[rollei_list] Re: OT - The Concorde

  • From: Eric Goldstein <egoldste@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: rollei_list@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 14:14:19 -0400 (GMT-04:00)

The biggest problem with correcting conventional wisdom is that so frequently, 
the corrections are equally wrong... ;-)

I am familiar with the Dash-80 doc to which you refer and there are other 
accounts what provide alternative details... it is all interesting and I'm sure 
"the truth" lies somewhere in the mix...

Eric Goldstein


-----Original Message-----
From: David Seifert <dseifert@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Apr 22, 2005 12:50 PM
To: rollei_list@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [rollei_list] Re: OT - The Concorde


The biggest problem with conventional wisdom, is that it is so 
frequently wrong.  The history of the development of the 
367-80/707/KC135 is a very interesting and has many twists and turns.  
The 367-80 designation was chosen by Boeing to throw the competition off 
the track.  Model 367 was a large piston driven B-29 derived commercial 
aircraft known as the Stratocruiser.  Boeing  built the Dash 80 as a 
demonstrator, not a prototype.  It was designed in secret and built 
entirely on company money.  Boeing bet to company on the project.  As an 
aside, Boeing would do the same thing (bet the company on a big idea)  
in the late 60's with the 747 program.  The purpose of the demonstration 
was to get a piece of an anticipated USAF contract for a jet tanker.  
The newly developed  practice of mid-air refueling long range jet 
bombers had shown that piston driven tankers required the jet bombers to 
slow to near stall speeds.  Upon demonstration the Dash 80 was 
acknowledged as largely meeting the USAF needs but the internal politics 
were wrong for Boeing.  The Air Force really wanted to buy a plane that 
Lockheed was proposing but could not deliver for a while.  The Air Force 
ordered a small number (29 to be precise) of Dash 80 derived KC135s from 
Boeing but intended to buy a much larger number of the preferred  
Lockheed plane.  I mention that the  KC135 was a derivative of the Dash 
80.  The Air Force required that the KC135 have a larger fuselage cross 
section than the Dash 80 which required quite a bit of redesign.  An 
interesting thing is that the KC135 had a circular cross section where 
the 707 is bi-lobal.  They really were not the same aircraft.  In the 
fullness of time the Air Force changed their mind about the Lockheed 
aircraft.  My guess is that the "Senator from Boeing" Henry "Scoop" 
Jackson had something to do with it although there can be no doubt that 
the KC135 was a near perfect plane for the job.

The development of the 707 followed a similar pattern.  The initial 707 
design was close but not quite what the airlines really needed.  Pan Am 
bought a small number of the 707-120 for initial service but planned to 
buy a much larger number of the yet to be delivered DC-8.   Seeing that 
the 707-120 needed to be larger Boeing went about creating the 707-320 
Intercontinental.  The stretch required a new wing design and 
consequently is really a whole new plane.  The 707-320 is the model that 
was produced in large volumes and the plane we think of when we say 
"Boeing 707." Douglas had the benefit of watching what Boeing was doing 
and learned from the mistakes and as a consequence the first DC-8 was a 
much more durable design. 

Marc is correct in that without the initial KC135 contract Boeing would 
not have had the resources to have spun-out the 707 series.

Most of this information was covered in a one hour documentary of the 
Dash-80 originally shown several years ago on the Discovery Wings channel.

Jerry, first flight of Dash 80 was July, 1954.  First KC-135 flight was 
August 1956.  Initial USAF purchase contract issued in 1954.  First 
707-120 flight December 1957.

Sources: Boeing, NASA  and Airliners.net websites

Ardeshir, with respect to your suspicions about BA and AF claims that 
Concorde operations were unprofitable, I point out that your assumption 
about actual fares paid per passenger is wrong.  The price a handful of 
celebrities paid to be on the last flight is not reflective of the 
actual fares charged during revenue service.  Large numbers of seats 
were sold to Cunard as part of QE2/Concorde packages.  These were 
regularly scheduled flights not charters like the ill-fated AF flight.  
BA routinely offered Concorde seats as an even swap for full-fare first 
class sub-sonic seats on a space available basis.  Also, your dates for 
revenue service are wrong.  The Concorde first flight was, indeed, in 
1969 but final approval for operations between JFK and LHR was not 
achieved until 1976 when revenue operations began.  This changes your 
depreciation numbers quite a bit.

David




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