--- In
Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@..
.> wrote:
<snip>
>
SWM on accounting for consciousness:
> >There are a four ways on the table that I can think of offhand here:
>
> >1) The self or subject is seen as a separate existent from the things
> >it apprehends. (This is dualism though it may have more than one form
> >or way of being described: It could be a transcendental subject a la
> >Kant or a monad a la Leibniz or it could be a parallel dimension of
> >existence, co-existing with the physical phenomena of the world and of
> >which it is aware -- a Cartesian kind of dualism.)
>
> this account of substance dualism is quite confused.
>
It's intended as a generic account, not a specific presentation of any particular doctrine. As such it's meant to cover a variety of bases.
> a hard core physicalist would likely agree that the experiencing I is
> not identical to the stone, or the afterimage that it apprehends. that
> alone doesn't make the physicalist a dualist.
>
The point is that one either must presume that subjectness is lodged in the physical world (is an aspect of it) or it isn't, in which case it is a co-existent, etc., etc.
> what's important is how many 'substances' (types of metaphenomenal
> objects) and/or how many sets of properties are needed to explain the
> phenomenon in question: experiencing *as* an experiencing I, the self or
> subject.
>
The idea of a "susbtance" is somewhat antiquated today. One needn't speak in such terms to suppose that consciousness is ontologically distinct, in some basic sense, from other existents which, presumably, are physically derived. However, the point that needs to be made is that whether one calls it "substance" or something else, if one supposes this ontological divide (that one thing is not reducible to the other in terms of how it comes about) then one is on dualist ground.
One doesn't have to adhere to old ways of speaking, old concepts about how the universe is to be explained, in order to hold a dualist conception of this.
> all of those you mentioned, Kant, Leibniz and Descartes would be
> considered substance dualists according to this definition.
>
As I say, "substance" reflects an old way of speaking, one that is not essential to making the same point if one can explain it in different terms. I have noted many times in our discussions about this that I avoid reference to "susbtances" precisely because such a reference is entangled with old fashioned pictures of the universe, pictures that are not consistent with modern physics. But one needn't use an old fashioned vocabulary in order to invoke dualism. The mistake, or at least one mistake one can make about this, is supposing the idea depends on the particular vocabulary. There are generally many ways of expressing a point in language, of getting the same thing across, of speaking about the same idea.
> >2) The self or subject is one or more (an amalgam) of properties that
> >some physical phenomena (brains or parts of brains or activities of
> >brains) have/produce but which are irreducible to anything else (this
> >is also dualism but a more confused picture on my view -- it supposes
> >that brains somehow summon/bring/
introduce some fundamentally new
> >existent into the world).
>
> this seems to be an attempt to describe property dualism; and, it is
> good to see that (despite years of claiming that they are
> indistinguishable) you are now striving to articulate the difference
> between them.
>
I am saying nothing different in the above than I said in the discussions where this first came up with Walter on Analytic. I said
then and say now that I agree with Searle that unless one is invoking what has historically been called "substance dualism", then merely to speak of mental properties of certain kinds of physical things or events is not dualism by itself. However, if one wishes to name it dualism, one can get away with it but then one has to see that this isn't the "dualism" that's meant by the kind of anti-dualist claim I have made and which I believe Dennett is opposing.
The further problem that came up with this was one Walter was never willing to explicate his own view on and to this day it remains unclarified. It was whether the "properties" of brains (or parts of brains or particular brain events) he alluded to are reducible to something purely physical in an explanatory sense. If they are reducible then there is no real dualism but if they are deemed to be irreducible then they are no different than a claim of "substance dualism" because an ontological basic is implied.
The distinction between a claim of property dualism of this type and the classical substance dualism you are so interested in appears to hinge on whether the claim of property dualism is a claim that something new enters or is brought into the world in lieu of its always having been present in some co-existent fashion with the physical phenomena of the world. But note that either way the implications are the same. If on the other hand one merely takes these "properties" of brains to be akin to what Minsky calls "system properties" then there is nothing about them that is ontologically distinct in terms of their genesis (even if they are not the same as other kinds of "properties" we encounter in the world, e.g., color, taste, texture, mass, shape, etc.) and in that case this isn't really dualism at all. Or if one wants to say it is, then one has lost the original raison d'etre for claiming dualism, i.e., the features of mind are seen to be proces
s-based system features and there is nothing gained by noting that they aren't the same as the observable features or properties of the process-based system itself. Of course they're not. Who would deny it?
This whole dualist business strikes me as a big mish-mosh of confused usages and concepts.
> all that is required to establish property dualism is using two sets of
> properties to explain ... whatever.
>
See above.
> >3) The self or subject is one or more (an amalgam) of properties
> >(features) that some physical phenomena (brains or parts of brains or
> >activities of brains) have/produce and which ARE reducible to those
> >phenomena (which are not, themselves, subject-like, i.e., they lack the
> >qualities we associate with being a subject, etc.).
>
This is the idea that one can call the features of mind "properties" without invoking any genuine dualism, hence "property dualism" is rather confused. However, I will note that Walter claimed that Searle misstated the property dualist position and that, on his view, no real property dualists fall into the ontological dualist divide that characterizes the kinds of dualism you call "substance dualism". However, because Walter refused to explicate his own view as to the question of whether features of consciousness associated with brains can be reduced to physical processes that are not themselves conscious, he left unanswered whether he was prepared to take his assertion to its logical conclusion that, in such a case, Searle would be right and that THAT kind of dualism would not really be dualism in the sense that dualism matters at all.
> >4) The self or subject is not explicable in any way, it just happens to
> >be present in the universe and we can't say how or understand why,
> >etc., etc. It's just an unresolvable mystery of being.
>
> we've covered this possibility before. neither of us believes that the
> presence of subjectivity in an otherwise objective universe is
> inherently inexplicable. you think that the presence of the experiencing
> I has already been solved; whereas, I don't. you think there is no
> mystery; but, I think the mystery remains.
>
Yes we are in disagreement here and that just reflects our different conceptions of consciousness and of what it takes to understand consciousness. The point of the above breakout that I provided to Bruce was to show what I take the options to be. I take it that you are adamant that some form of dualism is required to explain the occurrence of minds in an otherwise physical universe?
All though you have never given an explicit affirmation that that is your position, it certainly seems to be from all you've said. As you note, I take a different view. But note that I don't deny that a mystery remains. Indeed, because I think this is finally an empirical question and that it has not actually been resolved, I do not deny that there is plenty we don't yet know. The difference in our positions seems to be that you are a believer in the idea of a uniquely "hard problem" (a la Chalmers) whereas I am not. That is, I think that a Dennettian type model is likely to prove adequate when put to the empirical test.
> in any case this option is not relevant to discussions of whether the
> von Neumann Interpretation of QM is or is not dualistic.
>
The only thing that's relevant is whether the von Neumann thesis implies something with regard to consciousness that is equivalent to dualism, in which case a model like Dennett's cannot be successful if the von Neumann thesis is then true. But of course that remains an open question as well!
> >As you know, I hold that #3 offers the best explanation for the
> >presence of subjects in the universe. But I don't pretend to "show" why
> >#3 is true because I don't claim it is true! It's a way of explaining,
> >of understanding, the phenomenon.
>
> >On this view, it strikes me that #3 is the best choice because it
> >doesn't require that we posit extra existents in the universe (the
> >dualism of 1 and 2),
>
> property dualism doesn't postulate extra existents;
We have seen that that remains an open question. If mental properties are not seen to be reducible to other things that are not themselves mental properties, if intentionality as a property of some brain or brain part or brain event is not reducible to some brain events, etc., then extra existents are being postulated even if they are only supposed to be brought into existence by the brains or their parts themselves.
The issue at bottom that makes something dualism is not whether a vocabulary of substances is in play but whether reducibility is allowed.
>unless, you have a
> weird definition of 'existent'; otherwise, property dualism just
> requires two sets of properties.
>
The issue is reducibility. We can explain redness in terms of physical phenomena on a level of decriptive physics. The question then is whether we can also explain the awareness of the redness on a similar descriptive level or not. If we can, then there is no dualism but if the claim is that we cannot, then there is. However, the point of Dennett's model is to present a way of doing this that accounts for all the features of consciousness on a physically descriptive level so to demonstrate his model can't work you have to identify at least one feature that is essential to any designation of consciousness which cannot be so reduced. Merely to say it has yet to have been done completely (one of PJ's arguments) is not sufficient because the issue is what can be done not what has been done.
On the other hand you seem to be insisting that the von Neumann interpretation implies something about consciousness that isn't accounted for by Dennett's model (free will? causality?). But for some reason you still haven't made a case for either beyond assertion. And it isn't enough to assert that Dennett's model misses the boat because it doesn't account for dualist assumptions when it's point is to discard those very assumptions.
> in any event, just having a taxonomy of belief systems is not enough.
> one must also apply it consistently and coherently; but, you are not.
> you, Dennett and Searle are all trying to be in category 3; but, neither
> you nor Dennett can avoid the same latent property dualism of which
> you've accused Searle.
>
I'll let you demonstrate that with an argument then since I think that is just wrong.
> physical objects have physical properties that cause measurable
> phenomena. some objects also have physical properties that cause
> experienceable phenomena.
>
All measureable phenomena are experienceable since you cannot measure what cannot be encountered in experience, either directly or indirectly. This distinction is not a distinction at all.
> >Now you can continue insisting that a "phenomenological reality" cannot
> >be "physically derived" unless someone can show you that it can but all
> >you are doing by this is insisting on a dualist picture (as seen in
> >either #1 or #2 or, perhaps, some variant I haven't accounted for
> >above).
>
> my claim is that the von Neumann Interpretation is dualistic (type 1)
> because the abstract 'I' von Neumann postulated is best classified as an
> I-3 (an entity of reality type 3) on the grounds that it is required to
> be non-physical and causally effective.
>
And I have pointed out that there is nothing in this thesis that requires that a subject be a stand-alone entity in the universe. A physically derived subject can be conceived of just as readily as a monadic type.
However, I have also asked you to sa a bit more about what YOU mean by an "abstract I" since it's possible you mean something more than what I am getting from the usage. To date though you've been rather reticent to deal with this.
> >But it is no argument against a Dennettian model to say that it is
> >wrong because it doesn't explain things dualistically.
>
> I am saying that a Dennettian account of consciousness such as your own
> does not explain how a fictitious entity, the self, described as a
> 'narrative center of gravity' make a free choice (as to how to set up
> its measurement apparatus) or be causally effective at collapsing the
> wave function of a subatomic particle.
>
And I am saying that it certainly does, i.e., by understanding the self or subject as a complex system with many sub-systems and parts and that within this complex are physically causal elements and that what you are calling the "narrative center of gravity" that is also a part of it (after Dennett's usage) is not necessarily a stand-alone entity. Such a complex model of a self could operate as a subject, indeed, it could play the role of an "abstract I" which, finally, is just that, a role (unless you can explicate it in a way that shows that it is something more).
> >You can't say it's wrong because it doesn't account for dualism (of
> >course it doesn't!)
>
> I'm saying that you and Dennett refuse to admit to being property
> dualists.
>
> Joe
>
See my analysis above of what is meant by "property dualism". However, if it makes you feel more at ease, I will gladly accept the terminology as a way of describing this position as long as it is seen to have no relation to any kind of dualism that hinges on the supposition of at least two ontological basics co-existing in the universe. The problem with this, though, is that your dualism DOES seem to require that and so you need me to say I am a "property dualist" so you can construe my position as dualism which, of course, it isn't as already described and explained numerous times above.
If this is about nomenclature alone, we could readily resolve this by carefully explaining and defining our positions. But the problem is that this goes beyond the words themselves since you insist on this von Neumann thesis you have elaborated which implies NOT property dualism as I have offered it but a deeper dualism, one of ontological basics. Thus in the end this argument between us rests on a confusion, your attachment to the idea of dualism and the terminology associated with it, whatever others may mean by the terms.
SWM
============
=========
=========
=========
==
Need Something? Check here:
http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
