[C] [Wittrs] Re: reflections on the grammar of pictures pt.1
- From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2010 17:58:02 -0000
"... a couple of reactions (not quite sure what you are looking for)"
I didn't have any specific expectations. Responding as you deem appropriate to
however the piece strikes you is helpful to my getting a sense of how I
communicated and can spur further discussion. And you did that. Thanks.
I responded to the matter of Dumbledore in a separate post. It's an
interesting topic in its own right but I want to separate it for a few reasons:
a. Whether a work depicts so-and-so and whether a work depicts so-and-so as
being thus-and-such are distinct questions (though part 2 will touch a bit on
the second question in relation to pictures but... well, you'll see).
b. The whole idea that various activities and artifacts should be grouped
together as "the fine arts" and that attempting to make generalizations about
the whole group is a fruitful way to proceed is one I find suspect. Not that
comparison and contrast, noting similarities and differences do not have a
place, but I am hesitant to pursue such a broad approach while examining
differences between different kinds of pictures.
c. If we were to focus on the question of whether a work depicts so-and-so
while admitting works of fiction, a better example would be the allegory or
roman a clef, though the analogies break down quickly here too. Other
analogies arise for the biographical or autobiographical novel, the historical
novel, and other forms of non-fiction novel. But if the character is entirely
fictional (not a living person, an historical figure, or a figure of religion,
myth, or folklore) and entirely the author's creation (as opposed to, e.g.
modern authors writing Sherlock Holmes stories), then how can the question of
the creator's misidentification or misdescription even arise? (Sloppy or
inconsistent characterization over the course of a work or series of works is
another matter.)
d. Talk of "textualism", the applicability of "adherence to the text" to
discussions of pictures, is problematic in a number of ways. Is a label fixed
to the back of a painting, even if it was shown to have been placed by the
painter, part of "the text"? It certainly isn't typical to allow museum goers
to inspect such things and their appreciation isn't considered deprived for
that. But then even titles are not typically part of the "text". It is
standard in art historical scholarship to rely upon documentary evidence, on
the artist's testimony and correspondence, on contracts, on prevenances, and so
forth, in determining the subject of a painting. What the museum docent has to
tell us what the pamphlet accompanying a museum show has to tell us are
ubiquitous in art appreciation. And art books are seldom without extensive
text. (But note: the title of a painting is often not one the painter gave it.)
Now, regarding the rest of your remarks...
I'm not certain where your finding "confusion" in my comparing of two different
cases and keeping them quite distinct, attending to differences between them.
Perhaps you could elaborate on what I actually wrote that struck you as
confused?
As for the remarks about "affect" and "declaration", I take it that you are
distinguishing between the deference given to artists and whether any
individual has authority over the content of their work. Or something like
that. You seem to be saying (and it is not at all clear to me, so please
correct me if I've misunderstood) that:
1. We are taught to respect certain artists and the works of certain artists
in the course of learning to appreciate art.
(Why you call this "affect" eludes me. Is it to suggest that learning art
appreciation is learning to make the right faces and gestures when viewing art?
And "bowing"? This all confuses me a bit but point (1.) above is what I took
from those remarks.)
2. We defer to artists with regard to the content of their works, at least to
a degree and at least to the extent that they are deemed "great".
3. either:
a. (2.) is explained by (1.),
(That would be a theory, by the way.)
b. (2.) is in part constitutive of (1.)
4. Such deference as (2.) is not the power of the artist to say what her work
means or what it depicts but rather our reluctance to criticize a great artist
and this only to the extent that the question is relevant to the aesthetic
criteria for judging the work.
(Your phrase "criteria for enjoyment" is... unfortunate. We may or may not
enjoy a work more for having judged it a worthy work but the criteria do not
determine whether we will enjoy it (as if the criteria were a psychological
theory) nor whether we ought to (which would be moralistic and priggish). if
someone felt the need to apply criteria to determine whether they enjoyed a
work, that would indicate that they did not enjoy it. And it might suggest an
inability to have an authentic aesthetic experience. I suppose if one say
enjoyment entirely in terms of "bowing" appropriately and showing the right
"affect", that wouldn't be a problem. I'm having trouble not reading you that
way but part of me is thinking, "That can't be what he's saying!")
A few observations:
Appreciation, evaluation, and interpretation are different, albeit overlapping
actvities. For example, an historian may be concerned to study the subject
matter characteristic of the painting in a particular era without having any
concern whatsoever with the aesthetic merit of the work and without enjoying it
at all.
Furthermore, aestheticism is anachronistic when applied to works for different
periods, different cultures. It also doesn't apply to a great many uses of
pictorial images in our own time. That doesn't mean that we cannot approach
such works in that way but it would be a grave mistake to treat such an
approach as a guide to meaning in pictures generally.
I made no claim that artists have some power over the interpretation of their
works. On the contrary, I believe an examination of the case of the children's
illustrator (also an intermediate case between "great art" and a child's
drawing) and the ambiguous drawing would show that i resisted precisely that
temptation.
The greatness of the artist is beside the point when it comes to the artist's
intentions. Sincere avowals are (defeasible) criteria for ascribing intention
regardless of who makes the sincere avowal.
Now, an artist says, "I had meant for this to be a depiction of X" A viewer
says, "I had take this to be a depiction of Y." What do we say in this case?
What do we need to say? There's no disagreement so far. Only if we insist on
saying, "Yes but is it really a depiction of X, Y, or something else?" is there
a problem. And then do we say contentious things like, "What the painting
really depicts is what the artist intended"? We could say that, but it amounts
to nothing more than a proposal for how we speak of depictions. Some will
follow it, others not. But what else might we mean by, "really a depiction
of..."?
Equally contentious, "What the artist has to say is irrelevant." It is
relevant to those who deem it relevant, irrelevant to those who do not. But
saying that is neither contentious nor particularly illuminating.
Our historian may be concerned with what the painter intended. He may be
concerned with how the painter's contemporaries received the work. Or he may
be concerned with how later generations, perhaps in another culture received
the work. What is "relevant" all depend on one's concerns.
And if one's concern is with the artist's use of iconographic and private
symbolism to convey a distinct personal worldview (which might be deemed
"aesthetic" in contrast to the historian's concerns), then the artist's
intentions would be deemed quite relevant.
(I am resisting again the temptation to explain some of the defects in
Beethoven's Symphony no. 5, some of which I imagine he might have acknowledged
by the time of his Ninth and of the final Quartets. I would say that someone
who understands these defects (or at least why they might be deemed such) and
who understands how these defects might have emerged in the context of his
experiements with cyclic motives may have a far deeper appreciation of
Beethoven than one who simply revere the work. Acknowledging the caveats
concerning such claims, I would say here that "bowing" is "irrelevant".)
As for the "power" to say, "I don't take the Potter stories that way," we
needn't have any prior experience with a genre to take a story one way or
another. Our reception may be more or less insightful or interesting because
of that but clearly we can take a story one way or another and we can
communicate that. I don't see why we'd call this "power". Unless you mean
that our taking the story this way or that is just as "legitimate" as what the
author has to say. (Or something of the sort.)
What is "legitimacy"? That a reading deserves to be aired and merits
consideration? I could at least imagine Political Correctness playing a role
in whether certain readings of Dumbledore's sexual orientation were published
or discussed but setting that aside (since a hypothetical someone who was so
censorious wouldn't be persuaded by philosophical discussions of interpretation
anyway!), the bar for a reading to be aired is pretty low. For it to reach a
wide audience, it would need to be interesting but I don't think you're
defending the claim that reading Dumbledore as heterosexual is just as
interesting.
Does the reading "merit consideration"? Consideration for what? Being a more
or less plausible reading? "Plausible" how? Plausible as an account of what
the author intended? That can't be if we're treating the author's intentions
as irrelevant?
Plausible as an interpretation of the characters' personalities and motives
that is consistent with what has been established in this fictional universe?
Okay. And then the familiarity with the genre would be a relevant
consideration.
But then the same sorts of issues would be equally relevant to assessing a
reading of works by Goethe or Shakespeare (who presumably are candidates for
"bowing"), so the "genius" of the artist is not relevant here.
With regard to "play"...
A child completing a classroom assignment is not "playing": she is engaged in
schoolwork.
Being the work of a child engaged in play or schoolwork does not preclude being
a candidate for aesthetic appreciation. Consider the study of children's
drawings by the artist Paul Klee. Or the Art Brut movement.
Also, consider what Friedrich Schiller had to say about the relationship
between play and aesthetics.
The child cannot intend her work to be appreciated in the way that an adult
artist might? Agreed. But then, we're bringing intention into it, aren't we?
But most important, the point I am making - or a similar point - could be made
without bringing the issue of children or a contrast between play and art into
it. Suppose an artist becomes fascinated with the design of Buddhist art in
Southeast Asia. And suppose he creates works inspired by his exposure to such
art but has not done so indepth a study into the iconography as would enable
him to recognize and depict various Bodhisattvas, Buddhas, Arahants, and so
forth as a native artist might. Under these circumstances, the same sort of
indeterminacy could arise as to whether he had depicted this figure or that or
whether he had represented a figure incorrectly, failed to represent that
figure, or represented another figure. The ambiguity or indeterminacy is a
matter of the artist's competence in the use of certain names, his knowledge of
various stories and traditions, and his acquaintance with various conventions,
not a matter of his age or whether he was engaged in "play" rather than art.
"... just off the top of my head, J!"
I appreciate it. And as much as I have been critical, your remarks have been
helpful to me. Thanks.
JPDeMouy
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