[Wittrs] Re: Newsflash: Stuart Nominated for a Cicero Award
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2010 21:45:08 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>SWM wrote:
>
> >>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>... the third axiom makes these two claims because it is the
> >>conjunction of two statements each of which makes one of these claims.
> >>Searle's claim that the third axiom is conceptually true is a claim
> >>that each of the conjoined statements is conceptually true.
>
> >But only one is manifestly conceptually true
>
> what is the difference between 'manifestly conceptually true' and
> 'conceptually true'? are you trying to sneak back in your well-trashed
> claim that the third axiom is 'self-evidently true'?
>
> given that the CRA is valid in form, the third axiom only needs to be
> true to justify saying that the conclusion of the CRA is true.
>
The addition of "mainfestly" was to address your prior comment, Joe, that just
because something was conceptually true didn't mean it was self-evident. Hence,
I added "mainfestly" here to make clear that it is self-evident as well as
conceptually true. Of course, your response is, typically, to try to come up
with a new problem!
> now, we happen to be talking about the conceptual analysis that
> justifies saying that the third axiom is conceptually true; but, we are
> not limited to showing that it the third axiom true because it is
> conceptually true; and, we are certainly not required to show that the
> third axiom is 'manifestly conceptually true'.
>
Pointless.
> >As I noted above, one can use "constitute" to make a causal claim in
> >certain cases, too, as Searle does.
>
> where does Searle do this?
>
> I don't recall any such case.
>
The wetness of water . . .
> >However, the claim of the CRA depends on the idea that "constituting"
> >consciousness in the CR means having some feature or property we
> >recognize as understanding. BUT IF CONSCIOUSNESS (UNDERSTANDING) IS
> >SEEN TO BE A SYSTEM PROPERTY THEN THE ONLY THING THE CR SHOWS IS THAT
> >THAT PARTICULAR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION DOESN'T DO IT. It says NOTHING
> >about what the constituent elements of the system can do in other
> >configurations.
>
> the CRA only says what the constituent elements of a system can't 'do'
> (cause) or 'be' (constitute) if that system operates solely by syntactic
> transformations.
>
The point is it does not. It only shows what that particular system can't do
because of what it is. As Dennett correctly notes, the system leaves important
things out. It is, in other words, underspecked.
> >Thus, as I have said here numerous times, the CRA depends finally on a
> >dualistic presumption about consciousness, i.e., that it is
> >ontologically basic, irreducible to anything more basic ontologically
> >than itself. Dispense with that presumption and the CR does not
> >demonstrate the inability of CR type processes to cause consciousness
> >because what they cannot do in isolation is not necessarily denied them
> >in the right kind of combination.
>
> unless you can explain why formalist mathematicians do not need to
> presuppose interactive substance dualism, you haven't shown that the CRA
> depends on a presupposition of interactive substance dualism.
>
Demonstrate that instead of asserting it. And show why it's even relevant.
> >>>>the third axiom is the conjunction of two statements, each of which
> >>>>makes a distinct claim:
>
> >>>>[1] syntax does not constitute semantics
> >>>>[2] syntax is not sufficient [for causing] semantics.
>
> >>>>notice the 'and' that it contains. that indicates that the third
> >>>>axiom is a complex statement.
>
> >>>The presence of a conjunction does not imply anything about the way
> >>>the phrases on either side of it should be interpreted.
>
> >>logically, the presence of the conjunction, 'and', does not alter the
> >>meaning of the statements it conjoins.
>
> >And both sides of the conjunction can be read in both ways.
>
> are you saying that the statement 'syntax does not constitute semantics'
> in isolation must be read in both ways?
>
I AM SAYING SEARLE READS IT IN BOTH WAYS IN ORDER TO REACH HIS CONCLUSION.
> >Because the statements are made in ordinary language we have to
> >determine their meaning and dual readings are possible. It is these
> >dual readings that allow us to conflate a non-identity claim with a
> >non-causality claim.
>
> if you choose a reading that 'allows' you 'to conflate a non-identity
> claim with a non-causality claim', then you, not Searle, is responsible
> for any resulting equivocation or other fallacy.
>
Searle says the third premise is conceptually true but only one reading is. But
it's not the one that supports his non-causality claim!
> >>unless, of course, you invent a new rule of logic that is [so] bizarre
> >>that it is without precedent in the entire history of rational
> >>thought:
>
> >Oooh, that hurts!
>
> it should. it was sufficient for me to nominate you for a Cicero award.
>
> [NB: the Cicero is awarded annually on April 1 by the town council of
> Arpinum, birthplace of Marcus Tullius Cicero who once said that no idea
> is so absurd that it hasn't been advocated by some philosopher. the
> Cicero is awarded to that individual who, in the previous year, has best
> demonstrated that Cicero's indictment of philosophy is still valid.]
>
> Joe
I'll leave the absurdities to guys like you who think dualism is needed, either
implicitly or explicitly, when there are better and far more reasonable
accounts out there for the taking.
SWM
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
