[nasional_list] [ppiindia] Syria in the firestorm
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- Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2006 13:55:53 +0100
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**http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/778/op11.htm
19 - 25 January 2006
Issue No. 778
Syria in the firestorm
That Khaddam's remarks on Syria may have been driven by revenge does
not change the fact that he endeared himself to no Syrian, leaving question
marks as to why he spoke out, writes Hassan Nafaa*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abdel-Halim Khaddam, former vice president of the Syrian republic and a
primary staff member of the Syrian Baath regime for 40 years, suddenly appeared
out of oblivion to cast a bomb into the midst of the enflamed Middle Eastern
arena. Because a thick, rising smoke followed the explosion, obscuring all
sides, it is difficult to ascertain the losses or just what is taking place on
the ground. The most significant aspect is timing, for this moment came when
Mehlis' report seemed to be on the verge of collapse.
It is well known that the report took its first blow when several
German newspapers published an investigation that cast doubt on the credibility
of one of its witnesses, Muhammad Zuheir Al-Sadiq. This was quickly followed by
another blow, when a second witness, Hussam Hussam, the "masked witness,"
changed his statements asserting that they had been extracted under the
pressure of blackmail and the temptation of bribery. Then Mehlis made the
surprise of resigning from the head of the team investigating the assassination
of Rafik Al-Hariri for "personal" reasons that failed to convince anyone. This
gave the impression that matters had begun to enter the market of political
auctions and that the door had opened to predictions on the fate of a process
that had lacked, from the beginning, the fundaments of neutrality, independence
and integrity required of any judicial investigation.
The appearance of Khaddam has upturned the case's given assumptions and
pointed everything in a different direction. The former deputy to the late
President Hafez Al-Assad no longer remains a mere "witness from his people" who
possesses important information that might benefit the investigation. Rather,
he has become party to a struggle over power and a possible alternative to a
regime whose change is being demanded. With this sudden and unexpected
appearance, the "Syrian crisis" entered a new stage that may be a repeat of the
"Iraqi crisis" shortly before the American invasion. It appears that what is
required now is to bring together the ranks of the Syrian opposition and drive
it against Bashar Al-Assad's regime to topple it. This is a dangerous
development that might push the entire region to the brink of disaster.
The danger of this development is that it helps to orient the
controversy over Syria away from consequences that might ensue with regards to
stability in the region. As previously took place with the division of Arab
intellectual and political elites over Saddam Hussein, when the dangers of a
probable American invasion of Iraq were forgotten or purposely overlooked, it
is not at all unlikely that this elite will be split again over its position on
Syria. Dangers that would certainly ensue from an attempt to topple Assad will
be forgotten or disregarded, even if an invasion or foreign military operation
ensues. Should that happen, it would have only one meaning -- the elite has not
learnt or comprehended anything and no longer has a clear national or pan- Arab
plan. To my mind, elites that cannot agree on requisite standards and precepts
become accomplices to and directly responsible for disasters that befall their
countries and the pan-Arab community as a whole. It fo
llows that such an elite is not worthy of the name it carries, deserving the
curses directed at it by the people. It is thus necessary that efforts to avoid
such splits take first priority.
No respectable observer can deny the despotic nature of a regime that
depends on the support of security agencies in safeguarding its policies.
Though the Syrian regime is not an exception, it cannot be considered the most
despotic or totalitarian Arab regime by global standards. All the regimes are
shining, as they say. It therefore seems to me that the concerned parties who
define their position on the crisis ensuing from the assassination of Al-Hariri
on the basis of, or with reference to, the Syrian regime's position on issues
of democracy and internal reform have no political or moral justification to do
so. Yet judging the extent of rightness or wrongness of these positions, from
national and pan-Arab perspectives, requires minute knowledge not only of their
holders' motivations but also of the actual or expected results that may ensue
from such positions and whose interest they would serve. These are the same
standards by which we should understand the intent a
nd import of the position expressed by Khaddam in his lengthy interview with
Al-Arabiyya satellite television. What, we may wonder, are the motivations and
goals of this man, the probable results of his positions, and who are the
parties likely to benefit?
In my view, Khaddam's motivation is one of only two possibilities: an
awakening conscience or a desire for revenge. His motivation is either noble,
if it proves to be the former, or malicious, if it proves to be the latter. I
bet on the latter, for I consider it improbable that the position Khaddam put
forth on Al-Arabiyya was an expression of conscience. My reasons for this are
many, most of which revolve around the simple fact that a conscience capable of
sleeping for 40 years, during which many serious and reprehensible crimes were
committed, is in fact a dead conscience that cannot possibly return to life
suddenly on the occasion of one crime, even of the scope of the assassination
of Al-Hariri; that is, unless this particular crime is tied to personal
interests.
Whatever the case, it is difficult to precisely determine the true
motivations behind Khaddam's actions as long as the precise ends he seeks or
thinks he can gain remain unknown. Again, we find ourselves before one of two
possibilities: helping the international investigation committee to reveal
those embroiled in the assassination of Al-Hariri, or participating in
finishing off a regime he believes is on the edge of collapse and presenting
himself as an alternative ambitious for the seat of the presidency that he
believes he was most deserving of, even if that takes place under the spearhead
of American lances. I expect it to be the latter possibility for several
reasons.
Firstly, it is unlikely that Khaddam possesses definite information
about those truly involved in the assassination of Al-Hariri, simply because he
was distanced from the real corridors of decision making in Syria even before
the difference over the extension of Emile Lahoud's term flared up. Secondly,
Khaddam decided to move rapidly from the position of an oppositionist
volunteering testimony to that of a critic split from the regime, clearly
announcing his desire for its downfall and appearing ready to participate in
its collapse. Finally, it seems that Khaddam was secretly interviewed by the
Mehlis team before he left Syria, making it possible that he was in fact the
source of much of the information -- attributed to an anonymous source -- in
Mehlis' later report. If this proves true it would serve as evidence that
Khaddam had been used since the beginning as an important link in a chain with
the aim of exploiting the Hariri case as a means of doing away with the r
egime of President Bashar Al-Assad.
It initially appeared as though the Khaddam pawn was being orchestrated
in a final, decisive step that would end the chess game in the interest of the
United States and its allies. Yet the matter is not that simple. It is
difficult to imagine that Khaddam, a man who held the Lebanese file for many
years during which more than 30 assassinations claimed the lives of leading
personalities (among them two presidents, Bashir Gemayel and Rene Moawad, as
well as the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and Lebanon's mufti, Sheikh Hassan
Khalid), would be the winning card in the case of the assassination of
Al-Hariri. It is only logical that before the man provides information on an
assassination that took place during a period in which he was outside the
political inner ring he be required, morally and politically if not legally, to
reveal the circumstances of all the other assassinations. If the regime were
found implicated, he, and not any other person, would have to personally car
ry the political and criminal responsibility for what had happened by virtue
of his post and official responsibility at that time.
In this context, Khaddam's statements and testimony may seem impaired
and lacking credibility. Despite this, his statements are capable of
channelling wind under the sail of the investigating committee, which may grow
more insistent on questioning President Assad himself. Such questioning, should
it take place, might lead the crisis into a new and critical stage in which the
United States, France and Israel would necessarily be the greatest
beneficiaries.
There remains another side to the picture that no analyst has given
requisite attention. The appearance of Khaddam in this manner on the region's
political stage does not benefit him on the personal level, raise his worth, or
improve his image among friends or enemies. Yet it has wrought damage to the
Syrian regime that is irreparable no matter how loud parliamentarians scream
and accuse Khaddam of being an agent and committing treachery. Regimes capable
of embracing personalities prepared to sell their homelands in this manner,
despite the honours reaped upon them over the decades, are not immune and lack
the simplest mechanisms of accountability to separate the wretched from the
valuable at the right time. The question is, how many personalities of this
kind are crouching in dark corners waiting for the appropriate moment to pounce
on what remains of the Syrian regime's credibility?
My interest in the Syrian regime has been, and remains, tied to its
pan- Arab position. I am concerned that Syria remains, both as a people and a
state, steadfast in the face of Zionist and American avarice, whose
incompatibility with the Syrian regime I well know has no relation, near or
far, to issues of democracy or the assassination of Al-Hariri.
* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
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