SWM wrote:

>Responding to Joe re: Dennett -

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>how can the out-of-the-loop press secretary be anything other than
>>>>epiphenomenal?

>>>By presuming that the self (consciousness in this case) is
>>>multi-layered and that the "press secretary" isn't the bottom line
>>>agent. That doesn't mean there isn't an agential aspect to the
>>>process-based system in the brain that constitutes the consciousness.
>>>It just means that all aspects of the agential system are not equal.

>>the question is whether the causally effective aspect of the human
>>individual is some part of the brain or the narrative center of
>>gravity constructed by some part (not necessarily the same part) of
>>the brain.

>On a Dennettian model (and one can say it's certainly not unique to
>Dennett -- I've recently finished reading Ramachandran's Phantoms in
>the Brain, which basically presents a model like this albeit without
>Dennett's explicit computational component, and, as we have seen, on
>this list, Stanislas Dehaene seems to have a similar view), the
>elements of mind consist of many different functionalities which
>coalesce into recognizable features at the level of personal
>observation (introspection). At a deep level lots of things are going
>on to which we don't have introspective access. As Ramachandran puts
>it, we have multiple zombies operating in our brain, below the
>conscious level. As Dehaene suggests (though Ramachandran doesn't go
>this far -- he is eschewing comprehensive theorizing in favor of
>empirical observations) what produces the experience of consciousness
>may just be a certain "global" level of operations of these various
>brain processes that is achieved for some of these operations (or their
>combinations) but not others.

>The "self" (for many, including Ramachandran) is rather like a
>composite of different elements -- it consists of many different
>combinations. On such a view, the idea that some aspects of the self,
>of our mental life, are more salient or more empowered than others is
>perfectly sensible. It just challenges the idea that, at the core of
>consciousness, mind, there is a simple element or constituent that is
>pure consciousness, set apart from everything else, some untouchable
>thing that makes the experiential parts of mind we normally think of in
>connection with being a subject in the universe possible.

>>what was above didn't explain how a literary fiction can be causally
>>effective. indeed, Dennett seems to be saying that it is the *brain*
>>that is causally effective. that would clearly imply that the
>>narrative center of gravity is completely epiphenomenal.

>I would suggest that is a misreading of him. What he is saying is that
>the mind is a complex of brain events which, in a manner much like the
>way an orchestra operates, produce the "music" of being conscious. On
>such a view, the various referents we have in mind when we use a word
>like "self" will not always be quite the same. Ramachandran
>distinguishes between the "embodied self", the "passionate self", the
>"executive self", the "mnemonic self", the "unified self", the
>"vigilant self", and the "conceptual and the social self" (which last
>two he links). pages 247-253

>This viewpoint suggests that the "press secretary" you are referring to
>is just one aspect of a very complex arrangement of mental features and
>proclivities, all of which are outcomes of various brain operations at
>various levels of integration. That some aspects of what we think we
>are are better understood as observer rather than executor doesn't mean
>we don't have executive capabilities or aren't part of a larger complex
>with such capabilities. The point is to replace the idea that mind,
>consciousness, is what it is because of a core constituent that is
>somehow pure subject. Being a subject is a result, on this view, of a
>complex of processes found in certain kinds of brains when they are in
>good operating order and operating at capacity.

perhaps that is how the sense of being a self (or subject or experiencer
or agent, etc) arises. the point is that this sense of self experiences
itself as the executing agent of its intentions.

if the actual work is being done by the brain; then, there is nothing
left for the subjective self to 'do'. the subjective self is then
epiphenomenal.

see generally: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
><snip>

> >This viewpoint suggests that the "press secretary" you are referring to
> >is just one aspect of a very complex arrangement of mental features and
> >proclivities, all of which are outcomes of various brain operations at
> >various levels of integration. That some aspects of what we think we
> >are are better understood as observer rather than executor doesn't mean
> >we don't have executive capabilities or aren't part of a larger complex
> >with such capabilities.

> > The point is to replace the idea that mind,
> >consciousness, is what it is because of a core constituent that is
> >somehow pure subject. Being a subject is a result, on this view, of a
> >complex of processes found in certain kinds of brains when they are in
> >good operating order and operating at capacity.
>

> perhaps that is how the sense of being a self (or subject or experiencer
> or agent, etc) arises. the point is that this sense of self experiences
> itself as the executing agent of its intentions.
>

> if the actual work is being done by the brain; then, there is nothing
> left for the subjective self to 'do'. the subjective self is then
> epiphenomenal.

> Joe

The point, as I am trying to convey it (perhaps badly, perhaps it cannot be conveyed better absent a shared insight), is that the sense of self we have is actually multiple, i.e., it is not a fixed self qua entity (see Ramachandran's proposed breakout) even though there is a general overlapping of the self images operating within the consciousness framework in each of us, an overlapping that prompts us not to see the distinctions unless we are looking very, very closely.

On this view, the point to be made is that the self you have named (the "press secretary") is part of a larger complex of operations including other self images and does not, in its normal operation, distinguish itself as the "press secretary". When "it" "speaks" it does so for the full complex of selves, all the iterations, all the participating self images (or at least for a cluster of them, as they are relevant). The mistake I think you make, in drawing a conclusion of epiphenomenalism from this is to suppose that there must be one unigue agential self, identifiable with the speaking self, in order to have a causal subjective agent in the mix. But there is no reason to assume that we need such a distinct and separate agential entity of this type for that.

The press secretary in Washington speaks for the administration and the administration has many departments and many subdivisions, from the executive on down, and decisions get made at many levels moving both upward and downward in the hierarchy as needed. As with the government, on this model, so it is with us as individuals. The various physical selves are part of the cluster that the press secretary speaks for and, indeed, our secretary could not speak if it could not call on some physical self already in the mix to get its message out.

There's no epiphenomenalism here, just a more complex picture and a divergence from an older, more simplistic idea.

SWM

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Joseph Polanik wrote:
> I suggest that you take a look at a paper by Suarez,
> Nonlocal "Realistic" Leggett Models Can be Considered
> Refuted by the Before-Before Experiment.
> http://www.quantumphil.org/SuarezFOOP201R2.pdf

In the face of this result how can it still be maintained that
"consciousness cause the collapse of the wave function"?

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:

> 1. "The unicorn is in the barn," is NOT nonsense, it is FALSE. And
> it is therefore a proposition.

That one, I can agree on.

> 2. "The unicorn has two purple souls" is nonsense, ...

I can imagine that as the first or second sentence in a short
metaphorical tale intended to make some important point that isn't
about unicorns. And if it can be used that way, then it isn't
nonsense.

> It is nonsense because of the simple fact that: (a) the matter
> cannot be pictured in the world; (b) it is not an analytic statement
> in service of something picturable; and (c) does not, therefore,
> SAY anything.

I think you have just asserted that much of pure mathematics is
nonsense and does not say anything.

> 3. "God has unicorns in heaven." This is seemingly NOT nonsense. It
> is simply unspeakable.

Yet you have just written that sentence. And if it can be written, it
can be spoken. Therefore it cannot be unspeakable. I'm not sure why
you think this importantly different from the many theological
innovations that are commonly accepted by people of various religions.

Regards,
Neil

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
>
> > 3. "God has unicorns in heaven." This is seemingly NOT nonsense.
> > It is simply unspeakable.
>
> Yet you have just written that sentence. And if it can be
> written, it can be spoken. Therefore it cannot be unspeakable.

H.P. Lovecraft is the most famous practitioner of the unspeakable - his horrors were commonly described as unspeakable, indescribable.

Was it Wittgenstein (Googling ... no) make that Ramsey who said, what
we can't say, we can't say, and we can't whistle it, either.

Sean is mixing up the unspeakable facts with speakable sentences.

... though I suspect most of those "facts" are phenomenal, or abstract properties of beauty or horror that invoke qualia that no words seem to capture, and need be no more (or less) mysterious than
a pretty flower or a nice sunset.

And people are always going on about the truth of sentences, as if the true sentence should be written in gold and the untrue sentence burried under a rock, the better to teach those sentences to behave themselves.

Josh

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Hi Neil.

I. I was only saying that the statements were nonsense in Tractarian terms. Not my own. The fact that you can imagine a unicorn with two purple souls is something Tractarian Wittgenstein would either doubt outright or would want to know what verification of the matter consisted of. If I am reading this right -- and I would love to be corrected (just doing my best) -- all matters must boil down to a true/false, yes/no, or be in service of the same. If you have a matter that cannot reduce to this format, you don't have something that can be said in the sense of "demonstrable thinking."  Another way of saying it is: the only true form of thinking is science, logic, & math.  

However, as Kirby pointed out (much of which I will attend later in the day), "true thinking" is not really the Lord Barron in Wittgenstein's world, once the mystical enters the picture. Wittgenstein does not deny that "true thinking" might actually be inferior to aesthetics, moral, ethics -- but he says, in effect, that such matters cannot be demonstrated in the current form of life, because the only way we demonstrate is by propositions (science, math, logic).

And so here we are. Language is a picture. Logic, math and science are the tools. Metaphysics go in the trash can. But the mystical stays under the bed, with hopes that a change in the form of life (death) brings about the things that we feel (are shown to us), but cannot be proved.

2. On the issue of mathematics being empty when not put in service of picturable statements, see:
 
6.21 mathematical propositions express no thoughts.
 
6.211 In life it is never a mathematical proposition which we need, but we use mathematical propositions only in order to infer from propositions which do not belong to mathematics to others which equally do not belong to mathematics.  
 
3. On the issue of things being capable of being said because we say them, Tractarian Wittgenstein would say that much of what people actually say is nonsense or should be passed over in silence. And that when they actually do speak, they merely reflect inferior thoughts. And to think properly -- without any inferiority -- you need to form propositions.

Regards.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

----- Original Message ----
From: iro3isdx <xznwrjnk-evca@yahoo.com>
To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
Sent: Wed, January 13, 2010 12:15:25 PM
Subject: [Wittrs] !!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:

> 1. "The unicorn is in the barn," is NOT nonsense, it is FALSE. And
> it is therefore a proposition.

That one, I can agree on.

> 2. "The unicorn has two purple souls" is nonsense, ...

I can imagine that as the first or second sentence in a short
metaphorical tale intended to make some important point that  isn't
about unicorns.  And if it can be used that way, then  it isn't
nonsense.

> It is nonsense because of the simple fact that: (a) the matter
> cannot be pictured in the world; (b) it is not an analytic statement
> in service of something picturable; and (c) does not, therefore,
> SAY anything.

I think you have just asserted that much of pure mathematics is
nonsense and does not say anything.

> 3. "God has unicorns in heaven." This is seemingly NOT nonsense. It
> is simply unspeakable.

Yet you have just written that sentence.  And if it can be  written, it
can be spoken.  Therefore it cannot be unspeakable.  I'm not sure why
you think this importantly different from the  many theological
innovations that are commonly accepted by people  of various religions.

Regards,
Neil

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:

> I. I was only saying that the statements were nonsense in Tractarian
terms.

Ah, thanks for that clarification. I always thought the Vienna circle
went too far in their "nonsense" claims.

> Another way of saying it is: the only true form of thinking is
> science, logic, math.

Yes, I guess that's the old version of the kind of extreme physicalism
we sometimes see in AI discussion.

> 2. On the issue of mathematics being empty when not put in service
> of picturable statements, see:

A side remark. As a mathematician, I don't have any problem with the
view that mathematical propositions are analytic (true by virtue of the
meanings of the terms). I am inclined to disagree with the view that
they are tautological, but that's because I make a distinction between
tautological and analytic.

> 6.21 mathematical propositions express no thoughts.

That's clearly wrong, for they certainly express the thoughts of
mathematicians. However, most mathematicians would agree that
mathematics is not about the real world, which is probably the main
thing 6.21 was trying to say.

> 6.211 In life it is never a mathematical proposition which we need,
> but we use mathematical propositions only in order to infer from
> propositions which do not belong to mathematics to others which
> equally do not belong to mathematics.

I would count that as largely correct, except that it ignores that
mathematics can be an art form in its own right.

> 3. On the issue of things being capable of being said because we say
> them, Tractarian Wittgenstein would say that much of what people
> actually say is nonsense or should be passed over in silence. And
> that when they actually do speak, they merely reflect inferior
> thoughts. And to think properly -- without any inferiority --
> you need to form propositions.

One of my criticisms of philosophers is that they say such things, yet
they have not adequately analyzed what is required in order to form
propositions. (Incidently, that was part of my disagreement with
Stuart in an earlier thread).

Regards,
Neil

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Neil:

Could you give me a little more on this:

"A side remark.  As a mathematician, I don't have any problem with  the view that mathematical propositions are analytic (true by  virtue of the meanings of the terms).  I am inclined to disagree  with the view that they are tautological, but that's because I make  a distinction between tautological and analytic."

What do you mean by tautological that you do not mean analytic?

Regards.
 
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> 2. On the issue of mathematics being empty when not put in service of picturable statements, see:
>  
> 6.21 mathematical propositions express no thoughts.

It is very hard (though perhaps not impossible) to square this with his later work in LFM or RFM.

I have in mind especially RFM on surveyability.

It is even harder to square statements like:

6.1265 It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every proposition is its own proof.

... with logic after Godel and Turing.

In fact, as I poke around in the 6's, I see some additional inopportune statements, that I need to fold into my thoughts about Turing and Wittgenstein. Thanks for pointing in this direction.

Josh

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SW,

> .. here's the way I understand this.
> I think this is right. (Tell me, J, if you agree):
>
> 1. "The unicorn is in the barn," is NOT nonsense, it
> is FALSE. And it is therefore a proposition.

Assuming that Wittgenstein would have accepted something like Russell's Theory of Descriptions as part of the process of analysis, that seems plausible.

However, I don't think the Tractatus itself takes such a stand. The correct analysis of sentences is undecided. Only that such an analysis should yield elementary propositions is decided.

I am agreeing so far but with reservations.

>
> 2. "The unicorn has two purple souls" is nonsense, but not
> because of arguments about mixing grammars (mixing color
> words with spirit words, which is a red herring here). It is
> nonsense because of the simple fact that: (a) the matter
> cannot be pictured in the world;

What are your criteria for whether it can be pictured?

Be careful equating the picture theory with the idea that we must be able to imagine, visualize, or make a drawing or sculpture, or whatever, of a state of affairs that a proposition purports to describe.

I wouldn't prejudge the analysis of the second sentence. Could a "purple soul" be a regal soul? Or a poetic soul? Could its " two souls" indicate something like a dual character? I don't know how these things are to be analyzed. It may be nonsense or not.

Because the Tractatus doesn't spell out the methods of analysis, I don't know that we can say.

(b) it is not an analytic
> statement in service of something picturable; and (c) does
> not, therefore, SAY anything. Furthermore (more
> controversial): (d) it is not a matter that purports to
> reside in the "netherworld" because the idea doesn't show
> or reveal itself to the form of life [see below].

hmmm. I am very suspicious of reading into the early philosophy anything like a later Wittgenstein's emphasis on the role religious beliefs play in a person's life. Also, I'd be careful about the role a belief plays in an individual's life being equated with the idea of the human form of life.

>
> 3. "God has unicorns in heaven." This is seemingly NOT
> nonsense. It is simply unspeakable. This is because
> it comes from another realm (mystical).

Why should this be distinguished from the unicorns' dual purple souls?

I would emphasize again that you seem to be making a distinction other than a logical one and trying to soften the logical distinction to accommodate it.

Mystical talk is also nonsense. Full stop.

And Wittgenstein even says that those who engage in it are "gassing". He also sees value in what he supposes must motivate them but that's a separate matter from whether it's nonsense.

The same is true
> of the statement, "Dance is beautiful," or "The good is
> being happy."

If the 1929 Lecture on Ethics is any indication (big "if") then statements about the good or the beautiful might be analyzable into other terms or they might not be. It depends whether "good" or "beautiful" (or "should", et al) are being used in an "absolute sense".

And these examples do describe activities or conditions of people in the world, so they don't illustrate your point very well.

Yes, their absolute value must reside outside the world on the Tractarian view but this brings us the question: why should we any less suppose that the twin purple souls of unicorns must reside in the world?

Furthermore, how do you know that (returning to your anachronistic point) the twin purple hearts of unicorns don't play a serious role in the life of someone who says such things?

>
> However, note that the statement "God has unicorns in
> heaven" may not be given the status of unspeakable merely
> because God as a subject matter is referring to an
> extra-worldly place. It's not grammar that does it (the
> grammar of "God."). What he means by the transcendental
> "showing" itself, I think, is something that is deeply
> felt. And so if I say in despair, "I feel God" -- and if I
> am devout about it -- I am saying something that has ground
> in my feeling. This is important because feelings of this
> sort periodically show itself in the form of life. But it
> does not ever render itself capable of being true or false.
> (The feeling might be true or false,

Feelings aren't true or false. Avowals may be sincere or insincere and ascriptions may be true or false, but feelings, per se, are not.

but not the statement
> it births. For example, "I feel God" would be false where
> the person is lying and feels no sensations. Maybe he is
> just play-acting. But where the person feels sensations and
> attributes the affect to "God," whether God had been "it"
> would not be something true or false).

Be careful. A believer says something and I refuse either to agree or to contradict him. That needn't mean that I would say, "It's neither true nor false". There are just some things I'm not inclined to say.

>
> Hence, this is how the transcendental shows itself, but
> cannot be the subject of propositions. So if you say
> anything metaphysical from a sense of AFFECT -- "dance is
> wonderful" -- you have not stated a proposition, but have
> talked about something that shows itself in the form of
> life.

That's a form on non-cognitivism, a thesis (!) often ascribed to the later (!) Wittgenstein

The only confusing part about this is why it requires
> silence ??!!! I guess because Wittgenstein is trying to
> formulate a theory that says what proper speaking/thinking
> is. And proper thinking is only yes/no stuff. And if you
> have feeling-affect metaphysics -- the mystical -- you
> have something that simply cannot be asserted.
>
> The only other thing that I note with interest: under this
> view, it seems that certain kinds of continental philosophy
> are put wholesale in the toilet, but other kinds -- say,
> Kiekegaard -- are put in the closet. Do you agree, J? Plato
> & Co get shown the trash can (regarding metaphysics),
> but Kiekegaard gets put under the bed? (Of course, the
> bizarre thing is that Kierkegaard can't write anything and
> you can't read it, at least not if either is doing
> philosophy properly, which is the equivalent of thinking
> properly).

Again, the logical status of a sentence and its psychological significance are separate questions. "Nonsense" needn't be a rebuke.

And do not suppose that Wittgenstein would rebuke what Plato has to say while accepting Kierkegaard. Recall the significance of Plato to Augustine!

JPDeMouy

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JRS.

> It is even harder to square statements like:
>
> 6.1265 It is always possible to construe logic in such a
> way that every proposition is its own proof.
>
> ... with logic after Godel and Turing.

The scope of "logic" in TLP may not be clear on this point. If he is describing the propositional calculus, then what Godel and Turing have to say about second and higher orders of the predicate calculus would be irrelevant. And his point concerns the method of truth tables and of demonstrating the truth of a tautology by inspection rather than by deriving it from logical axioms such as the law of the excluded middle, De Morgan's laws, or what have you.

Of course, higher orders of the predicate calculus are now accepted as part of standard definitions of "logic", and on that reading 6.1265 would be more problematic.

Consider what precedes and follows:

6.1262 Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the
recognition of tautologies in complicated cases.

6.1263 Indeed, it would be altogether too remarkable if a proposition that
had sense could be proved logically from others, and so too could a logical
proposition. It is clear from the start that a logical proof of a
proposition that has sense and a proof in logic must be two entirely
different things.

6.1264 A proposition that has sense states something, which is shown by its
proof to be so. In logic every proposition is the form of a proof. Every
proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs. (And one
cannot express the modus ponens by means of a proposition.)

6.1265 It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every
proposition is its own proof.

6.127 All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case
that some of them are essentially derived propositions. Every tautology
itself shows that it is a tautology.

JPDeMouy

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J D" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> > It is even harder to square statements like:
> >
> > 6.1265 It is always possible to construe logic in such a
> > way that every proposition is its own proof.
> >
> > ... with logic after Godel and Turing.
>
> The scope of "logic" in TLP may not be clear on this point. If he is describing the propositional calculus, then what Godel and Turing have to say about second and higher orders of the predicate calculus would be irrelevant.

Sure, but by what principle would one separate out only first-order statements? But I don't think that's quite the direction that Wittgenstein would (did) take.

...
> 6.127 All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not
> the case that some of them are essentially derived propositions.
> Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology.

This is interesting. I have problems with it, serious problems, but
first let's see what is good about it (and related TLP points).

Even here as early as the TLP, we see Wittgenstein starting to avoid "method". Not all method, to be sure, as TLP *is* method, which the
later Wittgenstein had to give up for consistency sake, I guess.

My take on this is per the linguistic turn, in that Wittgenstein
would not see individual statements as the kind of thing that one
either derives or proves, and certainly not in any way that depends
on others (what is the Quine quote, "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body", none of that "corporate" stuff
for Wittgenstein).

Wittgenstein took this same approach contra Godel and Turing, or at
least that's (my interpretation of) Shanker's description: "so there
is one statement (or class of statements) that cannot be proven - so what?" I have a lot of sympathy for this, btw. However, in general,
it seems most people do not. And it may not be pertinent to the
question.

Because then we come up to Turing and computing. I find it very
hard to look at a computer program in execution and say that nothing
there is a derived proposition. While a number of these TLP
statements support each other, I'm afraid that they are very
problematical when one considers computation - or even the process
of mathematical proof as Wittgenstein reviews in RFM.

Josh

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JRS,

> > The scope of "logic" in TLP may not be clear on this point. If he is describing the propositional calculus, then what Godel and Turing have to say about second and higher orders of the predicate calculus would be irrelevant.
>
> Sure, but by what principle would one separate out only first-order statements? But I don't think that's quite the direction that Wittgenstein would (did) take.

Three of the principles used in the Tractatus (all of which would be rejected by the later Wittgenstein) are:

1. the treatment of universal quantification as an abbreviation for a conjunction and existential quantification as an abbreviation for a disjunction;
2. the replacement of identity statements (which standardly involve quantification over classes) with the requirement that in a logically perfect language, each symbol corresponds to one and only one object; and
3. the assumption that a complete analysis of a proposition will yield elementary propositions, each of whose truth-value is independent of the truth-value of every other elementary proposition.

All of these are problematic, as every Wittgenstein scholar should know, but if one were to suppose them true, the idea an analysis requiring only first-order predicate logic becomes more plausible.

I agree with you that he was wrong on this but I am more interested in why he's wrong and why he might have made such a supposition (aside from the face that insights such as Turing's and Godel's came later).

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.. I'm having trouble with one more aspect of Tractarian thought. I'm writing a manuscript that is summarizing Wittgenstein's views, and I'm stuck in the bloody Tractarian period. I didn't want to give some cheesy account of it and then go to the more interesting latter Wittgenstein. I wanted it to come to life. But I find my self saying things about the Tractatus that I have trouble finding textual support. Can anyone help with this one ...

Starting point: Propositions must be true/false and must be in the service of picturing the world. That much is clear. (See 4.023, and, in general,  6.111, 6.113, 6.1222, 6.21, 6.211).  

Troubling point: What about speculative empiricism? There is a crater on planet zebu, where "zebu" means the fuzzy thing located by the Hubble telescope, and where we hypothesize it to be a planet, and where the tiny freckle is hypothesized to be a crater.

These statements are hypotheses. They are in THEORY true or false. Where does Wittgenstein say that this is ok? Is it just by implication? Or is this statement taken as saying only: "there is a fuzzy thing with a freckle," wiping away the conjecture. Or is the conjecture reduced, too? The conjecture says: (1) "fuzzy things look like less fuzzy things that we know to be planets of shorter distance away; (2)  hypothesis: the greater the fuzz, the greater the distance; (3) therefore, fuzzy thing (zebo) is a planet of farther distance."

Here's my point: does Tractarian Wittgenstein accept the empirically unknown as "propositions?" They are, in theory, "in the world." My answer would be yes. This would be no different than saying, "the gold is in the cave," where I have no idea that it is. Whether I know it or not, I have asserted a proposition. I guess I'm confusing justification with whether the format is empirical.

Also, please note that I am not interested in Popper or the Vienna Circle here. I'm purely wondering what Tractarian Wittgenstein thought. I think I have my answer. (Tell me if I am wrong). The answer is that speculative empiricism is a proposition. Whether it is true is another matter.

Regards.  

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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... regarding speculative empiricism, I found it, I think.

4.464. "The truth of tautology is certain, of propositions possible, of contradiction impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we have an indication of that gradation which we need in the theory of probability).

Segment of 4.463 [after discussing tautology and contradiction, which I think in this sense is stipulation and negation, he writes: The truth-condition determines the range, which is left to the facts by the proposition. (The proposition, the picture, the model, are in a negative sense like a solid body, which restricts the free movement of another: in a positive sense, like the space limited by solid substance, in which a body might be placed) 

So, possible statements are still propositions. It's only the form of the proposition that matters. 

Regards.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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SW,

> J: I don't mean to abuse
> your presence here,

Please, do not worry about such things. Presumably, anyone who posts here does so because such topics as we discuss hold some interest. If I have been irritable with anyone, it is less about the topics discussed so much as a steadfast refusal to acknowledge or follow suggestions that would clearly make discussion more fruitful. But that doesn't apply at all to your case nor does it apply to most others here.

And it is flattering that you would take such an interest in my particular take.

I should warn you that in discussing the Tractatus my sole interest is in the light that can be shed on the later philosophy by examining the concerns of the earlier, the ideas that were later rejected, and the reasons for their rejecting. Such a largely negative approach to the Tractatus is inevitably going to be a one-sided appreciation and that may in some ways limit the value of my reading.

but if you have time, tell me what you
> think of this simile. I put it in the paper I am working on.
> It concerns summarizing the essential idea that Wittgenstein
> has about LANGUAGE in the tractatus. I think the simile is
> good and does the job. Looking to see how it hits you:
>
> Perhaps Wittgenstein's early approach to language might
> be summarized with the following simile. Imagine a blurry
> picture that did not "show" something that could be
> verified with eyesight,

I'd be careful here. A Tractarian "picture" is not necessarily a visual image and reading conditions of verification or verifiability into the Tractatus is problematic as well.

The relevance of a "picture" to Tractarian thought is that it presents relationships between "objects", that there are correlations between the pictorial elements and the objects making up the states of affairs the picture would be able to represent.

The model of Tractarian pictures is a model used in a trial dealing with a traffic incident, where the different vehicles, the streets, and so forth, are each represented by elements of the model, but the elements can be rearranged to represent different states of affairs.

But even this is an analogy because whatever Tractarian objects may be (subsequent analysis was meant to uncover this), a car is surely not an "object".

but where the reality that is the
> subject of the picture was not, in fact, blurred or
> obstructed. In other words, the person's picture was
> simply poor or ill-taken (and was not at attempt at abstract
> art or something similar). In a certain sense, a picture of
> this sort would be useless. It would be cast aside among the
> other pictures that show the world properly.

I think I see where you're going with this. And why you would read him that way. But my own supposition (and since we don't have concrete examples, we have only suppositions here) would be that the analysis of such a vague, blurry picture might well be a disjunction of elementary propositions. (Perhaps it would be an endless disjunction and this is one of the places where the idea of elementary propositions as independent runs into trouble.) A proposition corresponding to a vague picture may be neither senseless nor nonsensical but merely include several different states of affairs. It would be the logical sum of those propositions that are consistent with the picture.

(That's not quite right either, because any number of elementary propositions that feature objects not involved in the picture would be consistent with the picture but presumably would not feature in the disjunction.)

Very crude: the propositions might be something like "Either there are 5 walnut trees or there are 6 walnut trees or..." which is vague but not meaningless. On the other hand "...or Obama is President", which is also a possibility the picture does not exclude would still not be part of the meaning of the picture.

Vagueness and ambiguity are distinct matters from nonsensicality.

For early
> Wittgenstein, language has this sort of ethic. Assertions in
> language that do not picture an otherwise clear reality are
> meaningless, unless the reality itself is blurred, making
> the picture accurate, but depicting only the mystical.

I'd be very suspicious of a simile that seems to equate the putative meaninglessness of the mystical with mere indeterminacy.

> Although an accurate picture of a blurred nothing was not
> "meaningless" – because it showed its subject – it
> made no sense to speak of it, because the
> depiction was hidden from the start.

The depiction was hidden? Or the thing depicted?

JPDeMouy

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SW,

>
> Here's my point: does Tractarian Wittgenstein accept the
> empirically unknown as "propositions?" They are, in theory,
> "in the world." My answer would be yes. This would be no
> different than saying, "the gold is in the cave," where I
> have no idea that it is. Whether I know it or not, I have
> asserted a proposition. I guess I'm confusing justification
> with whether the format is empirical.

That seems like it may be part of the difficulty.

I agree with your conclusion but I'd add the following: we might speculate that, had he concerned himself with such matters before coming to see grave errors in the Tractatus view, he might have taken the analysis to propositions concerning the planet Zebu to include all sorts of theoretical claims. There's no telling in advance how complicated a complete analysis might be.

JPDeMouy

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So, possible statements are still propositions. It's only the form of the proposition that matters. 

Regards.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.

Language is a twisted rope having got several knots in its length.The way it got knotted is important otherwise propositions move only in between knots.

thank you

sekhar

The INTERNET now has a personality. YOURS! See your Yahoo! Homepage. http://in.yahoo.com/

Neil,

Regarding unpleasantness between SWM and myself.

Sometimes disagreements are inevitable.

Sometimes misunderstandings and miscommunication are inevitable.

Sometimes what is a straightforward reading to one person will strike another as patently bizarre.

I had no illusions about changing Stuart's mind. Nor do I object to his continuing to read Searle as he does. I don't even completely dismiss the possibility that he at least has a point. But even if he were completely, utterly, and undeniably wrong, he would still be entitled to hold and to share those views.

I don't think you quite "get" why I was so impatient with Stuart but it doesn't matter. For me to elaborate on that would mean dragging out the unpleasantness and that's quite unnecessary.

But I did want to acknowledge the points you've made. Partly for anyone else who might be concerned that I'll be offended with them if they disagree with me. I am not so easily offended. Really!

JPDeMouy

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SW,

> ... here's the basic problem as i see
> it for Tractarian Wittgenstein. It's the picture theory.
> Everything hinges upon it.

If "the picture theory" includes various other theses, such as those regarding the nature of elementary propositions, then this is true. But vacuous. Of course, everything hinges on the truth of a theory that is taken to include... pretty much everything.

On the other hand, if "the picture theory" is construed more narrowly (supposing that there's a way of presenting it that doesn't include the theses about elementary propositions, objects, and so forth) then it's not to clear that everything would hinge on that.

This sounds cliche, but consider
> the book's main point (as told by Wittgenstein)"
>
> "This book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or
> rather – not to thinking, but to the _expression_ of
> thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we
> should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we
> should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be
> thought). ... The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in
> language and what lies on the other side of the limit will
> be simply nonsense" (27).

Such talk or drawing limits doesn't seem to obviously involve the picture theory.

>
> Think about that. In order to know what can't be thought,
> we would have to be able to entertain it. We can't do that.
> Therefore, we can only draw the limit in language. KEY
> PREMISE: Because language's purpose is to mirror the
> world, it's only proper use is to picture reality (or
> perform logic upon picturing statements).

Yes.

>
> Once you take away the picture theory, the whole thing
> changes, yet still stays the same.

I could imagine someone attempting to draw such lines on the basis of something other than the picture theory. For example, verificationism doesn't obviously entail the picture theory.

That is,
> thinking/speaking are still balled up in important ways. You
> still can't really split that nut well (other than for
> discreet purposes in ordinary language). And because the
> new role for language is simply to be another kind of
> behavior (meaning is use), now, everything can be said.

Everything that can be said can be said. But that's obvious. Are there things that cannot be said? What things? Well, presumably we can't say what those things are. But then what could it mean to say, "everything can be said"?

> There's no requirement of silence.

There's no longer a self-refuting claim that there are things about which we cannot speak, no.

HOWEVER, that doesn't
> make everything that is said WORTH saying. What determines
> this is grammar and the aesthetic in question.

What determines what is worth saying is presumably whether someone has decided to say it.

Note however that Wittgenstein has not rejected the idea that certain seemingly meaningful strings of words are in fact nonsensical. Some read in the Tractatus a distinction between what can be spoken or uttered and what can be said, treating "saying" as necessarily meaningful and "speaking" as consistent with "speaking nonsense". Whatever the merit of that particular reading, certainly we do distinguish between uttering sounds and saying something meaningful.

>
> In both worlds, language still bounds the form of life.

How so?

An examination of the role "form of life" plays in various discussions suggests that if anything, our form of life constrains our language (but even that would be a thesis and Wittgenstein doesn't say such a thing), not the reverse.

And
> in both worlds, it is language is still the focal point.

Language is the focus, but our form of life and our ways of acting cannot be neglected.

> Instead of language wedded to logic, it is now wed to
> grammar.

Actually, both "grammar" and "logic" have widened uses in the later work. But I take you to be contrasting "grammar" (widely understood) with "logic" (narrowly understood, perhaps as the formal logic of textbooks).

Once Wittgenstein saw that the aims of language
> were not what he originally envisioned, the central tenets
> of the Tractatus had to change,

As an historical matter, an emphasis on a wider conception of the aims of language came relatively late, compared to the collapse of tenets like the independence of elementary propositions.

but the mission of it really
> stayed the same.

The mission of drawing a boundary between sense and nonsense? I thought that was tied to the picture theory and was rejected with it?

It is almost as if the Tractatus simply
> had to be recommissioned. It's the same project. It's the
> same goal. It just now serves the new instruments (the new
> understanding).
>
> Indeed, I see many things in the Tractatus that are still
> alive today. I see conditions of assertability all over the
> place.

But where do you see conditions of assertibility in the Tractatus?

And what I fundamentally see as the major error is
> simply the role that language is thought to play, and the
> resultant feature that logic had to play to keep language
> in order. One wants to say: the Tractatus is really a
> prequel of sorts. It's like what the Hobbit is to Lord of
> the Rings.

Interesting. But clearly, I have my reservations.

JPDeMouy

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I'd like to address Sean's "dilemma' of the distinction between metaphysical and mystical "nonsense" by again going back to my initial readings of the Tractatus and the usefulness of my acquaintance with "group theory" at that time

I have repeatedly made reference to the notions of "groups" as opposed to "sets" in helping understand the Tractatus..and in understanding Wittgenstein throughout his writings. Although I don't pretend to be a mathematician is was my fortuitous appreciation of some of the rudimentary concepts of group theory which allowed me to immediately understand ( or believe I understood) as unparadoxical many of the statements of the Tractatus

Hopefully, Sean, you will consider this theme as I raise it again.

Additionally, and importantly, the questions of who the "we" is in the above statements of mine is crucial. Since it is my impression that the Tractarian Wittgenstein was rather myopic in his focus of interest....knowledge of the "world" and the rapid and startling advent of science in his formative years.

So if there is a criticism by Wittgenstein of those engaged in the various kinds of nonsense it would be a critique of those who speak from within the language game of "philosophizing" about science or about "knowledge".

The universe is a simple place for W during those years...knowledge which we tend to speak about (and scientific knowledge at that) versus that which cannot be known and which we are tempted to speak about (perhaps the mystical)

In the later Wittgenstein the "language game notion" allows him to appreciate the mitigating factors in the making of various statements as derived from the role or use those statements play within a variety of different "games of language".

The Different Kinds of Non-sense addressed by Sean:

(a)The kind of nonsense which can be dismissed as "metaphysical nonsense" is one where we speak of things which have no meaning as if they have meaning...of things which may not rightly be conjectured even before their validity might be verified by some procedure because they do not lend themselves to any meaningful verification.

In the case of the quest for the proper method for the trisection of the angle, for example, we were all applying the rules of speaking to a domain where they seemed appropriate but we were inadvertently misapplying the rules under which we were functioning in such a manner as to leave us with the conjuring of a situation where no reasonable action would or could follow.

(b) That which is mystical is where we speak of things which might be said to exist but cannot be talked about....of course, if they cannot be talked about, then they cannot be argued or verified either....certainly not within the 'rules of operation" in which our way of speaking is founded.

In {a} we talk about matters which mislead us into believing we can "do" something to verify our statements about them or not , The mistake is one of not understanding the rules of speaking.l

In (b) we try to speak about matters but which are simply not amenable to our speaking or any action that rightful follows from that "speaking". The "mistake" seems more conspicuous than the mistake in (a) because it more readily apparent that the statements are not going to validated or not by any consequent actions on anyone's part.

To escape Nonsense (a) , we must more closely and adequately know and then correctly operate within the 'rules" or operations that we have as our "grammar".

To escape Nonsense (b) we must more closely and adequately know our rules and thus realize that, given the subset of rules which we depend on, they only can carry us so far and that to discuss further matters we would require an amendment of the "rules' or "operations" that constitute our current "grammar"

Anticipating what I will say below, If we take complex/imaginary numbers versus real numbers, or irrational numbers versus rationals, in case case, they were originally considered to be mystical and something which could not properly be spoken about. And indeed, given the lack of mathematical sophistication at the time it was not possible to speak about them in any productive fashion...at best bewilderment would result. Ultimately the rules for speaking about those matters were broadened and those 'numbers" were included in the domain about which we might sensibly speak.

While in (a) the mistake is one of less than apt or adequate implementation of the rules for speaking (whether "picturing" or what I take to be a more implicit mathematically based notion of these "rules"), the mistake in (b) is that, based upon the rules of ones grammar or way of speaking, one is taking a less than apt or adequate domain about which one is speaking and then no matter how artfully the rules for speaking are employed the statements will not be amenable to consequent productive action...such as verification.

> This book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or
> rather – not to thinking, but to the _expression_ of
> thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we
> should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we
> should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be
> thought). ... The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in
> language and what lies on the other side of the limit will
> be simply nonsense" (27).

In the statement of Wittgenstein's that Sean has seized upon he is making a rather obvious and straightforward point. It is one of the direct, immediate and obvious consequence from understanding of aggregates as "groups" rather than as "sets" However, this is not obvious or straightforward at all if one is not appreciative of the importance that mathematics and its _expression_ had for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus years and truly throughout his life.

When Wittgenstein speaks of the "limits of _expression_" he is pointing directly to the manner in which the rules of a system of operations determine what will or will not fall within the scope or landscape of any such iteration of those operations or rules. It is the rules or operations which essentially "limit" the domain of what can be expressed. In "Group theory" this basic property is known as "closure." It embodies the charting of a 'limit" from within and not having to be at external "vantage point" as one must be when seeking to express oneself in "sets".

The integers are a "group" with respect to the operations "addition" What this means is that you can repeatedly implement sequential additions and you will never arrive at a number that is not an integer. You need not have an external or God like vantage point to know that you can never be able to exceed the 'limits" determined by the successive implementation of these operations. That is one of the definition s of a group: It's closure or self contained nature. IF you maintain the successive application of addition the successive application of its operations only leads to further members of the group. In a group such as the "shuffling of a deck of cards" no matter how many times you apply a 'shuffle" you are always only going to yield up the equivalent of another single "shuffle" that could have been made. This group also demonstrates "closure".

When the further operation of "multiplication" is considered and we allow for the successive application of either of the two operations, addition or multiplication, we end up with a different group, the "rationals", and,l again that group is closed and the 'limits of _expression_" are known.....for those involved they do not need to have a "vantage point " or "view' from outside of irrational numbers or imaginary or complex numbers or so on in order to be aware (once they are aware of the grammar of use which arises from the restriction to the operations of addition and multiplication) that these are the 'limits of _expression_".

There is much more to the application of the language and stratagems of 'Group theory" to interpreting Wittgenstein.

As to the notion of "form of life" and the relation of "form of life" to "language games", I believe that we are still operating while seeking to ignore the puzzle which remains as to just how "form of life" relates to "language game" other than as some amorphous "backdrop"....There is much more to this issue and to the far from automatic manner in which a variety of "language games" arise from each of a variety of distinct 'forms of life". The issue has to do with the manner in which "rules" or 'operations" are adopted by the participants...as the "language game " is shaped. Moreover, the kind of "therapeutic" becoming familiar with the grammar of how we speak that Wittgenstein gives us is a crucial tool in our society coming to terms with how a form of life might give rise to one or another "language game" , with one or another set of rules and operations behind it.
>