[Wittrs] Linguistic Behavior: Is Self-Referencing Allowed?
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 05:58:19 -0500
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Cayuse wrote:
>>>Whether or not there are other consciousnesses cannot be known,
>>>and furthermore it has no practical application, though we behave
>>>as though there are other consciousnesses.
>>I behave as though there are other consciousnesses; but, you do not.
>I disagree -- I can't help but feel pity for somebody in distress, and
>to do so is to assume that they are associated with data of experience.
I'm glad that you feel that way. I always recommend observing Descartes'
advice to the would be philosopher: before initiating any philosophical
inquiry, resolve to continue one's everyday behavior.
a full account of the relation between the philosopher and the
philosophy would be a complex and intricate matter; but, it is not at
all on point. what's at issue here is whether your linguistic behavior
(in pursuing a philosophical inquiry or in advocating its results) is
consistent with a solipsistic philosophy such as you deny having.
now, on the matter of other consciousnesses, you have previously defined
'consciousness' as a stream of experiences.
>[Cayuse: 10/14/2009 09:12 AM]: So I'm using the word 'consciousness' to
>allude to the collective entirety of the immediate data of experience
>that constitute what Nagel called the "what it is like [to be me]", and
>what LW called the "microcosm".
and you acknowledge the obvious fact that each person has his or her own
stream of experiences.
>[Cayuse, 11/09/2009 07:17 AM]: Firstly, I recognize that there are
>other people than myself in the world ... Secondly, I have never denied
>assuming that these other people each have an associated consciousness
do you admit or deny that any of these 'instantiations of consciousness'
may self-reference?
once one recognizes that there are innumerable instantiations of
consciousness (one for each person), it seems to me that any one of
these instantiations of consciousness may self-reference for accuracy;
for example, to report "an afterimage arises in *my* experience". you
seem to have a problem with statements of that sort.
if your philosophy allows self-referencing; then, what possible evidence
or argument can you offer to refute a claim such as "an afterimage
arises in *my* experience; therefore, I am the experiencer of this
afterimage"?
conversely, what possible evidence or argument can you offer to support
a claim such as "an afterimage arises in *my* experience; but, I am not
the experiencer of this afterimage".
[surely, in a non-solipsistic philosophy you would need some sort of
evidence/argument to support a claim such as "I am not an experiencer"
or "I do not experience". you don't expect other instantiations of
consciousness to just take your word for it, do you?]
for that matter, what is the argument that disallows any of these
instantiations from asserting "I am this stream of experiences" or
something like "I am the container (or bundler-together) of this stream
of experiences"?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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