Neil, No major disagreements but a few clarifications. 1. My purpose in sharing that material was to assist you in determining whether we were talking past one another when I mentioned "methodological propositions". I wanted to provide the context of Wittgenstein's usage. And my own. 2. Translating "Satz" as "sentence" in some contexts and "proposition" in others is a tricky issue for Wittgenstein translators. Since he did follow the distinction in some of his writings and lectures in English, the translations are well motivated but sometimes underdetermined. 3. "Methodological propositions" so-called would be verbal expressions of rules within a methodology. And they could be called "true" to the extent that they accurately reflect the practice. But calling them "true" could be misleading if it suggests that rules, per se, can be true or false, i/e/ that we can justify our grammar by reference to reality. Because that is misleading, it would also be misleading to call them "propositions" since that may suggest bipolarity. 4. The boundary he is suggesting is not a sharp one, the boundary between rules and empirical propositions, is blurred by such things as the way that symptoms and criteria determining the applicability of an expression can shift (as per BB and PI) and that sometimes what has been treated as a well-supported empirical claim can come to be treated as a rule (as per PI and OC). JPDeMouy ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/