[Wittrs] Re: Let's Try Something a Little More Formal
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 00:00:21 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> Stuart, for the umpteenth time, writes:
>
> "As I noted above, one can use "constitute" to make a causal claim in certain
> cases, too, as Searle does."
>
> Not buying this, Stuart. When he says that syntax doesn not constitute
> semantics, he is saying they are not identical.
>
Oh, I fully agree! The problem is he doesn't notice that he then elides a
non-identity claim into a non-causal one because he is a victim of his own
verbiage in the third premise. The reason he is is that it reflects his own
deepseated conception of what consciousness is, i.e., the dualistic presumption.
>
>
> Stuart continues:
>
> "However, the claim of the CRA depends on the idea that "constituting"
> consciousness in the CR means having some feature or property we recognize as
> understanding. BUT IF CONSCIOUSNESS (UNDERSTANDING) IS SEEN TO BE A SYSTEM
> PROPERTY THEN THE ONLY THING THE CR SHOWS IS THAT THAT PARTICULAR SYSTEM
> CONFIGURATION DOESN'T DO IT. It says NOTHING about what the constituent
> elements of the system can do in other configurations."
>
>
> Notice that you're not keen on understanding Searle's point that the system
> in question in the CR is S/H. You tirelessly write as if Searle is arguing
> about a nonS/H system. IOW:
>
Searle's attack on "strong AI" is an attack on a project involved in running
programs on computers. This has nothing to do with non-software/hardware
systems except insofar as it includes a claim that brains must be that (though
with an acknowledgement that we don't really know what brains are).
> 1. You conflate the CR with a nonS/H system (are the "configurations" 1st
> order properties without being defined computationally or not?
This is a false distinction that has no bearing on the AI project of the strong
persuasion.
> Is it a _combination_ of properties being "configured" in an S/H system or
> nonS/H system?..).
>
The CR is a particular configuration of certain processes performing certain
(very limited) tasks. Understanding is absent from the CR. The question is
whether it is absent because whatever constituent element it takes to have
understanding is also missing or because
the system, itself, is inadequately specked to achieve understanding using
those constituent elements. My answer is the latter. Searle's and yours and
that of other Searle supporters here is the former.
> 2. Point out that Searle is arguing against something we might as well for
> all we know consider to be nonS/H (by 1).
>
Searle is arguing against the possibility that one can construct a conscious
entity using computational programs running on computers. If he is arguing
against anything else as "strong AI" he will be seen to have built himself a
strawman. I don't think he makes that error.
> 3. Point out that Searle is arguing against nonS/H (by 1).
>
Searle is arguing against the possibility of constructing a conscious entity
using computational processes running on computers.
> Then conclude that Searle must be a dualist (by 1, 2, and 3).
>
>
Searle's implicit dualism is found in his supposition that whatever
understanding is, it can only be understood as an ontological basic, a
constituent process level property in the system called the CR, rather than as
a function of a certain complex configuration of those processes.
> But the achievement is done by equivocation. Searle simply is not as sloppy
> as you would like him to be. You simply happen to be as sloppy as is
> required for your conclusion.
>
Searle has made enough mistakes to be deemed sloppy but I wouldn't call him
that. I think the issue is very complex and not easily deconstructed so he is
not to be blamed for having made that mistake. Perhaps we should blame him
though for having clung to it in the face of all the problems with it for so
many years thereafter.
> Sloppy is as sloppy does, yada, yada.
Now that's a really compelling argument!
> And in the name of being clear and distinct you blatant liar--
And here once again the old reliable ad hominem fall-back! Why should I be
surprised? You have gone to this mode eventually on every list where we have
conversed. I guess people don't change, not even, or especially, on philosophy
lists!
>or maybe you really think that computational properties are physical
>properties. All configurations are 1st order properties and now both strong
>and weak AI are not to be distinguished from brains.
>
Well you said it!
> I don't think Dennett would make this mistake, though.
>
You mean Dennett would argue that computational programs running on computers
are "second order properties" without causal efficacy in the world? Have you
checked Dennett's views lately?
> With friends like Stuart....
>
> Hey, all in good philosophical fun, Stuart.
>
I don't count insults as "good philosophical fun", Budd.
> After all my accusations, I wouldn't mind having a friend who was willing to
> be so bad at philosophy. And as with friends, "Just shut up" is not unheard
> of!
>
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
Well, maybe something is missed in written communication such as we find on
lists like these. We can't wink at one another or exchange knowing looks or
arch the eyebrows or share a beer. Maybe I really am just too sensitive to some
of your remarks which you genuinely do seem incapable of controlling. And,
oddly enough, I do feel as if we're friends, having barked at one another over
the course of four (or is it five?) lists now for what amounts to half a
decade. Well, keep on drumming and I shall keep on beating my head against the
wall of my latest writing project and who knows, maybe one of us will achieve a
breakthrough! At the least, perhaps we will even one day share that beer. (I
like Sam Adams by the way!)
SWM
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