--- In
Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@.
..> wrote:
>
> --- In
Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Dennett's view is there is no special entity called "intention",
>
> Who holds that an act (taking a stance) is an entity. Two questions. Who
> takes a stance? In what sense can a stance be caused.
>
As to my point about what "Dennett holds" I was pointing it out in response to your comment that perhaps my view isn't Dennett's (I'm sure it isn't in every particular), thereby putting in question what Dennett holds. I was answering that question.
As to "who takes a stance" obviously we as speakers do -- that is part of what Dennett holds. As to "in what sense can a stance be caused?" it can be in the sense I have been describing here since we began talking about it: The brain as the operating entity performs certain functions via physical processes going on within it which, as a comprehensive system has certain features including, among these, the taking of such stances. And so on . . .
> > What is an "aware self" in your lexicon?
>
> What everyone else means by the term, a person who freely acts on the
> basisw of reasons, in part.
Well an entity can, conceivably, act "freely" (in an undetermined way) without being self aware. Would that still be what you mean by an "aware self"?
> In contrast to a mechanical thing (like the
> brain) which doesn't reason any more than my big toe, as you are fond of
> saying. Apparently Dennett wants to shift the meaning. Can he?
>
Well, he is addressing the idea that we need to think of consciousness in a different way, as a process-based system of a particular type, etc. Is that to "shift the meaning"? And if it is, is that therefore an illegitimate move in trying to understand the way consciousness comes about and the relationship of it to brains?
Now does the brain reason? Well, it does indeed if it is the seat of a mind, which is to say that a properly working brain of a certain type and capacity, under conditions where reasoning is warranted, would be said to be reasoning. But no, we don't typically substitute "brain" for "person" but that is because we don't deal with free standing brains but, rather, with entities with operating brains (along with operating hearts and lungs and even big toes -- assuming they haven't recently lost them to a bout of forstbite, gangrene, etc.).
> > The Dennettian model is suggesting that it is just the interplay of
> certain functionalities in the brain.
>
> Claiming that the brain is vital for taking a stance may (or may not)
> shift the meaning.
I don't think the point of the Dennettian model is to claim that "the brain is vital for taking a stance". Rather it is an assumption of this model, the model being the method of explaining how this could be so.
> I'm comfortale with "I use my brain to reason", just
> as I use my hands to play the piano. But that is not your use.
>
Nor is it the use we are addressing here. The two uses should not be confused. Of course you use your brain to reason. You use it for a lot of other things, too, including seeing, smelling, remembering, dreaming, breathing, etc. But in this latter sense of "use" it makes no sense to speak that way since we have more observable physical constituents that are like our hands, namely we use our nose to smell, our tongues to taste, our eyes to see, our ears to hear, etc. That is, while a part or parts of the brain are implicated in each aspect of perception alluded to above, we do not typically speak of the parts of brains or the brain in general because these are not observable and directly associated with the functions involved.
Where we mean "use" in the broad sense we don't use "use" at all, i.e., we don't say I think I'll lie down and use my brain for a nice dream now or I'll use it to remember something (though we might want to say THAT if remembering required an effort at reconstituting some string of associations in order to call up a particular fact, i.e., we might say to a student struggling over an exam question, think, man, remember what so and so said, use your noggin -- meaning, of course, use your head, your brain).
> > As a result of these a self is generated...
>
> which means all that I think and do is produced by prior causes in the
> physical sense you go on to say. I've asked, and I'll see if you get to
> it, do you freely choose to see your self as caused by your brain?
>
It depends what we mean by "cause". In the sense Searle uses and that I have agreed is relevant here, absolutely. But that is not the only way I use "cause". Your post here has caused me to decide to type out the current response you are reading. Had you not posted it, I would not be typing this response. My personality causes me to respond to this particular stimulus as I do. My personality is the result (has been caused by) a combination of my genetic predispositions and the history of my life to this point, and so forth. There is a physical dynamic to all of this though my reading and understanding of your post, my decision to respond and how I then proceed to respond are not mechanical in the usual sense of THAT term. But they are mechanical on a larger and deeper level. But then THAT isn't what we mean when we usually speak of something's being "mechanical"
. Language is rich with nuance, as in ranges of meaning (of use).
> > But there is no dissonance between a claim that a conscious self is
> physically derived
> > and a claim that intentionality, understood as part of a conscious
> self, is a matter of imputation
>
> Right! Completely consonant. You can say of others, if you choose, that
> there so-called free intentionality is a myth and, as been suggested by
> another Post, they are simply products of programming. But can you say
> that of yourself?
>
I don't consider it a "myth" My point is that these distinctions reflect different uses, different contexts, different levels of discourse.
> > But I treat you as a creature with an inner life, a mental life, on a
> par with my own,
>
> Did you choose to think this or was it caused by your brain?
I (as a conscious self) am caused by my brain and thus every thing I think is caused by it, too. But this is not to say we don't use "cause" in other ways and that some uses involve the naming or describing of different relation strings.
> And how can
> you tell the difference? If one can't, the Dennett's model of brain
> causation is indeterminanat.
>
I don't know what point you are trying to make. On this kind of view we can be said to have a degree of indeterminacy if for no other reason is that we are part of a vast physical universe whose interplay is beyond any possible capture by a comprehensible formula, etc. So for all intents and purposes, that indeterminacy makes us "free", even if there are some things that we can learn to predict about ourselves.
But if you mean by "indeterminate" that Dennett's thesis isn't established truth, that is certainly the case but then I have never claimed otherwise. Dennett's thesis is a model of how consciousness works, what it is. It is for empirical science to test out its workability. However, conceptually, it does a decent job of accounting for all the features we think consciousness consists of (and it doesn't require unncessarily complicating our picture of the universe with something extra).
> > Since I don't take a "causal stance" toward you or other creatures
> like us,
>
> You don't think of my mental life as caused by my brain activity?
>
I do but so what? That doesn't mean I don't think you have a real mental life (i.e., are intentional, etc.). We're talking about the intentional stance here, right?
> > Nothing about the model of mind I have been explaining here implies
> that I must, to be consistent,
> > treat you or myself as automata, without real minds, without the
> ability to make choices, etc.
>
> Really? You have a mind, in the ordinary sense, ability to reason, make
> choices, and yet all this is caused by brain activity.
What else? My heavenly soul? Some monadic entity peering through a window of spacetime? An homunculus of unknown origin? You say you aren't a dualist and then you say things like the above!
>That which is
> freely done is caused? Where else in the physical world does this
> happen? Does the sun refuse to rise?
>
This just confuses notions of "freedom".
> As I've suggested before. Dennett's dread of spirit entities in the
> skull has prompted him to attribute to the brain, a real physical thing,
> if you will, all that others attribute to mind, making choices, etc. but
> then cover his tracks by talking about causation -- which upon
> examination bears little resemblence to physical causation.
>
> bruce
>
I thought you said he talks about "influences" rather than causation in your earlier post???
Can you show that Dennett has this "dread of spirit entities" as you put it, beyond diagnosing this otherwise undocumented "dread" as the cause or reason for his apparently mad obsession with attributing mental phenomena to brains? How could he have possibly been moved to such an outrageous supposition? Perhaps he has missed some other more reasonable alternative? Spiritualism perhaps?
Since you suggest he is covering his tracks here, can you show us what lies beneath that cover through an analysis of his actual claims or words rather than relying on mere suggestion or interpolation? What are the reasons that prompt you to such a conclusion?
SWM
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