[Wittrs] Bogus Claim 6: The Third Axiom is not Conceptually True
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2010 09:49:14 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>what makes you say that Searle's argument has shown that the
>>non-constitution claim is conceptually true but has failed to show
>>that the non-causation claim is conceptually true.
>The claim of conceptual truth depends on the reader seeing the
>conceptual implication and realizing that it is the case as Searle
>says.
the CRT is the conceptual analysis that justifies the claim that the
third axiom of the CRA is conceptually true.
>The CR, itself, is intended to demonstrate THAT conceptual truth which,
>upon consideration, the reader or listener will, if he or she is
>honest, be moved to say, you're right, by George, Searle, it IS
>conceptually true.
yes, I agree, that's how conceptual analysis works. it's an appeal to
the intuition of language users. as you say, ""it's just a matter of
understanding the concept at issue".
>The problem is that the IMPLICATION of this agreement, which the claim
>is intended to elicity from honest, intellectually competent
>interlocutors, depends on seeing consciousness in a certain way (as a
>process-level rather than a system-level property).
you are recycling tired, old claims without replying to previously
stated objections:
Searle alleges that consciousness is a system property of the brain;
and, consequently, your claim (that being willing to draw the conclusion
promoted by the CRT depends on seeing consciousness as a process
property) is false.
furthermore, I deny that consciousness is a property at all. I treat it
as a phenomenon. nevertheless, I accept the conclusion of the CRT.
consequently, once again, your claim (that being willing to draw the
conclusion promoted by the CRT depends on seeing consciousness as a
process property) is false.
>The third premise in the CRA merely articulates the understanding from
>the CR
I agree.
>The problem is that the conclusion of the CRA is about a causality
>relation, not an identity relation,
perhaps Budd is correct to suggest that you might need remedial english
lessons.
the third axiom makes two claims, a non-constitution claim and a
non-causality claim.
have you got some sort of reading disorder such that, when you see the
words 'does not constitute', you claim that you've read 'is not
identical to'? are you, perhaps, trying to reserve claims of
constitution for use by Dennett?
in any case the structure of the conclusion mirrors the structure of the
third axiom (Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for
minds).
>... the jump from the non-identity interpretation of the premise ...
>to the non-causal interpretation ... loses its force. That is, it no
>longer supports a causal conclusion from the combination of premises in
>the CRA.
there is no such jump.
the non-constitution claim of the third axiom supports the
non-constitution claim of the conclusion; and, the non-causality claim
of the third axiom supports the non-causality claim of the conclusion.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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