[Wittrs] Re: Let's Try Something a Little More Formal --- Deconflation
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2010 21:36:45 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
<snip>
>
> >That's probably because you share his preconception about consciousness
> >and so are inclined to conflate identity with causation in this case.
>
> no. the truth is that, against your verbose opposition, I am
> *deconflating* identity, constitution and causation.
>
Verbosity is only necessary because you don't get the point.
> >In fact, if consciousness IS irreducible as dualists would think,
>
> are you saying that *only* dualists think that consciousness IS
> irreducible? if so, then it would follow that Dennett (whom we agree is
> not a substance dualist) thinks that consciousness *is* reducible.
>
Dennett does think consciousness is reducible, i.e., to things (physical
events) that are not themselves conscious and are more basic than the
phenomenon we call consciousnss.
> in what sense(s) of 'reduction' does Dennett say that consciousness is
> reducible? causal reduction? ontological reduction? something else?
>
That it can be explained in terms of the physical processes going on in brains.
> >Thus "constitutes" (which is another variant of the identity claim)
>
> now you are conflating constitution and identity.
>
> you might read the page on Material Constitution at SEP for insight into
> the ongoing philosophical debate over whether claims of constitution and
> claims of identity constitute identical claims.
>
> "What is the relationship between a clay statue and the lump of clay
> from which it is formed? We might say that the lump constitutes the
> statue, but what is this relation of material constitution?
Why conflate "material constitution" with "constitution" in this case? I have
given no indication that that was what I had in mind!
> Some insist
> that constitution is identity, on the grounds that distinct material
> objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Others argue that
> constitution is not identity, since the statue and the lump differ in
> important respects."
> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/]
>
This shows that "constitution" is not a fixed concept but varies with usage (as
most words do, of course -- though philosophers are often prone to forgetting
or just missing this fact). The question, however, is what Searle has in mind
when he employs the term in his third premise:
"Syntax does not constitute and is not sufficient for semantics" -- a statement
that, Searle tells us, is "conceptually true". But what about it is
"conceptually true"? Well, that syntax is not the same as semantics is. If you
have an instance of syntax it is not to say (and not sufficient to say) you
have an instance of semantics!
But non-identity does not imply non-causality in and of itself (though there is
at least one possibility where it might: if to cause is also to constitute or
be that thing -- but then that would need to be shown to be the case, not
merely assumed, as Searle does in the CR).
> >would be a way of referring to causation in this case and the idea that
> >syntax can't constitute what consciousness has (understanding,
> >semantics, etc.) seems to support the CRA's conclusion a la Searle.
> >However, IF consciousness (i.e., understanding in this case) is a
> >system level property (a function of complexity in the operations)
> >rather than an irreducible property of some operation,
>
> does the complexity of operations make a system property reducible; and,
> if so, to what is consciousness reducible according to Dennett?
>
What makes a system property reducible to the constituents of the system making
it up is that it occurs only as an outcome and not a co-existent of that
system. Consciousness is reducible to the processes running in sync as a
complex system on brains and, theoretically at least, any other physical
platform capable of running an equivalent system.
> >then the issue of constitutes qua causation no longer works.
>
> now, you are insisting on conflating constitution and causation even
> though you agree that such a conflation is unworkable.
>
Sometimes it works and this goes back to the way we speak, the force of
ordinary language. After all, even Searle notes that the wetness of water is
caused by the behavior of the H20 molecules that make up (constitute) water
(what we mean by the term "water").
> >Because we don't see these fine points in the way the third premise is
> >phrased without a lot of careful parsing, it elides the idea of
> >non-identity into one of non-causality.
>
> the third axiom makes claims of non-constitution and non-causation.
>
And non-constitution can be read as either non-identity or non-causality. There
is no formal logical relation of "constitution" in the way there is that of
"identity". You have to pay attention to ordinary language, which is something
philosophers should generally do anyway, instead of thinking that formal logic
offers a magical elixir for getting at the truth.
> >as we have seen in the past, I am not entirely alone in such
> >criticisms of the Searlean argument
>
> can you cite a philosopher who agrees with your treatment of 'and' as a
> bidirectional meaning assignment operator?
>
> Joe
That is you invention, not my claim, so why would I have to?
SWM
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