[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth [Really] Focusing On
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 23:59:00 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> Budd writes:
>
> > [Searle] went out of his way to say two distinct things in the third
> > premise and no amount of bad English is going to get him as saying the same
> > thing in two different ways--that would be like making Searle look like a
> > monkey but only due to monkey shines on the part of the interprer.
> >
>
> Yes, Searle clearly went out of his way to make the point in two ways, Budd.
> I think you are right on that and others here, who want to say he meant to
> say the same thing on both sides of the statement are wrong. But that does
> point up a big problem with his formulation. Four of us are arguing this and
> all four are reading it differently. That alone should tell us something
> about the mode of expression Searle used. It isn't clear.
On the contrary, it is crystal clear. It may just be the case that you are
playing a game called "Let's see how badly we can get Searle wrong."
>
> My point, of course, is that Searle's third premise trades on the ambiguity
> of reading that his vagueness made possible (intentional or otherwise, and I
> will give him the benefit of the doubt and say it was otherwise). Instead of
> saying "Syntax isn't the same as and cannot cause semantics" (which looks
> like what he meant) he says "Syntax does not constitute and is not sufficient
> for semantics".
Let's stop right there. Let's agree that he meant what it looks like he meant.
> The latter phrasing allows of two readings at least:
>
> 1) "Syntax isn't the same as semantics and it is never sufficient to to say
> we have an instance of semantics when we have an instance of syntax." (This
> reads the text on both sides as a non-identity claim where the second side
> depends on the assertion of non-identity on the first side.)
That's awefully bad interpretation, though. Nothing justifies it except poor
English.
>
> or
>
> 2) "Syntax doesn't constitute semantics (syntax doesn't make up semantics)
> and thus to have an instance of syntax isn't sufficient to have semantics
> (because syntactical constituents cannot combine to give us semantics).
>
> Note that #2 is a claim of non-causality.
Yes, but you still are trying to use the constitutes idea when insufficient is
sufficient for "insufficient to cause. What you end up doing is puutting more
into the third premise than is stated. There are two thoughts, and for the
life of me I can't understand why you ever would have had such trouble as you
seem to have. So my first guess was that you were just playing a game. It was
later that I thought to give you a choice between that and outright inept
interpretation.
>
> Recall that Searle asserts that the premise in question is "conceptually
> true".
It is conceptually true that syntax is not semantics. It is true as a matter
of fact (first premise) that syntax is formal. Given all that, it is
conceptually true that syntax is insufficient to cause semantics. But perhaps
it is not _just_ conceptually true after all. So be it.
>
> Note that the causal reading isn't conceptually true though the identity
> claim in #1 can be said to be.
I'll have to buy that. Perhaps Searle had the first premise in mind?
>
> Note that the conclusion of the CRA (that computers can't cause minds, as
> brains are said by Searle to cause them) is a causal claim (about an
> assertion of non-causality).
Okay.
>
> Note that the non-identity reading doesn't imply anything about non-causality.
Okay....
>
> Note that Searle's assertion that the third premise is conceptually true only
> applies to the reading in #1.
Unless it is parasitic on the first premise..
>
> But note that Searle, as you say, went out of his way to formulate the third
> premise as a compound sentence (X and Y). Therefore he presumably to make two
> distinct claims.
That would be good English parsing, I should think.
>
> However, the claim that the premise is conceptually true only applies to one
> reading. But recall that Searle does not make THAT distinction. He doesn't
> say part one of the premise is conceptually true. He says the whole premise
> is.
Perhaps he had the first premise in mind.. And I would allow a reading where
it is false to say of something that it is conceptually true when it in fact
was discovered to be true. Perhaps some context. Where is Searle saying that
the third premise is conceptually true? Keep in mind that I don't think this
issue trades on understanding the CRA.
>
> Therefore he is eliding the distinction between one part of the premise and
> the other and, in doing so, allowing the notion of conceptual truth to serve
> as the basis for believing the conclusion that rides on the non-causal
> reading.
Or he has the first premise in mind..
>
> Because both sides of the premise can be read either as a non-identity or a
> non-causal claim, this confusion allows us to buy into the idea that the
> CRA's conclusion is logically inescapbable.
Perhaps he only needs the first premise after all.. Hence the modern
formulation of his view in the APA address.. Check out the eight point
summary. Please.
>
> But as we have already seen, in order to believe the non-causal part of the
> claim is true, we have to believe something else about the CRA, i.e., that
> what Searle calls "semantics" cannot be present as an outcome of some
> particular combination of what Searle calls "syntax". But that, unlike the
> non-identity claim, IS NOT CONCEPTUALLY TRUE!
It is simply true given that programs are formal. Perhaps once one understands
the first premise, the third premise seems conceptually true?
>Indeed, it depends on our adopting a particular conception of "semantics",
>i.e., that it cannot be broken down to anything more basic than itself! And
>that, again, is a dualist presumption.
But that doesn't follow. You are forcing the issue by being blind to the first
premise and particularly blind to Searles reasons for the first premise and
particularly blind to how the first premise may allow for the third to seem a
conceptual truth.
>
> So the CRA hinges on a dualist presumption which is obscured by the ambiguous
> wording of its third premise.
But it really is not ambiguous unless one is playing a game or is having a hard
time with plain English, as I think I should stil think.
> The logic of the CRA is driven either by accepting a misleading elision
> between two readings of the third premise (the equivocation) OR by accepting
> another (suppressed) premise regarding "semantics" itself that is not
> self-evident, not "conceptually true" based on the CR, but, rather, arguable
> based on empirical information that drives our conceptualization of it.
>
> SWM
Or, it is about the consequences of programs being formal. See how easy it is
to forget that?
Cheers,
Budd
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