[Wittrs] Re: [C] On Languge Being "Open Ended"

  • From: Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 14:53:17 -0800 (PST)

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [C] [Wittrs] On Languge Being "Open Ended"
> To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Thursday, February 11, 2010, 6:10 PM
> ... reply to this (and a private
> message of Stuart's): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/4288
> 
> One of the things I have found about people who cannot
> become black-belt Wittgensteinians is that their language
> skills are poor. 

Sean, your abominable understanding of later Wittgenstein would be tolerable if 
you weren't so insufferably arrogant. If there was anything likable about you, 
I would cringe with empathetic embarrassment everytime you post something. But, 
alas, you appear to have virtually no redeeming qualities as a human being. We 
all have our foibles, but you appear to have little else. What is really 
telling, concerning your ignorance of all things Wittgensteinian, is that you 
can't tell when Wittgenstein is taking a position in preparation for its 
demolition! I pointed out a specific instance to you, and even Stern mustered 
sufficient nut to agree with me - If I remember correctly, he even quoted from 
PI the material succedent to your quote which showed incontrovertibly that 
Wittgenstein was attacking the position that you claimed was his 
(Wittgenstein's) position. Now, you have a similar situation in which I have 
attacked your inane interpretation of "family
 resemblence" and "language games." In case you have not noticed, JPD leveled 
exactly the same criticisms against your views as did I, though I am guessing I 
will get no support from JPD, probably because he finds my rhetorical tactics 
boorish, and he simply does not like me. So be it. I can live with that. But 
clearly, much of his latest, undeniably-harsh, viciously-sarcastic reply to you 
was peppered with statements that revealed that he had read the post to which I 
am replying. Anyway...on to the rest of your insipid post...  

>And it isn't language skills in the sense
> of being a good grammarian or English professor -- though
> some of that may be connected -- its poor "radar" for what
> language is doing. And hence you get the following:
> (a) a bumper-sticker approach to the issue ("the
> anything-goes approach to language"); 

Even Stuart, clearly no fan of mine, was compelled to defend me with respect to 
this issue, and his post echoed the same points made by me and JPD with respect 
to your "anything goes" interpretation of word usage. 

>(b) terrible
> counter-examples ("come over to my can of peas, and we'll
> lick it over a cup of puke" -- which, of course, still could
> make sense under given circumstances [can of peas = hobbit
> house; puke= a putrid drink]);(...) 

Good God, Sean, of course the example I gave "makes sense"; I simply 
substituted "can of peas" for "house," "lick" for "discuss," and "puke" for 
"coffee" (tea if you live on the other side of the pond). The example is 
simplistic, befitting your limited (and that is being charitable) philosophical 
skills, but it makes the same point that JPD did when he challenged you to 
defend, in court, someone who was married, and cheating, who claimed they were, 
by some definition, "a bachelor." It is clear, to anyone but the sycophants 
that largely populate this list, that JPD has delivered to you a serious 
spanking. Now, you may say, if you had any inkling of the understanding of 
fallacies, that I offer naught but an argumentum ad populum, but it is you who 
has made this into a political game.  

(c) a failure to understand
> Wittgenstein; and, relatedly, (d) the failure to
> appreciate how structure exists in the absence of
> rules, definitions or determinacy. Also, there seems to be
> this concomitant psychological need to see words as things
> that bind people in certain ways, or else, "the world
>  shakes," so to speak.

Most of the above strikes me as gibberish. But I think it is clear that I, and 
others, are arguing that it is you who fails to "understand Wittgenstein.

> 
> Hopefully, when I complete the manuscript I am working
> on, you can both find help with these matters. (Be done in
> about 2 months). For now, some basics:
> 
> 1. It is Russellian to say that words mean what
> dictionaries say or what is "commonly said." It is no
> coincidence that this view is linked with the view that
> logic dictates what is said, and that what cannot pass this
> test is not meaningful. This school of thought was
> overthrown by Wittgenstein. (Hallelujah).

This is somehow a characterization of what I have said? Where have I said this? 

> 
> 2. Meaning is use means exactly that. There are no statist
> or political criteria. 

Good Lord, Sean, that is not what "meaning is use" (MIU) is meant to convey. 
The message is that there is no thing, in the alleged mind, or the 
widely-misunderstood brain, that is the hidden, occult cause of meaningful 
utterances. There is nothing that is hidden (in the alleged mind or the real, 
but misunderstood, brain) behind utterances. Utterances, as behavioral 
phenomena, are to be taken at face value; they are not "symptoms" of some 
mental (or neurological) entity! And Wittgenstein is ever-so-clear on this 
when, early in PI, after talking about "slabs" and "blocks" etc., he asks how 
is it that these commands are effective; the answer he gives is "training." Do 
you deny this? Unfortunately, not even Wittgenstein, himself, saw the 
implications of this statement for science: What is the relation between a 
person's history ("training") and what they say in certain circumstances? This, 
of course, is a question that a science of behavior addresses. In
 its rudimentary form, it asks the question, "If an animal is exposed to an 
enviroment that has particular characteristics, what does the animal come to 
do?" 

>Majorities do not determine what
> people say. Only brains and their behavior do. 

What utter garbage! Of course, "majorities" determine what people say. I speak 
English because I was raised by English speakers, in a town where almost 
everybody spoke English. I call a chair "chair" because of my exposure to this 
community. Do you think that Wittgenstein would have a problem with this, oh 
Arrogant One? And the implication that "behavior determines what people say" 
(i.e, Majorities do not determine what
people say. Only brains and their behavior do)? Speech (and signing among the 
deaf etc,) IS behavior. How could it be that behavior determines behavior? What 
could that even mean?

>What this
> means is that language is as language does. And that if X
> and Y "score goals" with whatever usages they do, there is
> no authority structure that can be appealed to that could
> invalidate the goals. (Cardinal Principle #1: meaning is
> use). 

Au contraire, Herr Dimwit, "goals" can only be "scored" if the cultural 
histories are shared among the participants, and these "cultural histories" 
consist of a community that tells one things like, "No, that is not a 'dog,' it 
is a 'cow.'" This is painfully obvious. That you have missed it is indicative 
of your adherence to some bizarre philosophical view of the nature of 
"authority." Those that have caused me to "speak English" are not, in any 
sense, an official "authority"; they do not dwell in an office with a sign that 
designates them as such, but they are, nonetheless, a potent authority. No? 
Anyway, even though your post goes on below, I have expended enough effort with 
respect to your endless, insipid tripe, and I close, temporarily, here.
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