[C] [Wittrs] Re: The Epiphenomenalism of Dennett-Consistent Philosophies of Consciousness
- From: Justintruth <truth.justin@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 15:40:11 -0800 (PST)
You wrote: ”The issue isn't what do we mean by "aware" but what
produces awareness in the world?”
We get to the heart of the problem: I have re-read all of your posts
in this thread and based on your last response I see a problem that I
had not anticipated.
You wrote: “The issue is not to describe it but to account for it
causally.”
Ok. I now understand I think better how you are thinking. My response
to you should be much longer than I am capable of writing right now as
I must earn a living. However, I think it would be worthwhile to
summarize rather than just remaining silent.
Basically, if I understand you, you believe that physics accounts for
things causally. (By things I do not mean to limit it to just things
but the whole “state of affairs”)
I guess I should say that that is what I think you believe. Is it?
The second thing I will do is make a supposition that you do not study
physics. Is that right? If you can tell me it would help me. I do not
mean this rhetorically and stipulate that whether you do or not is for
the most part irrelevant, but it would help me to know whether you
have done the math and crunched some numbers and actually done any
physics to be able to communicate more effectively with you. Above
all I do not think that those who have done the math are embodied with
any “special” knowledge or anything like that. The meaning of physics
is understandable by those who do not do it – although it is a great
view once you grind through some of the equations! But oh what a
laborious walk up the hill! Still, if I knew you knew I could become
more technical in language.
I do not believe that physics can account for anything causally. My
view of physics is that it is descriptive. There is however within the
descriptions of physical theory numerous uses of the word “to cause”.
But when you study the theories in detail you realize that physics
actually does not contain any account of causality at all. It is
purely a descriptive discourse. When a physicist says that an apple
falls because of the force of gravity he does not mean it as you might
think. It is a way of describing what occurs, of parsing the motions
of things into that which is “natural” and therefore not “in need of a
cause” and that which is external to the nature of the thing (motion)
being considered and therefore in need of a cause. It a sense they
are saying “When an apple falls we call it caused by gravity.” The
“action” of the earth on the apple is definitional. It could have been
said simply that when and earth and an apple approach they accelerate
toward each other.
There is a very long post that should be inserted here on the nature
of being and its relation to causality but I can’t pursue it simply
for lack of time. Cop out.. cop out…yea I know. Can’t avoid it.
I recently had an experience in which I was standing alone by a river
in the middle of winter. Thousands of big chunks of ice in intricate
shapes and sizes were flowing by me in highly specific motion. No one
was around. It was very cold and I was dressed warm and comfortable. I
remember looking at the chunks as they passed by me and observing them
enter my field of view in all their specific bobbing and floating with
very specific motions each motion a fact that had occurred that I
witnessed in aspect at least. I began to look straight ahead and not
move my head to look upstream or down but just to let the ice flow
into and then out of my vision.
I began to consider the ice just before and just after it entered my
field of view. I could see very clearly the notion of material being.
My mind recoiled at the thought of positing that these chunks of ice
came into being only as they came into my field of view and then
disappeared from existence as they left it. These chunks had formed in
incredible detail unobserved way upstream and had floated down in
front of me and then they left and continued out of sight down the
river. And all that detail existed upstream and down.
And there “I” was. I too had floated down in a sense, my body having
had a history not unlike the history of the floating ice. Conception,
birth and the history of the particles entering into my body and
leaving it, while I grew and learned all “flowed” behind me in time. I
had a trajectory – a physical one that brought me here and that
trajectory could very truly be described in terms of the trajectories
of the arrangement of the particles in my body. If I were the ice I
would have seen my body pass by and wondered about its existence
before and after it passed by me.
I realize that most people believe that this idea is what
“ontological” means. That this ice unobserved and all of its
properties “were” even before they had entered my vision and continued
on after. That they “caused” me to observe them or participated as
the physical situation as a whole did. I do not agree actually.
I also theorize that the ice was upstream and down. But my
understanding of that fact is very different than the usual one. It
has the idea of the “ice upstream (and down) unobserved” in it and it
has the notion of the relations between me and my body. You would call
it a causal relationship and I would agree to a very large extent.
However, ultimately, we would disagree on the meaning of the word
cause in this case I suspect. Something about ex nihilo. I do not
believe that physical cause either of the objective world or of the
subjective is possible to infer.
I believe that the idea of “force” and “mass” in classical physics are
the roots of a kind of bias that mistakes motion for causality.
If as you say the issue is: “..not to describe it but to account for
it causally” then we are in agreement to a large extent but
unfortunately I believe that our understanding of what “account for it
causally” would mean would be very different.
Basically, I believe that the idea of causality in the physical sense,
the material cause, is descriptive and dependent on (is a description
of) a kind of stability in the appearance of the essent. That is why
all physical laws are confirmed in experiment. It is powerless to
describe “why things happen” in any way. Material causality is merely
descriptive.
So I do not share with you the possibility that physics could account
for the subject causally in a way that is beyond the term
“descriptive”. Material cause is a description.
But my disagreement is not limited to that. We have a more narrow
disagreement. If you will humor me and assume that material cause is
descriptive then I think that there is still a disagreement between us
over whether the principle of material causality in the objective
physical sense as conceived of in classical physics (neglecting for a
moment quantum mechanics and the relativity of time) could, ***without
modification*** “account for” the existence of consciousness. Why?
Basically it is because my belief is that the current physics as I
have studied it does not describe any mechanism, no matter how complex
its function, as being conscious. I realize that the mechanism of the
brain is not completely understood yet and so we are at a little
disadvantage but let me stipulate the following as a kind of thought
experiment.
First assume a classical physical world in which the positions and
velocities of all of the particles in a brain are completely known at
a given time. The sum total of what physical law would do would be to
allow one to express the future positions and velocities of that
assembly of particles. That is what I understand to be the extent of
its possibilities.
Now, there is a problem with this limitation. It does not predict any
experience at all!
Yet from it scientists can predict the outcome of an experiment and
confirm or deny the theory. How can a theory which does not predict
experience be subject to experiment?!
The answer is much like the “ice”. The current physical theory models
the objects of experience. It contains an objective model of the ice
and let us say that I went upstream took really good notes on the
position of some ice and drove downstream so many miles exactly and
stared outward. Ignoring the obvious scientific problems associated
with chaotic behavior etc I could in theory predict that I would
experience a particular piece of ice entering my field of view
simultaneously with the watch hands on my watch being at certain
locations. I drive down and sure enough it does. That helps confirm
the theory in the sense that Popper made clear.
Now here is the point. Note that I said two things that are apparently
contradictory: I said: “…let us say that I went upstream took really
good notes on the position of some ice and drove downstream so many
miles exactly and stared outward…” I also said: “The sum total of what
physical law would do would be to allow one to express the future
positions and velocities of that assembly of particles”. So how, if a
physical theory only expresses the objective state of things was I
able to predict the sighting?
The answer is that inside of current physics there are a host of
assumptions that play no part in the theoretical model. The classical
physical model is an objective model. It does not describe experience
in any way. There is no experience in it. It is just objects moving.
The physics however is more than the objective model at least in
assumption. It assumes that the physical model is “about” what my
experience will be.
If a physicist were to predict that a particular electronic display on
a piece of equipment would change its state and then turn away from
the equipment and report that he did not see it change state he would
be summarily dismissed. There is an assumption that someone will look
at the instruments or at the phenomenon directly (if you believe in
such distinctions) and the meaning of the reports he will give will be
relevant to the model.
So the current “physics” here referring to the model plus ordinary
assumptions made about its relationship to experience does include a
model of consciousness in it. Physics is not just its theory. It
includes predictions about what an “observer” will experience.
Einstein especially is loaded with descriptions of “observers” and
quantum mechanics makes frequent use of the idea of the “appearing” of
a particle. The visual spectrum is very good example of this as it
even associates “color” which is certainly subjective with certain
electromagnetic frequencies. This is not a statement of the frequency
response of the optics of the system. It includes “color photographs”
presented as a device to stimulate the optic channel and demonstrate
the meaning of the effect. The actual “color” is then demonstrated.
So then I seem to be supporting your claim! If classical physics
already has an observer in it and realizes that an eye needs to be
placed at the one end of a telescope while the other end is pointed to
a certain place in the sky in order to see the moons of Jupiter then
physics is already describing and including consciousness and its
relationship to the body in it. So where is the new information?
Well it is true that there are unstated assumptions such as I have
described but I also said that they were not part of the physical
model. When Dennett or you state that consciousness can be explained I
interpret it to mean that the physical model itself predicts
consciousness. It does not currently do that. As I said I believe that
the current physical model does not predict experience at all.
Now you may claim that some intricate mechanism is all that is needed.
Some very complex arrangement of parts moving in a certain way and
then the model will predict that experience will occur. I wish we
could have advantage of a complete description of the brain so that we
could just look at the model and see if it predicts consciousness but
it’s a red herring. I am saying that “on principle” any objective
mechanical model will not predict the emergence of consciousness. Why?
Again, because the current model just posits the existence of some
state of objective reality at one point in time and then allows one to
specify the objective state at a future time. And the state is limited
basically the position and velocity of matter. If we don’t add to that
model then there is no experience posited at all. That description, no
matter how intricate the mechanism, is all that it does. And the
meaning of “being conscious” is simply not that.
Now you will argue like this: You will say (have said): “But that is
not the issue. The issue is not to describe it but to account for it
causally”
But if you understand physics in the way I do that is never the issue.
Physics gives no causal explanation but is descriptive. Material
causality that is inherent in ideas like force are really descriptive
of nature. They just say how the thing is not what causes it to be
that way. Further the current model predicts only objective
properties. No where in the model does it include a statement like
“And then the mechanism is conscious”. What it says is that if you
position an observer in such and such a way this is what will be
observed. It does not say that if you position matter in such and such
a way an observer will be positioned!
Its just not in the theory.
It can be extended to do so. What is needed is to understand exactly
what arrangements of the mechanism are necessary to produce it.
In a sense this is not new news. Every father or mother knows that
physical mechanism causes in a “material causal” sense consciousness
and it is the source of their concern over whether to get pregnant.
Your idea that it is possible to set up within physics some principle
that would accurately describe what type of mechanism would be
required to cause a particular type of consciousness to occur I agree
with fully. I further agree that the rules of material causality would
apply, meaning that arranging the material would reliably produce the
consciousness and disrupting it would cause it to cease. This is why
we duck when a rock is thrown. But I do not agree that it is currently
in the physics of Newton, or Schrodinger or Einstein to describe under
what conditions this would occur. In fact it is not.
Furthermore it would be revolutionary to physics to do so because for
the first time some aspect of the model would not be objective. The
model would no longer just be about the position and velocities of
particles (or matter – excuse the exclusion of modern physics). It
would have now included a radically new principle. Instead of saying
that if you set up this arrangement and stand here you will see this
in ten minutes. It would say that if you set up this material
arrangement someone will be standing there.
Further new experimental techniques will be required to support this
new physics. I went back and re-read your posts and found a quote
about connecting physically our brains up with other entities and
experiencing what it is like to be them. I mentioned the same thing in
an earlier post. These are radical departures from the current theory
and methods of physics and indicate that something that would
currently be termed “non physical” is being considered for inclusion
in the models of physics. No experiment that I am aware of conjectures
such and arrangement and attempts to test it.
If I take your framing of the issue: “The issue is not to describe it
but to account for it causally” and interpret it this way… “The issue
is to see that the material of the brain when arranged in the
mechanism of the brain is conscious not in the sense that the meaning
of the phrase “consciousness” is reducible to the meaning of the
phrase “an arrangement of particles moving” but in the sense that the
existence of a physical brain is a necessary and sufficient reason for
the existence of consciousness and hence in that sense we can say that
consciousness “is” this mechanism since disassembling it will remove
consciousness and assembling it will bring it back.” Then I agree with
you.
However, if you make the leap from that to assuming that there exists
a physical mechanism which, if its motion is correctly understood
according to the standard current laws of physics, the workings of
which would express the meaning of consciousness, would “be” conscious
not by the interjection of a separate principle but by looking at the
mechanism itself, then I still believe you and Dennett are just wrong
on principle. Remember as Claude Shannon has said the fact that
information means something is irrelevant to the engineering problem.
I do not think that the fact that we do not know the working of the
mechanism has any bearing on the situation. A mechanism will remain a
mechanism and the current physical meaning of a mechanism does not
include the fact that it is conscious no matter how it moves or how
complex it gets. It’s just not in the physics.
To say that something “is only a mechanism” means that its properties
are exhausted in a physical description of matter located over time.
There are no other properties of a mechanism in the current physics.
And even if information is received processed stored and causes the
mechanism to move in various directions that does not mean that it is
conscious. It does not mean that the information means anything to the
mechanism or that it can see.
Current physical law does not posit the existence of consciousness in
its model. Therefore in a sense consciousness is non-physical. A
radical change in the principles of physics would be required to
include the obvious facts that mechanisms such as our brains with
properties not yet posited but which we presume neurology and
cybernetics will discover become conscious. That new assignment would
be a radical departure because it would cause the physical model to
include statements about facts that cannot be reduced in meaning to
the motion of matter. You might be able to identify them ontologically
(I don’t think so but even if you did) you would not be able to say
that the new entity was just an object moving and “an object moving”
is what the current physics has in it.
It would also be a radical departure because the only way that
confirmation of such a fact could be achieved by a scientist would be
for him to engineer a physical situation that would allow him to be
that arrangement (and remember it) so that he could see for himself
what it would be like to be that arrangement. Such a program is
conceivable and even probably achievable. In some ways we already
achieve it when we drink, take drugs (in fact it is inherent in the
meaning of the term drug) and undergo anesthesia. We already know that
by injecting anesthetics into our bodies we lose consciousness. I can
report that to you myself. I can say that under anesthesia I was not
conscious as far as I can remember.
There is a therefore a dangerous equivocation that must be avoided. To
say that conscious is the mechanism of the brain can easily be
interpreted to mean that there is no other principle than mechanistic
physics required to describe the meaning of consciousness. I take you
at your word that you do not mean that but only mean that the
arrangement of physical brain causes consciousness in the sense of
material cause. And while I do not believe in the ontology of material
particles you may be able to say that the material that is the body is
conscious but only by changing the limits of what material can be not
by understanding the geometry of a mechanisms motion. Many of the
discussions I see cause this equivocation
.
I have been reminded that I have not yet introduced myself to the
group so I must take a break from this thread now to figure out how to
do that.
Cheers!
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