Lastly, I'll comment on just a bit and let it rest. Stuart writes: "You presume something about syntax (that it's not being semantics excludes it from bringing semantics about) because of a certain way of thinking about semantics that you share with Searle and other dualists." So you say. But you are sadly mistaken. It's that computers don't even have syntax in the relevant sense. Also, it is that for Searle he's just coining the word "syntactical" to apply to the formality of running computer programs, and that includes his APA address which is dismissed by you so off-hand you can't be bothered with a close reading of Searle.. Was it you or Parr who claimed to find a contradiction in Searle such that reading a word more of him would be a waste of time? It was you, and that was another dodge. The certain way of thinking I share with Searle is not dualist, nor can you intelligibly prove this. All you can do is conflate what YOU think is syntax with physics. But when you do, you are sharing Searle's position AND disagreeing with him. You only get to argue that he is wrong about computers--not that he's a dualist for so arguing. Indeed, he argues against strong AI because it itself has dualism built into it. Unless you conflate syntax with physics, that is, which, in upshot, amounts to Searle's position, again, again. Stuart gets around more: "There's no getting around this. Unless and until you see this, you will remain in the same place re: this argument, i.e., completely unable to fathom the important distinction between a system level property and a property associated with some constituent(s) of the system." You are seriously confused or just pissing against the wind because you're into that sort of thing.. The point is that for Searle syntax doesn't add anything at the system level. Further, consciousness and semantics just are system level properties. If you want to say that Searle is wrong to think that syntax can't be a system level property, that is one thing. You can't argue from there that he doesn't view consciousness and semantics as system level properties of nonS/H systems. It is simply you types who don't distinguish between S/H and nonS/H. And to the extent that you don't, you end up with Searle's actual position anyway by conflating syntax with physics. You end up with a Fregean sense of Searle but spelled out in a mode of presentation such that it sounds at odds with Searle. I'm that quick on the uptake. Lastly, Stuart avers without good argument AT ALL: > Searle is badly mistaken. The system repliers have it exactly right and your > boy Searle just misses the boat entirely. > > SWM You're a funny guy. Gordon too. And Neil for suggesting that Searle ought to have been arguing against weak AI as Searle understands it.. You [Stuart at least] accept his position with or without knowing it. Your argument about the third premise is just aweful and made up to distract attention. Or your attention to English is just not that good. The system repliers are contradicting themselves, on one hand, and conceding Searle's point on the other. How do I know this? They conflate syntax with physics now compared to before when stating that it might be in virtue of the program that a system might understand a story. It turns out that the system repliers want to have it both ways but can't or cant. I'll let them have it Searle's way. It's funny that you don't see that the upshot of the systems reply is the very thesis of Searle--or it is a waffling between Searle's position and a position he showed to be incoherent. Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/