[Wittrs] Re: Focusing on the Made-Up Muddle
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 13 May 2010 23:07:24 -0000
I guess this is a strange way to end the debate, eh?
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart, you're really confused.
>
> Stuart writes:
>
> "In short, if arguing that the CR's problem is that it is underspecked is
> "consistent with Searle's position", as you put it, then Searle is in an even
> more contradictory predicament than I initially suggested (due to his
> discrepant treatment of brains and computers)."
>
> I didn't put it that way. I simply said that by conflating functional
> (2nd-order) properties with 1st-order properties, the upshot is something
> Searle is not arguing against!
>
If you insist on the faux distinction of software being separate from the
hardware it's running on and claim that introducing more things going on is a
matter of up-specking the hardware alone which takes it out of the realm of
what Searle is denying, you have made two blunders:
The first is in claiming that AI research is about algorithms in the abstract.
It isn't. You are arguing against the classic strawman.
The second is in claiming that to say, as Dennett and the Churchlands do (and
as I do!), that more of the same will do the trick is to agree with Searle. It
isn't. If it was Searle would presumably have endorsed the Dennettian position
rather than attacking it and, more, he could have simply up-specked his CR to
show us how understanding IS achieved in a computational machine. But wait, he
didn't do that and doesn't do it! What gives, do you think?
> This simply undercuts any charge of dualism you would wish to make.
>
I don't think you ever understood my point about Searle's implicit dualism!
> Further, it is precisely the issue about brains being entirely composed by
> 1st-order properties that makes for the difference between them and programs,
> which essentially have 2nd-order properties in their actual-running
> description.
>
Computers and brains are both physical platforms, "hardware" in your lexicon
though of different physical constituents. Why are we obliged to assume that
the physical constituents in brains are what matter without testing the
possibilities of computers?
> You are seriously confused to the point that you don't make good inferences
> at all. You jump on slivers and miss planks.
>
You are all at sea Captain Hook, having walked the proverbial plank!
> Peter was right.
No, he was wrong and a great purveyor of the ad hominem to boot, which is why I
lost patience with arguing with him. (By the way we continued for a time on the
AI philosophy list run by Eray even after I got the boot from the gang at
Analytic for going on too long about the CR issue and for insisting that their
pal Peter J. had misspoken in one of his claims against me. When PJ got nasty
again on the AI list I finally just refused to respond to him anymore.)
> You have a dilemma. And I'm happy to see you don't disagree with Searle at
> all.
> You just aren't aware enough to know it. That's why I said you were
> seriously confused.
I see PJ has nothing on you when it comes down to a reversion to the ad
hominem. However, he was certainly a mite more acrimonious so I guess I can
tolerate it from you for a while (given that we have actually ended our debate
as you said a couple of posts back).
>
> Do you think you might one day become less confused?
>
> Your arguments about Searle being muddled are too sloppy to take seriously.
> Seriously.
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
> =========================================
You just don't understand them and keep coming back with the same irrelevancies
and confusions by way of response. Ah well, until the next end-of-argument post
then!
SWM
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