[C] [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] What aspect of language cannot be conventional
- From: "walto" <calhorn@xxxxxxx>
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2010 01:52:45 -0000
3.342 In our notions there is indeed something arbitrary, but this is
not arbitrary: if we have determined something arbitrarily then
something else must be the case. (This stems from the essence of the
notation.)
3.3421 A particular way of symbolizing may be unimportant, but it is
always important that this is a possible way of symbolizing. And it is
like this in philosophy generally: the particular proves unimportant
time and again, but the possibility of each particular gives us an
insight into the essence of the world.
3.343 Definitions are rules for translation from one language into
another. Every right sign-language must allow of translation into every
other by means of such rules: This is what they must all have in
common.
3.344 That which signifies in a symbol is the common feature of all
symbols that can take its place following the rules of logical syntax.
W is claiming more here than that all languages must be
representational or intentional; he is saying that, e.g., names in one
language must correspond with names in another. Further, I think
he's saying that, e.g., signs for items in "color space" or
"music space" in any language must themselves somehow share in
those spaces to do their work (he talks about gramophone grooves,
musical scores, and acoustic sounds all sharing the same form). If the
various linguistic signs don't share in the appropriate range of
possibilities and impossibilities, their syntax (or grammar) will not
allow them to perform all the functions necessary to the linguistic
roles they're to play and they won't properly translate any
signs that DO perform such functions.
Walto
Other related posts:
- » [C] [Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] What aspect of language cannot be conventional - walto
