Messages In This Digest (18
Messages)
Messages
- 1.1.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 5:42 am (PST)
Cayuse wrote:
>BruceD wrote:
>>I'm trying to make sense of this. This is what I get. We agree that we
>>have experience. We agree that we experience ourselves as an
>>experiencer. But since our experience of ourselves is part of our
>>experience then there is way to tease apart the R from the E.
>If I use the word "experience" to refer to a skill acquired through
>practise (e.g. "machine tool operator required, experience essential")
>then I agree with Strawson that "There cannot be experience without a
>subject of experience because experience is necessarily for someone or
>something --- an experiencer or subject of experience". However, when
>discussing the philosophical problem of consciousness I'm not using the
>word in that manner, and judging by Strawson's writings I doubt very
>much that he is either. This leads me to suspect that he is being
>misled by language (confusion of language games).
>Certainly the *ideas* of experiencer, experienced, and experiencing
>stand in mutual relationship and interdependence, just as do the
>*ideas* of deceiver, and deceived, and deception. When we talk about
>experience as something gained through the practising of a new skill,
>then this mutual relationship and interdependence hold up
I agree that these ideas stand in mutual relation; and, that you've
given a good example of one situation in which the reality corresponds
to this set of ideas.
however, you've not explained why this set of inter-related ideas is not
applicable to the experience of seeing an afterimage.
there is a certain amount of skill involved in inducing an afterimage;
and, it takes a bit of practice to learn this skill.
if I can say that I am the subject of experience when claiming to have
experience learning and exercising the skill of inducing an afterimage;
then, I should be able to say that I am the experiencer of the
afterimage.
after all is said and done, if I am unable to say that I am the
experiencer of the afterimages that I induce, I would have no basis for
saying that I am experienced in the skill of inducing afterimages; or,
that I am the experiencer of my experience in the skill of inducing
afterimages.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.2.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 7:02 am (PST)
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>the last time this issue came up, we got to the point where you
>>admitted that there is experiencing (of an afterimage, to be
>>specific); but, you then declined to explain how it was possible that
>>there is experiencing an afterimage while there is nothing
>>experiencing an afterimage. you abandoned the argument at that point;
>>hence, it failed.
>Explanation, as I understand the word, involves finding a bigger
>picture within which the phenomenon under consideration may be
>accommodated. Some explanations have practical value in the world (like
>the explanation of how the motion of the moon relative to the earth
>causes the tides) and some do not (like the explanation that god
>created the world). What may or may not exist in some domain "beyond
>experience" cannot be known, and so any attempt to explain the
>existence of experience would be an explanation of the latter kind.
>Declining to engage in such pointless speculation does not amount to
>failure but to an acknowledgement that we simply cannot know. There is
>a limit to explanation, and this is where we meet that limit. If
>anything can be considered a failure here, it is the failure to
>acknowledge this and thereby to engage in pointless speculation.
we are not concerned with your inability to explain the existence of
experience. we are concerned with your inability to explain the
non-existence of the experiencer.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.3.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 10:32 am (PST)
gabuddabout wrote:
>... any possible theory of consciousness is going to appear to be yet
>another case of consceptual dualism.
>Once you got your explanation, you still have two categories in the
>real world: Those things which have minds (sufficient causal processes
>which allow ontological subjectivity while being merely physical
>processes) and those things that don't.
I agree that a successful theory of experience will still leave us with
the dualism of experiencing and non-experiencing; and, perhaps, other
dualisms as well (eg. the dualism between experiencing with and without
reflexive self-awareness or 'self-experiencing' ).
>And the debate can go on forever. Or we can see limits to the debate by
>understanding what we mean. Then we need a theory of meaning. But
>Wittgenstein railed against philosophy toying with theories.
>But once you have speech acts, it is actually encumbent upon a
>philosopher to come up with a bare-bones sketch of how speech acts are
>part of the real world. This eventually is supposed to lead to a
>biological account of how the brain causes consciousness for Searle and
>he mentions that this is where he probably parts company with
>Wittgenstein, what with his theoretical account about why it is
>senseless to come up with theories if one is merely describing language
>use.
it seems to me that we need to clarify the purpose of clarifying the use
of language in the Wittgensteinian sense. let's say that some analysis
of a particular language game dissolves a knot that currently puzzles
philosophers. do we expect that philosophers will cease their inquiry?
let's say that they do in some cases. for example, they might cease to
speculate as to what might be happening in a parallel zombie universe;
and, we'd all be better off for it.
however, this outcome seems unlikely to occur with respect to the
science and philosophy of experience. why would we cease trying to
understand the relation between brain and experience just because we
dissolve a linguistic puzzle that has limited the progress to date?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.4.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 10:58 am (PST)
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> we are not concerned with your inability to explain the existence of
> experience. we are concerned with your inability to explain the
> non-existence of the experiencer.
It will simply not do to argue that an experienceR exists by
virtue of the claim that it experienceS (or "has") experience --
this does not establish the existence of the putative experienceR.
If the putative experienceR experienceS (or "has") experience
(as though the experienceR and its experience were somehow
distinct), then what is it about the experienceR that permits
us to claim that it experienceS (or "has") this experience,
short of stamping one's foot and proclaiming "it just does!" ?
If the answer is "nothing" then the claim that the experienceR
experienceS the experience cannot be upheld.
If the answer is "something distinct from the experience"
then this "something" must be yet another experienceR,
and we fall into an infinite regress.
If the answer is "experience experienceS itself" then
experience would be constantly reflexive, which it is not.
Why might it be premature to conclude from the above that this
putative experienceR is a prime candidate for Occam's Razor?
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.5.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 11:03 am (PST)
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> after all is said and done, if I am unable to say that I am the
> experiencer of the afterimages that I induce, I would have no basis
> for saying that I am experienced in the skill of inducing
> afterimages; or, that I am the experiencer of my experience in the
> skill of inducing afterimages.
When we talk about experience as something gained through the practising of
a new skill, then this mutual relationship and interdependence hold up, but
to use the word as Chalmers does in reference to what he calls the "hard
problem" (i.e. conscious experience) is to engage in a very different
language game.
"Experience" in this latter game cannot be compared with deception
(or any other attempt at analogy) since deception constitutes only a
part of the "data of conscious experience", not the whole of it
(i.e. "experience" ). There can be only one "entirety of the data of
conscious experience", and the idea of experience (said idea being
merely a part of that data, additionally complicated by having variant
conceptions) is at the root of much confused thinking and cross-purpose
debate on this issue.
In this latter (Chalmersian) language game, the word "experience"
has been recruited to allude to something (or rather to "not a nothing")
that is at the very limit of language, in contrast to those games in which
the word is used to refer to some aspect of cognitive function. Being
at the very limit of language, it makes no sense to misconceive it as an
entity and then to pile misconceived entity upon misconceived entity by
postulating the existence of some associated "experiencer" that is distinct
from it but that stands in mutual relationship and interdependence with it.
It is by just such a misconception (putting the entirety of the data of
conscious experience on an equal footing with those entities, activities
and relationships that appear within the data of conscious experience)
that we arrive at the problem of accounting for the relationship between
conscious experience and the experiencer. The "experience" of which
Chalmers speaks appears nowhere within the data of conscious
experience, not as entity, activity, nor relationship, and neither does
this putative "experiencer" . Chalmers' "hard problem" results from
confusing the well grounded and useful idea of self as organism in its
habitat with the ungrounded and useless metaphysical idea of self as
experiencer.
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.6.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 1:30 pm (PST)
Cayuse wrote:
>Chalmers' "hard problem" results from confusing the well grounded and
>useful idea of self as organism in its habitat with the ungrounded and
>useless metaphysical idea of self as experiencer.
you have this backwards.
Chalmers posed the hard problem by unconflating two distinct language
games: the I as a physical object (an organism in its habitat); and, the
I as self-experiencing experiencer.
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.7.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 4:05 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Cayuse wrote:
>...useless metaphysical idea of self as experiencer.
Two questions. What makes a concept "metaphysical" and what makes it "useless."
I leave the metaphysical to you. But, all day long, I have use for the distinction between my experience and others.
bruce
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.8.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 4:12 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@.. .> wrote:
Bruce wrote.
> >Which is to say, would you agree, that the relationship between the
> >experiencer and what is experienced is not causal, but, let's say,
> >instrumental (in the sense of it suits my purpose to take them to
be)?
>
> a lot depends on what you mean by '*what* is experienced' . suppose you
> look at a red ball. would you say that you experience the physical
> object that appears to you as a red ball; or, would you say that you
> experience redness, roundness and so on?
I would say "I see a red ball." If I had reason to doubt my senses, I
might question whether it was physical, a illusion, or, perhaps, an
hallucination. When I'm in my artist frame of mind, I'd might say "I
experience its redness, etc.". But I wouldn't mean that these
experiences floated free of an object.
Does this help with my question?
bruce
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.9.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 4:43 pm (PST)
let me see if I can summarize the discourse to this point.
I claimed that "there is experience and there is experiencing; but, no
way to explain that fact without inferring that there is an experiencer"
and alluded to the failure your earlier argument to the contrary.
you challenged my evaluation (that your argument failed miserably). I
pointed out that you admitted that there is experiencing an afterimage;
and, that you were unable to explain how it was possible that there is
experiencing an afterimage while there is nothing experiencing an
afterimage.
your reply is "It will simply not do to argue that an experienceR exists
by virtue of the claim that it experienceS (or "has") experience".
your response is barely cogent; and, does nothing to carry your burden:
unless you can show that there is experience that is unexperienced by
anything at all, experience implies an experiencer.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.10.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 5:09 pm (PST)
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Chalmers posed the hard problem by unconflating two distinct language
> games: the I as a physical object (an organism in its habitat); and,
> the I as self-experiencing experiencer.
Where does he say this?
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.11.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 5:09 pm (PST)
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> let me see if I can summarize the discourse to this point.
>
> I claimed that "there is experience and there is experiencing; but, no
> way to explain that fact without inferring that there is an
> experiencer" and alluded to the failure your earlier argument to the
> contrary.
> you challenged my evaluation (that your argument failed miserably). I
> pointed out that you admitted that there is experiencing an
> afterimage; and, that you were unable to explain how it was possible
> that there is experiencing an afterimage while there is nothing
> experiencing an afterimage.
Your demand for explanation fails because on this issue we are at the limit
to explanation, as indicated earlier.
> your reply is "It will simply not do to argue that an experienceR
> exists by virtue of the claim that it experienceS (or "has")
> experience".
> your response is barely cogent; and, does nothing to carry your
> burden:
My response consisted of a reasoned argument for which you have consistently
failed to provide a refutation. Foot stamping carries no weight.
> unless you can show that there is experience that is
> unexperienced by anything at all, experience implies an experiencer.
I can't even show that there is experience, let alone qualify that
experience, and neither can you. Your conclusion is therefore in error.
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.12.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 5:46 pm (PST)
BruceD wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Cayuse wrote:
>
>> ...useless metaphysical idea of self as experiencer.
>
> Two questions. What makes a concept "metaphysical" and what makes it
> "useless."
>
> I leave the metaphysical to you. But, all day long, I have use for
> the distinction between my experience and others.
Conscious experience isn't an empirical phenomenon -- it makes no appearance
in the data provided by the sense organs. It only appears in conscious
experience as an idea, and one that is supported neither by direct empirical
evidence nor by indirect empirical evidence. I think you must be confusing
conscious experience with some aspect of behavior and information
processing -- if so then I too have use for the distinction between my
behavior and information processing, and that of others. As for the idea of
an experiencer, I can do no better than quote Laplace's answer to Napoleon
when asked about the idea of god: "I have no use for that hypothesis".
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.13.
-
Mon Mar 1, 2010 2:09 am (PST)
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>unless you can show that there is experience that is unexperienced
>>by anything at all, experience implies an experiencer.
>I can't even show that there is experience, let alone qualify that
>experience, and neither can you. Your conclusion is therefore in error.
you've previously admitted that there is experiencing; in particular,
experiencing an afterimage. are you revising your position? if so, how?
if you are not now denying what you previously admitted; then, the
problem remains: unless you can explain how there can be experiencing an
afterimage not experienced by anything at all, experiencing implies an
experiencer.
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.14.
-
Mon Mar 1, 2010 2:29 am (PST)
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Chalmers posed the hard problem by unconflating two distinct language
>>games: the I as a physical object (an organism in its habitat); and,
>>the I as self-experiencing experiencer.
>Where does he say this?
well, of course, he doesn't use those words; but, if you follow his
arguments in favor of property dualism, it's clear that he distinguishes
the physical from the phenomenal.
according to Chalmers, zombies are conceivable; and, therefore, the
phenomenal ('mental' in his vocabulary) supervenes on the physical. it's
a bonus whose origin is yet to be explained.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 1.15.
-
Mon Mar 1, 2010 2:34 am (PST)
BruceD wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>Bruce wrote.
>>>Which is to say, would you agree, that the relationship between the
>>>experiencer and what is experienced is not causal, but, let's say,
>>>instrumental (in the sense of it suits my purpose to take them to
>>>be)?
>>a lot depends on what you mean by '*what* is experienced' . suppose you
>>look at a red ball. would you say that you experience the physical
>>object that appears to you as a red ball; or, would you say that you
>>experience redness, roundness and so on?
>I would say "I see a red ball." If I had reason to doubt my senses, I
>might question whether it was physical, a illusion, or, perhaps, an
>hallucination. When I'm in my artist frame of mind, I'd might say "I
>experience its redness, etc.". But I wouldn't mean that these
>experiences floated free of an object.
>Does this help with my question?
partially, yes.
arguably, the brain of the experiencer causes or contributes to causing
the experience of redness. however, the experiencer does not cause the
ball to exist.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~@ ^@
============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 2.1.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 7:27 am (PST)
I replied to this one, Neil, but it never went through. Yahoo seems to do that at times. Anyway, fortunately I saved part of my reply, reproduced below:
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@ ...> wrote:
>
<snip>
>
Budd:
> > . . . It targets your point that parallel processing offers
> > us something more COMPUTATIONALLY than serial computing.
>
Neil:
> Can you point out where Stuart said that parallel processing provides
> something special, other than raw compute power. I seem to have missed
> that.
>
SWM:
In fairness to Budd, Neil, I do argue that something is added with parallel processing, but not that something is added "computationally" as he puts it. I think that capacity is required to achieve the requisite level of complexity in the system and that capacity involves running more processes doing more things at the same time in an interactive way. Thus I am saying that the capacity requirement is met by a parallel processing capability.
Budd seems to take me as talking about the quality of the processes in question whereas what I am actually doing is talking about the quality of the system in question, a system that is constituted by such processes.
~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~
Budd:
> > That is decidedly false and Searle's CR is equivalent to a UTM and
> > ALL possible parallel processing DEFINED IN COMPUTATIONAL TERMS is
> > also equivalent to what can be done serially with a UTM.
>
Neil:
> If computational AI is possible (and I don't assume it is), then
> Searle's CR is equivalent to a computer so highly powered that it could
> maybe have one thought every 1000 years. It is grossly underpowered
> for the job. And I'm pretty sure that is what Stuart was pointing out.
> That the CR is so underpowered, makes it implausible as a source of
> intelligence. And since Searle's argument is at beast only an attempt
> to show AI is implausible, his underpowered equipment makes the
> argument very misleading.
>
SWM:
Yes, here I think we are clearly in agreement, Neil (as we probably are on the matter of parallel processing, too, once we parse the difference between Budd's way of stating the matter and mine).
~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~
Budd:
> > No one is ever going to find that some process or other is
> > intrinsically computational.
>
Neil:
> This actually has no consequences, as far as I can tell. It's a side
> issue.
>
SWM:
Yes, I agree. This just looks like verbiage to me without any implications for the argument we are conducting on this matter. Heck, I don't even know what it means to speak of something as being "intrinsically computational" . Intrinsicness is plainly a relative matter and depends on the context. What, after all, is intrinsic in any absolute sense? So one could say that computer programs running on computers are intrinsically that in one sense, being what they are, but really just so many physical events, in another sense, because to be "computational" would mean to be a particular kind of alogrithm and the algorithm is an abstraction, a kind of content carried by the physical events of the processes going on in the machine, etc. But so what?
~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~
Budd:
> > The upshot of so saying is that it makes it difficult to distinguish
> > the truly mental from nonmental.
>
>
> > And this is the upshot of the systems reply as a reply to Searle's
> > CRA.
>
Neil:
> I am wondering whether you have ever read the Systems reply. It has no
> such consequences, and it is actually the correct response to Searle's
> bogus argument.
>
SWM:
I also don't see the point.
~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~
> I'll add that I actually think Searle might be right about AI. However,
> his CRA was a complete failure at showing that.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
> ============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Yes, Searle could be right for empirical reasons but not for the reasons laid out in the CRA.
SWM
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 2.2.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 4:35 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@.. .> wrote:
> The point is what is consciousness, i.e., is it a feature (or
features) of a certain kind of system or
> is it something that cannot be reduced to that?
Your questions are confusing. Easily I can say "consciousness is a
feature of organismic systems, simply meaning, some organisms are
conscious. Where is the puzzle here?
Reduction? If X is a feature of a system it is part of the system and
not reduced to it.
> If it can be reduced to that in brains
No "if" about it, in one sense. I can refer to the parts of the brain
that are correlated with various conscious states. But there is no
reduction here. I'm simply attributing to the brain "mental" features
which, of course, the brain doesn't have, the person has.
> The question is what is consciousness, what is it that we are saying
is caused?
Which begs the question of whether consciousness is the sort of concept
that can be accounted for in causal terms. I have a beer. My demeanor
changes. Exactly what did the beer cause? It reduced the availability of
oxygen to the brain cells. The brain fired differently.
In order to relate this change in brain, to change in MY demeanor, I, as
a person, has to be introduced into the account. "I" don't fit anywhere
in the causal change.
bruce
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
- 2.3.
-
Sun Feb 28, 2010 6:35 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@. ..> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > The point is what is consciousness, i.e., is it a feature (or
> features) of a certain kind of system or
> > is it something that cannot be reduced to that?
>
> Your questions are confusing. Easily I can say "consciousness is a
> feature of organismic systems, simply meaning, some organisms are
> conscious. Where is the puzzle here?
>
What does the organismic system we call "conscious" (as opposed to other kinds of systems) have that qualifies it to be called "conscious" and which those other systems lack and, therefore, are not justifaibly labeled as "conscious"?
> Reduction? If X is a feature of a system it is part of the system and
> not reduced to it.
>
If X is a feature of a system then it is something we can say that that system has or does and is thus the result of something that the consitutents (or some of the constituents) of that system are doing at a lower level of operation. Think of the molecules of H2O moving about and interacting in a way that we recognize as wetness (one of the features of the substance we call "water").
Still round and round the old carousel, eh?
> > If it can be reduced to that in brains
>
> No "if" about it, in one sense.
That's the sense I'm talking about. Nothing else. It's the issue of the relation of the brain to the mind.
> I can refer to the parts of the brain
> that are correlated with various conscious states. But there is no
> reduction here. I'm simply attributing to the brain "mental" features
> which, of course, the brain doesn't have, the person has.
>
It is arbitrary to say the brain lacks some of the features we also ascribe to persons and minds. We can speak of a person thinking, the thought being part of the person's mind and also the brain being the source of the thinking and thus the thought, for instance. It all depends on what aspect of the matter we mean to address.
Where is the "reduction" you are so keen to contest?
What do YOU mean by "reduction"?
I mean a causal explanation, i.e., an explanation for how the phenomena we call thought and minds occur in the world, and that is manifestly because brains do it. Nor do you seem to be contesting that, much of the time. Yet you persist in objecting to the notion of a "reduction".
So the issue is what do you have in mind by that term? Note that no one, least of all me, is saying here that minds or consciousness don't exist, aren't real, can be reduced away, etc. Nor am I making a claim for a metaphysical monism, contra your frequent concerns.
My use of "reduction" refers ONLY to the question of how consciousness happens in the world, what produces it, what is responsible for it?
Nor am I calling for a linguistic reduction that replaces talk about minds and thoughts with talk about brains and brainwaves either, which seems to be another of you concerns with regard to my position.
So, given this, what is it in my claim for the reducibility of minds to brain processes, that continues to trouble you?
> > The question is what is consciousness, what is it that we are saying
> is caused?
>
> Which begs the question of whether consciousness is the sort of concept
> that can be accounted for in causal terms.
See my hundreds of prior posts.
> I have a beer. My demeanor
> changes. Exactly what did the beer cause? It reduced the availability of
> oxygen to the brain cells. The brain fired differently.
>
> In order to relate this change in brain, to change in MY demeanor, I, as
> a person, has to be introduced into the account. "I" don't fit anywhere
> in the causal change.
>
> bruce
>
No one is taking the person out of the account. The question is what is it that produces the mind that constitutes a person in certain physical entities? What makes consciousness happen in the world? We can ask that question without supposing that persons don't really exist, aren't really persons, etc. This is just your ongoing misunderstanding of the position I am presenting here, that's all.
SWM
============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
![]()
|
