Siobhan Roberts has this excellent new biography out entitled 'King of Infinite Space: Donald Coxeter, the Man Who Saved Geometry' Walker and Company 2006. I will excerpt from her text (pages 106 - 107) """ The reclusive Wittgenstein had taken a liking to Coxeter when he was a student, and they kept in touch. "I had tea with Wittgenstein yesterday," he recorded in his diary. "He talked very interestingly about blindness and deafness, and why you get seasick on a camel but not on a horse. He doesn't seem any more abnormal than before." Coxeter had enrolled in Wittgenstein's "Philosophy of Mathematicians" lecture for the 1933-4 year. To Wittgenstein's horror, so did a total of forty students, far too many for the intimate lecture he was willing to deliver. "There are too many of you," the philosopher protested. "Will three or four please leave?" After only a few weeks, Wittgenstein informed his still too numerous students that the class would continue no longer. He deigned to lecture for only a chosen few. He would dictate his thoughts, and his select students were instructed to copy the notes and distribute them to the rest of the class in what became known as his Blue Books. The select group included Wittgenstein's five favorite students: Francis Skinner (a promising mathematics student who became Wittgenstein's constanct companion, confidante, and collaborator); applied mathematician Louis Goodstein; philosopher Margaret Masterman (a pioneer in the field of computational linguistics, her beliefs about language processing by computers were ahead of their time and are now fundamental to the field of artificial intelligence); philosopher Alice Ambrose (of the analytic school, who also wrote papers on pi, mathematics, and the mind); and Coxeter. """ Roberts goes on to talk about how LW didn't like the lecture hall setting and they instead retired to Coxeter's sitting room. Coxeter was actually impatient with LW's style and didn't feel he was able to grasp the substance, so stopped attending the classes -- even while they kept meeting in his room. Donald Coxeter's scenario is important in my technical writing and storytelling in part because it overlaps the scenarios of two philosophers I've studied: Ludwig Wittgenstein's and Buckminster Fuller's. There's a lot more on the Fuller-Coxeter relationship in this book. I was connecting some of these dots for readers of edu-sig just last night: http://mail.python.org/pipermail/edu-sig/2010-January/009722.html How I connect Fuller and Wittgenstein is through this notion of namespaces and invention. "Meaning as use" connects to "meaning as spin" (one changes the meaning by changing the spin -- hence "spin doctor" in popular parlance). LW spun the meaning of the word "philosophy" (to bring us a new / remade version of the discipline). Fuller imparted spin to a lot of key words in his own invented namespace, which I categorize as philosophical (with good reason). I actually own a four volume dictionary that helps me map Fuller's meanings (called 'Synergetics Dictionary' and a gift from the author, E.J. Applewhite). Thesis: I think the "doing" nature of the PI, versus the more passive "describing" nature of the TLP, brings the PI closer to contemporary computer science and its machine-executing languages. I am especially interested in connecting LW's idea of "language games" to "namespaces", as I've discussed in many previous posts already. A language game tends to impart its own spin (meaning) to its "names" (memes, monikers, tokens) which is why we consider "namespaces" to be "containers for meaning" i.e. a namespace, like a language game, supplies a context. A challenge in philosophy, and in scholarship more generally, is sorting out these partially overlapping meanings and tracing them back to their original contexts. Unless one is sensitized to the multiplicity of namespaces, one is in danger of assuming that what X means by Y is what Z means by Y, simply because they're both using Y. All nuance and specificity go out the door once you treat all Ys as "global" (i.e. as having some fixed objective meaning we all share irrespective of context). This work of providing context is called :"disambiguation" in some circles and is an important exercise whenever the waters get too muddy (as often happens in philosophical discourse, as well as in diplomacy). To take an example (from Wikipedia), we have two authors using the word "Synergetics" to describe their work, yet their respective namespaces are really quite remote from one another: """ Synergetics can refer to: * Synergetics (Fuller), a school of thought on thinking and geometry developed by Buckminster Fuller * Synergetics (Haken), a school of thought on thermodynamics and other systems phenomena developed by Hermann Haken """ [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synergetics ] Of course lots of "spin doctors" work it the other way too and deliberately take connotations and denotations from one namespace and apply them in another -- what's called taking something "out of context". Per Arthur Koestler, this may actually be a creative act and gets used all the time in advertising. Wittgenstein's notion of philosophy as a series of jokes (deeply grammatical?) would connect here (Koestler explores jokes in 'The Act of Creation'). I suspect we're all guilty of cross-breeding meanings across namespaces. That's part of what we do as tool users, as "memetic engineers." Stuart Kauffman's thinking on exaptations would enter in at this juncture: the unforeseen or unanticipated re-purposing of something takes us into the space of the "adjacent possible" i.e. some "other tomorrow." http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=636 One could mine the TLP here as well, for ideas about possibility vs. what's actually the case. However this post is already plenty long. Kirby "Flies fly back into fly bottles every day." ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/