[lit-ideas] to be or not to be
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 10:33:31 +0200
the stupidity of the wittgensteinians shines very high, when a language has
no copulation, what is the so-called 'being'?
see e.g.
- Moro, Andrea (2000). *Dynamic Antisymmetry*
<http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=4214>. MIT
Press <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_Press>. ISBN
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number>
978-0-262-13375-3
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-13375-3>.
- Moro, Andrea (1997). *The raising of predicates. Predicative noun
phrases and the theory of clause structure*
<http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?ISBN=9780521024785>.
Cambridge
University Press
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_University_Press>. ISBN
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number>
978-0-521-02478-5
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-02478-5>.
- Tettamanti, Marco; Manenti, Rosa; Della Rosa, Pasquale A.; Falini,
Andrea; Perani, Daniela; Cappa, Stefano F.; Moro, Andrea (2008). "Negation
in the brain: Modulating action representations". *NeuroImage* *43* (2):
358–67. doi <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_object_identifier>:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.08.004
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.neuroimage.2008.08.004>. PMID
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PubMed_Identifier> 18771737
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18771737>.
- Musso, Mariacristina; Moro, Andrea; Glauche, Volkmar; Rijntjes,
Michel; Reichenbach, Jürgen; Büchel, Christian; Weiller, Cornelius (2003).
"Broca's area and the language instinct". *Nature Neuroscience* *6* (7):
774–81. doi <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_object_identifier>:
10.1038/nn1077 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038%2Fnn1077>. PMID
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PubMed_Identifier> 12819784
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12819784>.
- Moro, Andrea (2010). *Breve storia del verbo essere: Viaggio al centro
della frase* <http://www.adelphi.it/libro/9788845924934>. Adelphi
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adelphi_Edizioni>. ISBN
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number>
978-88-459-2493-4
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-88-459-2493-4>.
On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 9:14 AM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>
> >Well, I don't want to go Heideggerian, but such terms as 'being' and
> 'essence' are scarcely meaningful in every-day modern English.>
>
> This is the kind of claim that Wittgenstein would think could only be made
> by someone trapped like a fly in a fly-bottle by philosophical approaches
> to terms. "[S]carcely meaningful in every-day modern English"?
> 1. I am being criticised from every quarter.
> 2. The essence of any good relationship is trust.
> 3. Why are you being such a fool?
> 4. To complete the recipe add some essence of vanilla.
> 5. Every human being has human rights.
> 6. Their analysis cuts to the essence of the problem.
> 7. Sometimes being in the office is the most depressing thing.
> 8. In essence, the idea that philosophers have access to privileged
> meanings, denied to ordinary users of language, is based on a mistake or
> set of mistakes about the character of language.
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
>
>
> On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 21:05, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> what is interesting and non trivial is relatively simple.
> wittgenstein gave an overinflated idea of what a language is and does.
> then with several tricks tried to re-prioritize the view that people have
> thoughts, states, minds, etc, and get to his point that the "language" is
> prior to something else.
> wittgenstein was a confused behaviorist. in my humble view while tractatus
> is wrong in interesting ways (see e.g. peter simons on this) the so-called
> 2nd wittgenstein is a waste of time, if not for historical reasons
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:56 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> As a 'thought experiment', we might imagine the mason and his assistant
> working together while not talking at all. Let's say that they had a heated
> argument the previous evening over the assistant's share of the wages, and
> they are not talking to each other now, but the work still needs to be
> finished by the deadline. Since the tasks are fairly routine, and they are
> an old tandem, the assistant knows when the mason needs a brick and when a
> slab without him saying anything at all. This does not take anything away
> from their being representatives of human life-form, if that is what is
> meant, or of a masonry life-style. Still waiting for an interpretation of
> W.'s statement that says something meaningful and nontrivial about this.
> (Where is R.P. ?)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:17 PM, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> yes, though the man lw would refuse to allow any talk of necessary
> and/or sufficient conditions, so if asked the question would be fudged by
> the usual bluster
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:11 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> So, perhaps W. does not mean that language is a necessary condition for
> something being a form of life, but that something having a language is a
> sufficient condition for it being a form of life. (To give it a charitable
> interpretation, although it certainly sounds like he is saying that life is
> defined by language.) Well, computers can use quite a few linguistic
> expressions nowadays; quite a few more than 'brick' and 'slab,' as the
> matter of fact. My computer is even capable of sending ambiguous messages
> like: "The application is not responding; you can close the window, or
> continue to wait." Is it therefore a form of life ?
>
> To sum up, I don't think that there is any kind of necessary connection
> between forms of language use and forms of life.
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
> >"to imagine a language... is to imagine a form of life." is, in my humble
> opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W. that do
> not stand to critical examination even of a superficial
> sort. Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the
> other hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
> specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
> 'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
> separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
> and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)>
>
> Unlike some commentators, I take "form of life" as a non-technical
> expression, at least in Wittgenstein's own hands: while admitting W might
> have been clearer and his compressed style can be gnomic, the expression "to
> imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" might be re-written as "to
> conceive the sense of a language is to conceive of a form of life within
> which it has that sense". It is a Kantian point:- that sense of what is
> immediate in language depends on an assumed background that is not 'given'
> by that immediate language but only against that background can immediate
> language have the sense it has.
>
> Long ago I posted how a 'slab-brick' language, which might appear to a
> language for performing tasks with 'named' objects, might turn out to be a
> language of prayer or of honour to the memory of a deceased builder - how a
> hidden background, not apparent from the immediate language used by
> speakers, might entirely change the sense of that immediate language from
> its sense in the background we assumed. For Wittgenstein this kind of
> background - the background we might check by making a 'surveyable
> representation' - is indispensable to the sense of any kind of language;
> and it is a background that can be seen as linked to a specific "form of
> life".
>
> As flowers do not have language in W's sense, it is irrelevant that they
> are a "form of life": that they are a "form of life" (without language)
> neither refutes nor proves W's contention about how the sense of language
> correlates with the "form of life" within which it is used.
>
> Nor is W suggesting the builders have a "form of life" distinct from
> other humans: on the contrary, their slab language makes sense to other
> humans because humans share a "form of life" within which referring to
> objects to perform tasks makes sense across widely different cultures and
> between widely different occupations.
>
> As far as the above goes, it seems to me W's Kantian point is on the
> right lines and is far from merely mystical. The key (as always with W) is
> that W also thinks there are "limits of language" such that we cannot
> express in language the conditions by which language has sense and we can
> only show them - but we show them only by assuming a "form of life "
> within which language has the sense it has. It is this doctrine of showing
> that is perhaps 'the mystical'.
>
> Dnl
> ldn
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 16:58, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
> "to imagine a language means is to imagine a form of life." is, in my
> humble opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W.
> that do not stand to critical examination even of a superficial
> sort. Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the
> other hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
> specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
> 'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
> separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
> and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>
>
>
>
--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
cell phone is 0762362391
*only when in Europe*:
inst. J. Nicod
29 rue d'Ulm
f-75005 paris france
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