped bring this out), a cause can not be identical to its own effect. this is due to Leibniz's Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. (the tooth has a property the pain doesn't have so they can't be identical). in short, causality implies non-identity. the non-identity of brain state or brain process and experience leaves us with two 'items'; and, this strikes some people as being dualistic; so, they would prefer to say: P is nothing more than T. that 'reduces' the number of items to be explained back down to 1; hence, it is an 'ontological reduction'. claims about causal and or ontological reductions are just rhetorical tactics employed for the strategic objective of 'proving' that evidence establishing that P is caused by T really establishes that P is nothing more than T. Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/